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SU MMARY OF AR GU M E NT
The Plaintifrs are not asserting the claims made in the fifth , sixth, and seventh causes
again st the city. These causes of action are specifically reserved against the RDA.
The Plaintiffs' claims from equitable relief ari se from thr ee sources. T he Religious Land
Use and Institutionali zed Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000 ee, ("RLU IPA") RLUIP A protects
again st governments rrorn imp lementing a land use regulation that discriminates against any

\ '111

3 Jet)

church on the basis of religion or religious denomination. Or unreasonably limits religious
assemblies in a jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend these provisions of RLU IP A impose liability
without the need to have a pm1icular piece of propel1y at iss ue and that administrative remedies
need not be followed when they have not been "available [to the Mission] without discrimination
or unfair delay."
The Missions equitable claim under the Utah Constitution are properly before this court.
Notwithstanding the Mission did not appeal the 1999 decision of the Plmming and Zoning
Commission and Board Adjustments, equitable relief remains appropriate on the grounds of (1)
the M ission was not a party to the Board of Adjustments ruling, (2) thee Mission had already
challenged on constitutional grounds with a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order unconstitutional aspects of the conditional use process associated with the
Mission, (3) futility, and (4) the occun-ence of actionable events since 1999. The equal
opportunity establishment clause analysis from Snvder v. Citv o(Murrav as well as the strict
scrutiny analysis recently suggested in dicta lw f"11e Utah Supreme C0U11 Customary practi ces of
the City that are contrary to a facial reading of ord1l1Rnces also merit injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs also have brought claims under 42 U.S. c. § 1983 rai sing a facial and as applied
chall enge to va rious City ordin ances. Claims under § 1983 do not require exhaustion of
administrativ e remedies. The City's definition of place of worship and " accessory use . .. fo r
religi ous worship" requires excessive entanglement of the PZD of what constitutcs religious
worship. The use of defini tions by Salt Lake County and Brigham City so as not to require this
conflict demonstrates that the City has not used the least restrictive means to achieve its zoning

IX

objectives. For similar reasons, the City's ordinances are void because they fa il to give proper
notice to its meaning and administrators differ as to their application . FUl1hemlore, th e zoning
ad ministrator is given " unbridled discretion" in detenn ining what is a complete applicati on for a
conditional use permit.
The Plainti ffs base damage claims under § 1983 on the City's facially unconstitutional
ordinances, implementation and interpretation of the same by policy makers, and the creation of
customs upholding unlawful interpretations and applications to the Pl aintiff. The City' s of
ordinances, in and of them selves, constitute policy for which a City maybe held liable when it
does not conform with the requirements to the federal Constitution. Under City and State Law
the City Attomey and Mayor are also policy makers for the City. The City Attomey, as the
"chief legal offi cer" of the City and those who work under his direction establish poli cy through
the criminal pro secution of Pastor Wilson, allowing and reviewing with approval decis ions by
the City Admini strator, Board of Adjustments, and other related matters it has served to imped e
and limit the "religious worship" of the Mission and Pastor Wilson.
The Mayor, on the other hand, is "responsible" fo r supervising Administration and
cnforcement of all laws in the City .... and administering and exercising control of all departments
of the City. The City had a policy of di sco uraging concentration of services availab le to the
homeless in one geographical area of the City. This policy, as app li ed, brought abou t a
concel1ed effort to remove the Mission from its premi ses, favorin g the "religious worship" of
pal1icipatin g Churches working with Int erfaith. Even with a reversal of thi s policy, the present

x

administrati on has not facilitated the location of th e Mission outside a classification as a
"homeless shelter".
Certain customs and policies were created and followed by the City Plmming and Zoning
Department ("PZD"), all in violation of the constitutional rights of the Mission. Issuing letters of
administration interpretation were issued without following the mandatory requirements of the
ordinance was used to the detriment of the Mi ssion. PZD staff (1) failed to follow mandatory
ordinances and provide the Mission with the documents from the Community Council to sign,
and (2) used discretionary authority, allowed in the application for a conditional use pennit and
the Board of Adjustments appeal process to thwart rather than facilitate "religious worship" of
the Mission, and (3) interpreted clear m1d vague ordinances to impede the religious worship of
the Mi ssion while favOling the "religious worship" of other entities than the Mission .
The ongoing facially invalid standards and previous unlawful conduct "applied" to the
Mission have caused the Mi ssion and Pastor Wilson to impose "self censorship" on various
aspecs of their "religious worship" until these m atters are clarified . To the degree the facial
chall enge to the City Ordinance on establishment clause or vagueness grounds are rejected in
their facial "context", the same claim s are also rai sed "as applied" context. As "applied" the
City's practices with the Int erfaith Church constitutes improper delegation of civic authorit y to a
religiou s entity. Thi s occurs wh en the City treats the Participating Church's serv ice to the
homeless as coming within the practice and policy ofln terfaith without fUliher inspect ion, and
allowing the pm1icipating churches to circumvent the administrative inter]Jretation or conditional
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use permi t process because they are affiliated with Interfaith. This fails the third prong of the
United States Supreme Court Lemon test.
In addition there has been objective favoring of other churches and religions when
compared to how the City has treated the Mission. The Mission was subject to administration
inspections whi le other participating Churches were not. The PZD did not require Zion's
Lutheran Church to apply for or complete a substantial expansion of conditional use. None of
the participating Churches were required to obtain a condition al use permit or at least an
administrative ruling. The Mission was treated differently in terms of the City's presentation and
procedures used in front of the Board of Adjustments, than was used at the Church of the
Madeline or the Jewish Community Center. Fin ally, an admini strative exception for the
Summum religion was justified in p3li because of "free exercise of religion"; it was not apparent
at anytime the Mission "free exercise of religion" was given equal consid eration.
These examples of di sparte treatment are considered together or indi vidually of violation
of establishment clause as been demonstrating, favoring one perspective of "worship" as an
"accessory use" over other perspect ivcs of other "religious worship" does not sati sfy the
perspective of the objective observer who is familiar with the hi storical context of the
governmcnt action and the implementation of government conduct. Witlloul question, any
objective observer would understand the objections of the City actions, would to make "outsiders
of non-adherents ." While in practice the restraints imposed on the Mission may reflect a secular
intent to reign "not in my backyard" syndrome ("NIMBY"). RefelTing or favoring one religion

xii

or "the exp ression" of "religious worship" violates the establishment clause of the United States
Consti tutian.
The validity of Plai ntiffs as "applied" challenge on vagueness grounds to various aspects
of the City ' s O rdin ances can be shown by the City's interpretation of its own ord inances .. For
example, inconsistent or incomplete applications of what a "homeless shelter" was vis-a- vis a
"place of worship" occurred on December 24, I 996, December 26, 1996, May 22, 1997, Apri l
20, 1999, July 2, 1999, September 8, 2003, and either June 21,2004 or July

,2004. There

was a signifi cant difference in the perspective of different Zoning Admini strators as to the
appli cation of vari ous aspects of mandatory constraints on questions of admini strative
interpretati on, what kind of "change" in "use" from a prior propo sal justifi ed reconsideration of a
determination of a Board of Adjustments rUling. Certain words and phrases remain stand ardless
or difficult for even zoning administrators to understand. TIle interplay between "accessory use
of a pl ace of worship" and a "homeless shelter" were confusing to Randy Taylor. He was
confused how homeless services could be paJi of a church, the distin cti on between a Mission an d
a church, and a church and various social service organizations.
Because the Ci ty's conditional use ordinances have various aspects that provide zoning
administrators with "unbridled discrction" and the City does not have time constraints for most
of it s conduct, the past customary actions of the City have established a "prior restraint" on the
Mission's and Pastor Wilson ' s "free exercise ofreligion". Ordinances and customary pra ctices
that all owed for overt or dislo,'uised di scri mination against the "religious worship" of the Mission
had the effect of persecuting and oppressing the Mission and Pastor Wilson and their otherwise
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lawful rel igi ous practices. All of the foregoing subjects the City ord inances, po li cies, practices,
and customs to strict scrutiny, a standard the City cannot meet. The City's conduct cannot even
meet a heightened equal protection standard applicable to regulation of more than economic
interests.
Damages allowed under § 1983 against a City are either nominal or compensatory. John
Ravarino's testimony was limited in scope and its duration. Nonetheless, compensatory damages
for non-econom ic damages are recoverable fo r both the Mission and Pastor Wil son. Even if the
Mi ss ion fails in its proof of recoverable damages, it would still be entitled to nominal damages.
Based on all of the foregoing, the City's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
I.

DISPUTED AND OMITTED FACTS

Pursuant to UTAH R. CIY. P. 7(c)(3)(B) , the Plaintiffs are choosing to contest various of
the facts listed by the Ci ty as undi sputed as well as providing a separate statement of
additional facts in dispute that are not raised by the opposing party.

A.

I.

Disputed Facts Claimed By the City

Pl aintiffs are persons affiliated with the Salt Lake City Mission (herei nafter

" Pl aintiffs" or the "Mi ssio n"), a nondenominational religious

b~·OUP

who provide service

primarily to the homeless and impoveri shed. (Deposition Exhibit 78; Appendix Exhibit 14; Salt
Lake City Mi ssion web page, Appendix Exh ibit A.)
Disputed Fact #1:

As a biblically based, Chri stian church, the Missi on provides both

"religious" and related "services" to the homeless and others in the City. (City's Answer to

XIV

Second Amended Complaint

'\I 9 at 2.) (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 19:1-15, Appendix

Exhibit 1.)
The Church's reli gious mini stries and services [provide hope] to the homeless and
other persons in the City in need of the blessings and assurances avai lable from
the teachings of the gospel of Jesus Christ. The focal point of the church's
ministries are suggested by the Biblical standard the "[e]ven as ye have done it
it unto me." The Church's
unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done
mission of saving souls has allowed many who suffer life-control ling problems
and overwhelming cares of the world to overcome these temporal challenges by
relying on the spiritual strength avai lable to those becoming a long-term disciple
of Jesus Christ.I
The Mission is different from other organizations such as th e United Way and the
American Red Cross that also provide services to the needy but are neither biblicall y based nor
founded on Christian principles. (Deposition of 101m Ravarino, 108:21-24, Appendix Exhibi t 2)
The Mission believes when it follows these principles it is acting for God. (Deposition of Wayne
Wilson,325:

7.

,Appendix Exhibit I.)

The Mission filed a claim for relocation expenses against the RDA.

The

Mi ss ion never filed any claim for relocation expenses against the City. (Deposition Exhibits
19, 26.)

Di sputed Fact #7:

The Mission's claim for relocation expenses under the federal

Un ifoll11 Relocation Assistance Act was justifiably filed with the City on April 9, 200 1.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Missi on is withdrawing its claim for relocation
expenses under the federa l URA against the City. All claims for the same are reserved as

1
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against Defendant Salt Lake City Redevel opment Agency.

Any damages regarding

relocation are not waived as they pertain to the remain ing constitutional claims.
The Mis sion also concedes that it filed no proof of claim under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. § 63 -30-11 (1999).
8.

On several occasions, the Mission inquired about various possibilities for the

relocation of its facility and was informed as to the process that would be required for such
an application. (Deposition Exhibits 2 & 11.)
Disputed Fact #8:

The Mission asserts it either was not properly infonned or was

informed of a process that, as app lied, discriminated against the Mi ssion. See Legal Analysis,
Part ll T. B.2; and C, 80-82, inji-a, and attendant deposition"
9.

"

The City also provided the Mis sion with blank application fonns . (Deposition

Exhibits 63 & 64.)
Disputed Fact #9 :

At no time did the City provide the document that the Community

Council was to sign for the Mission to return to the PZD after the Community COllll ci l
presentation was made. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 249:24-250: 2, Append ix Exhibit I .)
The

~mpression

given to Pastor Wilson that approval was required rather than merely

prcscntation was never clarifi ed by the PD Z.

The appearance of representatives from the

Mayor's office and poli ce departmen t at various Community Council meetings su pport cd
Pasto r Wi Ison's understand ing. (See Omitted Facts ## 119, 122, 129, 134, 135, it?Fa)
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10.

On at least two occasions, pursu ant to infoI1l1ation provided by the Mi ssion,

the City has issued an administrative interpretat ion regarding the Mi ssion's proposed
acti vities. (Deposition Exhibits 2 & 28.)
Disputed Fact # 10:

The Mission admits two letters dated Apri l 20, 1999, and

September 14, 1999, labeled as an Administrative Interpretation that were issu ed to the Mi ssion.
The Mission denies that the letters were issued according to the requirements of City ordinances.

(See Omitted Facts ## 81,84, inJi'a.)
11.

The Mission proposed to move into a building located at 580 West 300 South.

That building was located in zone 03. Based on the description of the uses of the building, the
City detenllined that the Mission would be a Place of Worship, which was a permitted use in that
zone, and a Homeless Shelter, which was a conditi onal use. (Deposition Exhibit 2.)
Di sputed Fact # 11:

The April 20, 1999, letter speaks for itself. The factual and legal

infillllities of that letter are detailed in (See Omitted Facts ## 90, 93, 94, 99, 100, 102, in/i"a;
Legal Analysis, Part, VI A. 8, pagel 07, inJi'a.)
13.

A pennitted use is one that is allowed merely by filing for a permit and meeting

appli cable City codes. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey,
Disputed Fact #13:

'13)

The Mi ssion was not allowed to secure a pennit for a church in the

D-3 Zone for the Cohen Building when it was entitled to one. (See Omitted Facts # 101,

inJi'a; ~

A

conditional use is determined by tile Pl anni ng Commission after consideration of an application,
staff report, and a fter a public hearing where the applicant can speak and the community can
speak.
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A conditional use is a use which has potential ad verse impacts upon the
immediate neighborhood and the city as a whole. It requires a careful review of
its location, desi gn, configuration and special impact to detennine the desirability
of allowing it on a particular site. Whether it is appropriate in a particular
location requires a weighing, in each case, of the public need and benefit against
the local impact, taking into account the applicant 's proposals for ameliorating
any adverse impacts through special site planning, development techniques and
contributions to the provisi on of public improvements, rights of way and servi ces.
Any applicant who seeks a conditional use pennit must appear before the affected
neighborhood's community council. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, -,r 4)
Di sputed Fact # 14:

The City's Planning and Zoning Dep artment ("PZD") and the

City Attorney's office applied this to the Mission as a pre-condition to accepting a
conditional use appli cation. (See Omitted Facts, # 116, infra.) Thi s was applied differently
to the Mi ssion than in certain cases to other churches and applicants. (See Omitted Facts, #
118, infra.)

14.

Purs uant to City ordinan ces, the Mission was required to present its propo sa l

for a co nditi onal use pennit to the local Community Coun cil to obtain non-binding input and
r eco mmendati ons. (19.. and Deposition Exhibit 76.)
Di sputed Fact #15:

The PZD and th e City Attorney's offi ce applied this to the

Mission as a pre-condition to accepting a condit ional lise application. (See Omitted Facts
## 5, 7, 116, 122, infra.) This was appli ed differently to th e Mission th an in cert ain cases to
other churches and applican ts. (See Omitted Facts, # 118 , infra.)
16.

Al l other app li cants for a place of wo rship have been required to comply with

thi s process. (City Do cument 327 , Appendix Exhibi t H.)
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Di sputed Fact #16 :

Zion's Lutheran Church, the Salva ti on Anny, and Parti ci pating

Churches with the Salt Lake In terfaith Hospitality Network ("Interfaith") were not required
to m eet these req uirements for conditi onal use pen n its. (See Omitted Facts ## 88, 11 8, 132,

infra.)
19.

Places of worship are allowed in Sal t Lake City as a matter of right in the

foll owing zones: Commercial CB, CC, CS, CSHBD, CO; Downtown D-l , D-2, D-3, D-4;
Gateway OMU; and Special Purpose RP, BP, I, UI, MU. These zones comprise approximately
10. 8% of the area of Salt Lake City (without including the City Creek area). (Affidavit of Cheri
Coffey,

~

6.)

Disputed Fact #19:

The City needs to clarify what was applicable in 1999 and at

present, 2006, and the percentage of areas of the City covered at each time .
20.

Places of Worship are also all owed as a conditional use in all residential zones, in

th e Neighborh ood Commercial zone (CN) and in the Light Industri al Zone (M-l). (Affidavit of
Cheri Coffey,

~

7.)

Di spu ted Fact #20:

The City needs to clarify what was applicable in 1999 and at

present, 2006 and approximately the percentage of the area of Salt Lake City that this area
compri ses at each time.
21.

Under Salt Lake Ci ty ordinances, a homeless shelter is classifi ed as a building or

portion thereof in which sleeping accommodations are provided on an emergency basis for the
temporarily homeless. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 8: 12-23; 34:23-24 .3. Appendix Exhibit 5.)
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Disputed Fact #2 1:

This is the definition of "homeless shelter" in the City Code that

exi sted in 1999 and presently ex ists. As applied, however, alternate definitions have been used
by reason of treating con duct that could be classified as a homeless shelter as an "accessory use
. for religi ous worsh ip. " (See Omitted Facts # I , inji-a.)
22.

Homeless Shelters are allowed as a cond itional use in the D-3 and the CG zoning

di stri cts. Salt Lake City has not prohibited the location of homeless shelt ers in the City. The
City has several operating homeless shelters. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, '1l 8. )
Di sputed Fact #22:

The City needs to clarify that the City's classification of homel ess

shelters as a conditional use was in effect in 1999 and remains the same in 2006. (See Omitted
Facts ## 1,2, 12, in/i"a.) The City claimed in its answer to Interrogatory # 8 (of the set answered
October 7,2005) that it did not "keep track of homeless shelters" (Appendix Exhibit 4.) (The
intent of the request was to include, in pali, the li sting of all current lo cations classified as a
"homeless shelter. ") The City's designated witnesses not only had no knowledge of the
identificati on of a homeless shelter by admini strative rule from 1995-2005 (Deposition of Ch eri
Coffey 38: 12-16, Appendix Exhibit 4), but only one, the Road Home, was id entified. (Deposition
of Brent Wilde 51 :23-52:9, Appendix Exhibit 3.) Notw ithstanding the fore going, Paragraph 10
of the Affidavi t of Cheri Coffey refers to City regu la tion of "all homeless shelters."

The

Mission's Final Set of Di scovery to the City defin ed three "homeless shelters" as being the three
ent ities id entifi ed in the RDA Depot Di stri ct Dcvelopment Plan, e.g.

Travelers Aid Socicty

(now, The Road Home), St. Vincent de Paul Center, and Salvation Army Thrift Shop an d
Kitchen. (Appendix Exhib it 17.) The City'S response indicated there had been thirty thousand
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(30,000) call s to the police or appearances made by the police at these three "homeless shelters"
in the City. (Appendix Exhib it 8, at 4.) If the City regulates these three and/or others, the City
should be required to identify the same.
23.

At one time, City policy di scouraged the concentration of homeless shelters,

substance abuse treatment centers and similar uses in the Downtown and Gateway area (the so
called "moratorium"). However, the policy did not forbid such uses, provided that an applicant
or the Mi ssion applied for a conditional use permit.

(Deposition Exhibits 2, 49 , 88, and

Deposition of Randy Taylor, page 37.)
Disputed Fact #23:

As to homeless shelters, the City had such a policy in place at least

as earl y as 1997 (see Affidavit of Matthew Hilton, March 16, 2006,

~ _,

Appendix Exhibit II.)

and ind epend ent of the 1999 moratorium. On Janu ary 12, 1999, and again on February 10, 1999,
the City adopted moratoria that prohibited the expansion of vatious types of treatment facilities
as a principal or accessory use in any commercial downtown or Gateway di strict. (D epositi on
Exhibit 88 ; Appendix Exhibit 18; Appendix Exhibit 19.) Even though the m oratori a did not
address homel ess shelters as a separate classificati on, it was understood that the purpose of the
moratoria was to stop the growth of homel ess s11elters. (Depositi on of Randy Ta ylor, _

:_ ,

Append ix Ex hibit 5; Deposi ti on of Brent Wilde _ :_ , Appendix Exhibit 3.) On April 29, 1999,
the Mi ssion had fil ed liti gat ion chall engin g the reasons for the moratOli a and asserted the
violati on of its own constitutional ri ghts and th ose of oth ers .' Because of pending liti gation, the
real purpose of the moratoria was not discl osed by the staff of the PZD to those citizens they

2

See Sal! Lake City's rvlemora nduJ11 to Di smi ss Second Amended Compla int, dated _ _ _ , App endix Exhi bit 20.

XXI

..

worked with. (Deposition Exhibit #
_

; Appendix Exhibit 20; Deposition of Randy T aylor

:

; Appendix Exhibit 5.) On June _ , 1999, the City Council adop ted Reso lution _ _ _

whi ch mad e the provisions of the moratoria part of the City Code. (D eposition Exhibit 88,
Appendix Ex hibit 18.)
Before and after the adopti on of the moratOJia as City Code, the Cohen property that the
Mi ssion desi red to locate on was in the D-3 zone and included in the area to whi ch the moratoria
appl ied . (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 47:24 - 50:21, Appendix Exhibit 3.) Had the Mi ssion been
understood to be only a church (or "place of worship") by the PZ D, the Mi ssion would have
qualified for a building pennit as a pennitted use. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, _ -_ , Appendix
Exhibit 3; Depositi on of Randy Taylor, _ -_ , Appendix Exhibit 5; Affidavit of Cheri Coffey,
Appendix Exhibit 10.)
Nonetheless, on April 20, 1999, Randy Taylor issued an unrequested "admini strative
interpretation" letter that found the Mission's use at the Cohen location constituted penni tted
uses of a " place of worship,"

a "charity dinin g hall" and "social servi ce organizati on," and

conditi onal uses of a "homeless shelter" and two of several types of "treatment facilit[iesJ ,"
whi ch required licensure by the state. (Depositi on Exhibit 2; -_ , Appendix Ex hibit IS. See
definit ions beyond Exhi bit 90, # 1 Omitted facts)
On Apri l 19, 1999, the State Depmi ment of Human Services, Di vision of Li censi ng,
notified the Mission that it was not subject to licensure. (Deposit ion Exhibi t

Appendix

Exh ibit 16.) On April 2 1, 1999, th e Mission sen t by facsimile a copy of the letter from the
Division of Licensing to the PDZ and Mayor Corrad ini. (Affidavit of Philip Arena,
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9,

Appendix Exhibit 9.) Notwi thstanding the foregoing, on Aplil 21, 1999, Brent Wilde, Deputy
Pl anning Director of the PZD, debated with Philip Arena of the Mission and claimed that all of
the uses identifi ed in the Apri l 20, 1999, letter wou ld be appl icable to the Mission at the Cohen
Property. (Deposition of Philip Arena _ :_, Appendix Exhibit 6; Affidavit of Ph ilip Arena

~

20;

Appendix Exhibit 9.)
In the April 20, 1999, administrative interpretation letter, city poli cy favoring the
decentralizatio n of services for the homeless was used as a basis to notify the Mission that PDZ
staff would not be able to make a positive recommendation were the Mission to submit an
appli cation for a conditional use pennit regarding the Cohen property. (Depositi on Exhibit 2;
Appendix

Exhibit

15 .)

Because

the

Pl alming

Commission

"usuall y"

follows

the

recommendation of the staff, (Deposition of Cheri Coffey _ _, Appendix Exhib it 4), or does so
eighty-fi ve to ninety percent (85% - 90%) of the time, (Depositi on of Randy Tayl or 44:3- 10,
Appendix Exhibit 5) the "unwritten" but impl emented City poli cy, aJUlounced in advance, of
decentralization of services to the homeless would guarantee a negative reco mm endation by the
staff regarding the proposed condi ti onal use and would al so result in a rejection of the proposal
by the Planning Commission.

See Omitted Facts ## 104, 147, inji-a . The Mission's li mited

budget and other time constra ints would not allow investmcnt in an effort to secure a building
PC1l11 it

for a build ing for which the City had vo lunteered such an openly hostile assessment.

(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson

'1'126, 28, 34, Appendix

Exh ibit 12.)

Indeed, the unsolicited and

unexplained offer to provide assistance to the Mi ssion to relocate in the County (in stead of
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remain in the City), Deposition of Randy Taylor

, Deposition Exhibit 5) made the Mi ssion 's

eff'0I1 to stay seem futile from the outset. (Appendix Exhibit 15)
24.

Salt Lake City has regulated all homeless shelters, regardless of their ownership

or affiliation. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey,
Di sputed Fact #24:

~

10.)

Salt Lake City has not regulated the Participating Churches whose

conduct also meets the stated definition of homeless shellers as it has been applied to the
Mission. See Omitted Facts ## 26-29, 34-42, 47, inji-o.

Furthermore, the City has failed to

disclose the location of the homeless shelters. See Disputed Fact #
25.

, supra.

The regulation of homeless shelters is motivated by wholly secular concerns, not

religious concems. (Deposition Exhibits 49,88.)
Di sputed Fact #2 5:

The fact that the City has used "accessory use of ... religious

worship" to allow Pmiicipating Churches to circumvent both the community council prcapplication involvement, the conditional use application process, and administrative regulati on
issues associated with providing shelter or other care for the homeless, invol ves more than
"wholly secu lar concerns." See Disputed Faets #____ infi'a; Omitted Facts ##26- 28, 34, 35,

4 1-43, infi·a.

28 .

In gencral Places of Worship in.h erently involve large numbers of people

congregat in g together with the attendant noise and traffic. Such a use has the potential to have
more negative impacts on residential neighborhoods and fewer impa cts in the zones whcre
Pl aces of Worship are permitted as a matter of right. Thus, in many areas Places of Worship are

..----
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a cond itional use to allow the specifi c fact based determinati on of wh ether they are appropriate
for that area, particularly residenti al areas. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey,
Disputed Fact #28:

'1 9)

Thi s City ordinan ce was not in place pri or to April 12, 199 5, when

the Participating Churches with Interfaith were originally built.

See Omitted Facts #2, infra.

Interfaith was not fonnally operating until 1997. See Omitted Facts #36, infra. Building pern1its
have been issued to _ _ _ of seven parti cipating Interfaith churches for remodeling since 199 5.
(Affidavit of Matthew Hilton

~

, Appendix Exhibit 11.) Issuan ce ofa pennit means the property

and uses were in confonnance with the City Code. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, _:_, Appendix
3.) Without an admini strative ruling or securing a conditi onal use pennit, the untracked and
unacknow ledged Particip ating Churches with Interfaith have received sLib siiento the benefit of a
new (and surely not customary as to that church 's pre-1 995 conduct and worship, as required by
the City Code's definition of "accessory use") "accessory use ... for reli gious worship" that
expands a "grandfathered" conditional use without requiring the detailed req uirements and
procedures to which the Mission has been subject.
29.

Pl aintiffs appl ied for and were heard regarding a cond itio nal use of the Rosewood

Terrace propeliy where they wished to locate thcir Pl ace of Worship. (Deposition Exhibits 48,
84, an d Affidavit of Cheri Coffey,
Disputed Fact #29:

~

14 and the attachm ents thereto .)

The Mission was heard but in a manner that depri ved it of due

process of law and other concems outlined in its Motion for a temporary restraining order,
including (1) use of the vote taken by the State Fair Park Community Counci l, (2) comparison of
police calls to other churches with that of the Mission, (3) use of present internet speech site to
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define future conduct, contrary to the application (see Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order, October 6, 1999, page 2) and (4) requiring the appearance before th e Commiss ion when a
secular boarding house would not have been required to appear. (Deposition Exhibit # 47;
Appendix # 20; Deposition of Randy Taylor

,Append ix 5; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton

~ _,

Appendix Exhibit 11.)
The discretionary failure to notify the Mission that the cancellation of the Fairpark
Community Council meeting did not prevent the filing of and beginn ing the application process
(Deposition Exhibit 51; Appendix Exhibit 21; Deposition of Cheri Coffey _ :_, Appendix
Exhibit 4) also damaged the Mission to the degree that the earlier initiation of the application
process would have allowed both the PZD to take additional time to evaluate evidence it had
received and allow time for the Mission to respond to and resolve with the City the pending legal
and factua l disputes regarding both the nature of the content of the staff repOJi to the
Commission as well as even the need to appear be fore the Commission. (Affidavit of Wayne
Wilson , ,35, Appendix Exhibit 12.)
30.

On October 7, 1999, the City Planning Commission denied the Mi ss ion's

applicat ion for a conditiona l use permit to relocate its facility to the Ro sewo od Terra ce
Building.

Pl aintiffs were not granted a co nditional use at Rosewood Terrace because of the

impact on the neighborhood and the inability to mitigate that impact. The Planning Commission
determined that the neighborhood was too fragile to supp0I1 the activities propo sed by the
Missi on.

The Commission determined that there were likely to be heavy impacts on the

nei ghborhood from this proposed use. The Mi ssion plan was to have 25 -3 0 residents on a semi-
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permanent basis in a boarding house at the site as well as to bus in up to 200 of the "homelesspoor" at various tim es during the day for a variety of counseling, rehabilitation services, religious
devotionals and chapel services. While it was felt that the Mission could control what went on in
its building, it was detennined that it likely would not be able to control what went on outside.
This was b ased on objective evidence. In its prior location the Mission had a history of at least
58 police calls per year and as high as 122 calls per year. It was stated by plaintiffs that the
Mission would be perfonning similar activities in the Rosewood Terrace location so it was
rationally detennined that the Mission would bring with it this higher need for police
intervention. This was of particular concern to the neighborhood surrounding Rosewood Terrace
because they were trying to recover from activities which had required police in the past. The
neighborhood included the Guadalupe neighborhood and the Fairpark community.

Both

communities were working on reviving from previous times of drug houses and high crime. The
goal was to establ ish safe, stable and cohesive neighborhoods for which progress was being
made. 1t was determined that the impact of the Mission would reverse that progress. Thus, the
Planning Commission concluded that the need for the conditional use did not outweigh the
potential impact on the community and it would not be possible to mitigate the detrimental
impact that the Mi ssion would impose upon that fragile neighborhood. (Salt Lake City Pl anning
Commi ssi on Staff Report attached to the Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, and Deposition Exhibits 79
& 84.)

Disputed Fact #3 0:

The Mi ssion does not di spute that the Planning Commission
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denied the request.

The minutes do not reflect the comments by counsel for the Mission

objecting to being required to be there in the first place. (A ffida vit of Matthew Hilto n

~

_;

Appendi x Exhibit II.) Th e Mission does dispute that the Planning Commiss ion made find ings of
fact as required by City ordin ance (Appendix Exhibit 23) or adopted the findings of the staff
report (Deposi ti on Exhibit 84, Appendix Exhibit 22). Based on the foregoing, while th e City
may point to what coul d have been "substantial evid ence" in the record, the Commission failed
to ind icate it relied on the sam e.
31.

In Sept ember 1999, the Community Council filed an appea l chall engin g th e

City's admini strative class ifi catio n of the Mission 's propo sed activi ties. (Depositi on Exhibit
55.)
Di sput ed Fact #3 1:

On October 4, 1999, th e P ZD assisted the Chai nnan of the

Fairp ark Community Council to file an appeal challenging the administrative class ification
of the Mission as a "place of worship."
Omitted Facts ##
32.

(See Deposition Exhibit 55; Appendix Exhib it 25 ;

, inFa.)

In conn ection with that appeal, the Mission received notice of, had the

opportunity and, in fact, did present ev id ence at the B oard o f Adjustmcnt hearing.
(Depos itio n Exhibits 8 1 & 42 .)
Di sput ed Fact #3 2:

As any o ther ci ti zen, the Pl ainti ffs h ad the right to appe ar and

pr esent evidence fo r the Board 's considerati on. The Boa rd of Adjustmcnts also received
irrelevant, negative infoml alion regarding the Mission at its Central C1u·istian Church location,

XX VIII

evidence that was promoted by City employees. See Omitted Fact ##13 4-135, irifi-a. Pro viding
information is not outcome detemlinative.
The notice sent to th e Mission regarding the Board of Adjustments hearing included
notice of the hearing, but not the staff report prepared by the City's staff for the Board of
Adjustments. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 80:5-22, Appendix Exhibit 3.) The staff report by
Merrill Nelson framed the issues for the defense of the appeal. (Deposition Exhibit _ ;
Appendix Exhibit 26) The framing of the issues raised with the Board of Adjustments after an
appeal has been made that places the Zoning Administrator in the position of defending that
position mayor may not include consultation with the original entity or person who received the
administrative deci sion. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 23:4-23, Appendix Exhibit 3.) The Mission
was not consulted by the PZD regarding the framing of the issues on the appeal. (Affidavit of
Wayne Wil son

'1'143-45, Appendix Exhibit 12).

How the City framed the issues for resolu tion by the Board of Adjustments could wel l
have become outcome determin ative of tIle result of the appeal. For example, the Board of
Adjustments did not address Randy Taylor's classification of the Mis sion's proposed
"missionary training program" use as a "board ing house." However, the Board did find that
the previous non- co nforming use of the property continued as a non-conforming use.
Furtherm ore, if the Mi ssion was really not a church as the Fairpark Community
Council claimed, then the portion of the appli cation relevant to the non- conforming use
would have been considered to be secu lar. If secular, a continuation of a non-conforming use
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could be applied and a building pemlit issued to the Mission without a conditional use pemlit
hearing.
In add ition, the Board of Adjustments found the Mission to be a church or "place of
worship." Had the City's pra ctices regarding "accessory use" and the Participating Churches
with Interfaith been disc losed to the Board by the City sta ff and/ or cou nsel, an obvious
excepti on in practice to what by ordinance was defined as "a homel ess shelter" would have
been evident.

(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson

~

44, Appendix Exhibit 12). Considering the

naITow limitations Randy Taylor had placed on the Church's protecting the "homeless" only
overnight when in "life threatening" situations, and limiting the Mission's advertising of the
new lo ca ti on, the Board of Adjustments could well have detennined the proposed "use"
similarly constituted an "accessory use" of a church rather than a "homeless shelter." See
Omitted Fa cts ##

, inji-a.

In addition, the City did not notifY the Mission of (1) the appellant's October 27,1999,
request to postpone the November 15, 1999, hearing (City 434; Appendix Exhibit 27), nor (2)
the opt ion to appeal the Board of Adjustments rul ing within thirty (30) da ys after the
decision was made (Affidavit of Wayne Wil son,
Matthew Hilton

~

'143,

Appendix Exhibit 12; Affidavit of

,A ppendix Exhibit I I ; Deposition Exhibit #

~

In additi on, counsel

for the Mi ssio n received a copy of the minutes of the November 15, 1999, meeting after th e
time for appeal had run. (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton

~

,Append ix Exhibit II.)

As to why the Mission was not a pm1y to the appeal, see Legal Analysis, Pal1 III A2,
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33.

In November 1999, the Board of Adjustment held that the Mission's proposed

activities constituted a place of worship and a homeless shelter. (Deposition Exhibit 42.)
The Mission disputes that it was a party to the appeal or bound by

Disputed Fact #33:

the ruling. See Legal Analysis Part III A 2, infra.

Because the City failed to follow its own

mandatory ordinances regarding the issuance of an administrative interpretation, the letter issued
September 14, 1999, was void as a denial of due process, leaving the Board without jurisdiction
to hear the appeal.
34.

Pl ain tiffs did not timely appeal the Planning Commission's denial of the

conditional use for the Rosewood Terrace location although they could have by appealing to the
Land Use Appeals Board.
(Affidavit of Cheri Coffey,
Disputed Fact #34 :

After that the matter could have been appealed to the courts.
~

II.)
The Mission admits it did not appeal to the Land Use Appeals

Board. To have clone so would have been futile for reasons cited in Legal Ana lysis, part III A 2
b, infra. Exhaustion of remedies is not required by 42 U.S.c. § 1983. The Mission does not
concede that it did not timely raise iss ues regarding the staff report of the Commission in
sta te district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 before the Commission hearing on October 7,
1999
35.

The Mission did not file a timely appeal of the decision of tlle Planning

Commission or the Board of Adjustment. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, ' 111)
Disputed Fact #35:

The Mission admi ts it did not appeal the decision of the

Planning Commission to the Land Use Appeals Board. This is not relevant under 42 U.S.c.
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§ 19 83 . The Mission does not co ncede that it did not timely rai se issues regarding th e same
in sta te di strict court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
36.
locations.

Pl ainti ffs had notice of and co uld have used the cond iti onal use process for other
Although the Mi ss ion made several inqui ries to th e City, it only filed one

application with the City, seeking to relocate its facilities to the Ro sewood Terrace Building
lo ca ted at 158 North 600 West. (Depo sition Exhib its 63, 64, Affidavit of Clleri Coffey,

~

IS.)

Di sput ed Fact #36:

Plaintiffs co ntest the adequacy of th e notice they recei ved

regarding the conditional use process , see Omitted Facts # _ _, inji-a; Legal Analysis, Part
_, pages _

- ._ ' infi'a , as well as its app li cation to the Mi ssion in an unlawfu l manner, see

Omitted Facts # _ _, inji-a; Legal Analysis, Part _, pages _
38.

- _ , il'zji'a.

Plaintiffs ha ve not been fl agged in Salt Lake City computers as being target ed fo r

ex tra scrutiny, it is not possible to flag persons or associations, only propeJiies can be fl agged.
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 18:1 8-19:2; Depos iti on of Roger Ev ans, 7:13-8:1, A ppendix
Exhibits D and E.)
Disputcd Fact #38 :

City staff gav e instructions to flag the computer. (See Deposition

Exhibit 12; Appendix Exhibit ) While witnesses may not recall the breadth of the "fl ag" written
relative to the Mission's inquiry about the Andrews Avenue property, arising aft er October 26,
1998 , staff at the permit counter kllew on June 25, 1999, th at the Mission cou ld not obtai n a
penn it on the Cohen propeJ1y without clearance from Rand y Taylor, Zon in g Administrator. (See
Deposition Exhib it _ _ ; Deposition of Randy Taylor 18: 15-20:4, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
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39.

Plaintiffs' propo sal for the Rosewood Terrace building was, in part, a Place of

Worship for peopl e who did not live in that neighborhood, plaintiffs stated that they would be
busing in most of the users of the building. (Depositi on Exhibit 78.)
Di sputed Fa ct #39 :

The City ordinances do not restrict members of a congregation

from onl y being within a certain radius of the church. Pl aintiffs do not kn ow what is meant by a
"user" of the building but do not di spute homel ess persons would be bused in for meals and/or
religious counselin g.
40.

Ultimately, Plaintiffs relocated their Pl ace of Worship, and carried out their

proposed activities in conformity with their religious beliefs, in the Central Christian Church
located at 370 East 300 South in Salt Lake City.

(Deposition of Wayne Wilson, page 267,

Appendix Exhibit 1.)
Di sputed Fact #40:

The Mi ssion was unable to carryon its own worship services at the

new location. (D epositi on of W ayne Wil son, 170:20-25; 175:5 ,6, Appendix Exhibit 1).
Notably, however, th e Mission, staff, and volunteers were able to provide emergency overnigh t
temporary hou sing for the homeless at the Central Ciu'istian Church at thi s site. (See Omitted
Fact # _ _ ; A ffid avit of Wayne Wilson

'148, Appendix Exhibit

12 ; Affidavit of Phil Arena '1

, Appendix Exhibi t 9.)
41.

The zoning ordin ances and tll eir regulation of temporary housing for the homeless

have a secular PUlvose, to limit the impact on neighborhoods to a reasonable level. (Affid avit of
Cheri Coffey, ' 112.)
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Disputed Fact #41:

The Pl aintiffs challenge thi s statement in that ( I) the City has

fai led to keep track of (m uch less regulate) the Participating Churches with Interfaith (Deposition
Exhib it, Appendix Exhibit _ _ and (2) whether or not allowing as applied use through the
City ' s definiti on of "accessory use .. . of rel igious worship" qualifies as a secu lar purpose. See
Legal Analysis, part _ _ _ _ _ , inji-a.
42.

Several Sa lt Lake area church es participate in the Interfa ith Hosp itality

Network. (Deposition Exhibit 32.)
Disputed Fact #42:

For a li stin g of tho se that host fami li es, see Omitted Fa ct #

infra. Other churches in Salt Lake City also participate. (See _ _ ; Appendix Exhibit 28.)

43.

Tho se In terfaith Hospitality churches operate within certain guidelines.

Pursuant to those guidelines, each church may house a maximum of 4-6 homeless fam il ies (a
maximum of 16-20 persons) for one week, four or fi ve tim es a year on a rotating schedule.

(l d.)
Dis puted Fact #43:

T he Mission acknowledges that th is is the stand ard recited by

Interfaith as exi sting in 2003. It is not obvious that the same stand ard h as always existed,
e.g. six (6) churches rotating th irty-six (36) families during 1997 would have requ ired more
th an fou r or five tim es a yea r. (Depositio n Exhibit 32; Appendix Exhib it 29.) Th e Mission
also observes that there are no in spection enforcemen t reco rds from the Ci ty/Coun ty Health
Department or the City that shows any in spectio n or confirmation of the stated levels of
temporary serv ice were not exceeded or that the safety of the churches for overn igh t guests is
maintained. (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ,, _ , Appendix Exhib it 11.)
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44 .

The City is wi llin g to allow the Mi ss ion or any other church to operate

according to these same Interfaith Hospitality guidelin es. (City Response to Request for
Admission No.9, Appendix Exhibit 6.)
Disputed Fact #4 4:

The City 's bel ated proffer of pseudo-equality

IS

objectionable

for several reasons.
First, The Mission b eli eves that being required to restri ct and redefine its religious
mi ssion to fit within secular categories of "use" that do not reflect its biblically based Mi ssion is
an affront to God . (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 325: Appendix Exhibi t 1)
Second, the City is willing to offer a standard to the Mission if the M ission will apply for
it with the City when no Participating Church wi th Interfaith either (1) has been required to
individually apply for the same, or (2) be subj ect to City regulation regarding the same.
(Appendix Exhibit 8, Answers to InteITogatories

, at

.)

Third, whi le perhaps based on "logical" assumptions, (Deposi ti o n of Brent Wilde _ _,
Appendix Exhibit 3.) the City's ad hoc determinati ons of what constitutes acceptab le amounts of
the "religious worship" o f a church by offering to allow the Mi ssion to conform to the In terfaith
"stand ard" ignores key aspects ofthe perspective as to thei r mi ssion s as a fun cti on of "religious
worship" that add ress issues beyond numbers of people assisted and duration of stay.
Interfaith and its Particip atin g Chu rches serving the homeless "share ou r fa ith by actio n,
not by words, bringing hope to those without." (Depos iti on Exh ibit 32, Appendix Exhibi t 1)
The Mission's religious convictions also illustrate that "faith without works is dead," (James
2: 17), and offers a different perspective on what it means to "feed Jesus [and] clothe Jesus,"
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(Depos iti on of Wayne Wilson, 292: 12-1 5; 294:3-1 1; 303:23-225; 304:8-13, Appendix Exhibit
I), believing "[eJven as ye have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto
me." (See Matthew 25: 40.)'
T he Interfaith guidelines operate not onl y in terms of numbers of homeless sheltered,
and the duration of the stay, but also as to who is served. Interfaith only serves single or
two-paren t fam ili es with children. The Mission serves families and individuals. Interfaith
wi ll not serve th ose wi th ad di ctions; the Mission will. In terfaith impli citly is understood to
work only with residents of the City and Salt Lak e Vall ey. (Depos itio n Exhibit 32; Appendix
Exhibit

).

The Mission serves local residents and those who are transient; taking the

b ibl ical injunction "least of these, my brethren" quite literally. The Miss ion wi ll not turn
away a home less person in a life-threatening position (twenty degrees (20°) or below
outside) wh en there are no other available opti ons in the City; Interfaith has no provision fo r
such assistance.
In addition, the Mi ssion also has strongly resisted efforts to use governmen t funding
[or soc ial service providers. (Affidavit of Wayne WilSOll

'154, Appendix Exhibi t 12.)

Pastor

Wi lso n is of the understanding that Int erfaith accepts government ['unding to ass ist it in
fuliilling its co mmendable efforts with the homeless. To imply or require affi liat ion with an
enti ty that serves God and the homeless with Caesar rather tha n separating the two is not pa rt
of the Ch r istian mission of the Missio n. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson

12.)

'Verified Complaint, September 8, 1999, ~ 8.
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54, Appendix Exhibit

The Miss ion does not facially object to operating within limits declared applicable to
certain uses and properties by fire, health, and related authorities as well as objective,
definitive criteria articulated in City zoning regulations that are equally applied. (Deposition
of Wayne Wilson, 482:21-24; Appendix Exhibit 1.)
45.

The Mission has acknowledged that it does not intend to operate its activities

within those Interfaith Hospitality guidelines.
Appendix Exhibit

(Deposition of Wayne Wilson, pp. 390-95;

.)

Di sputed Fact #45:

The Interfaith guidelines regulate far more than objective

criteria as to the number of overnight homeless sheltered, the duration of the assistance, and
who are "acceptable" homeless. See and incorporate response as Di sputed Fact # 43, supra.
47.

Virtually all of the events described in the Mission's Second Amended

Complaint occurred before September 2000. (Second Amended Complaint,
Di sputed Fact #47:

~~

9-88. )

Many of the challenges confro ntin g the Mission have been

ongoIl1g. See Mi ssion's Answers to Interrogatories, Deposition Ex hibit ___" Appendix
Exhibit

. The challenges faced by the Mi ss ion during Mayor Corradin i's administration

have resurfaced and remain unrcsolved during Mayo r Rocky An derson's administration after
the Mission left the Central Ch ristian Church in June 30, 2002, through the present.
Contrary to the City's claims in Interrogato ry responses, meetings and interchanges
with City staff including Mayor Anderson occurred on May 3, 2001, June 23, 2003, June 21,
2004, and July 19, 2004. Meetings with counsel and/or ranking staff of the PZD attended as
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noted in 2003 and 2004 as well as occurred on September 8, 2003.
Wilson

~~

48.

(Affi da vi t of Wayne

56, 69, Appendix Exhibit 12 .)
Plaintiffs have designated accountant John Ra varino as th eir spokesman on

damages. (Deposition of John Ra vari no, 209: 16-21 0:8 , Appendix Exhibit 2.)
Di sputed Fact #48: John Ravarino was designated as an expert witn ess for the Plaintiffs.'
[n the Miss ion 's response to discovery from the RDA, dated April 8,2005, the testimony of John
Ravarino was expl ained as "will testify regarding hi s knowledge of the Mi ss ion, its relocatio n,
and impact of the relocation on the Mi ssion." (Appendix Exhibit

at 2.) In response to the City's

di scovery request, his testimony was listed as "the same subject matter as Wayne Wilson and as
outlined in the RDA di scovery." (I'q)pendix Exhibit

at 4.) Wayne Wilson was designated as

testi fying regarding "his knowledge of the Mission and interacti on with the City, community
cou ncil s, efforts to rel ocate after 1999, its impact on the Mission , and factual claims not admitt ed
by the City or RDA in the pleadings ." ( A-ppendix Exh ibit

at 3.) Nowhere does it state that John

Ravarino is the sole witness for damages for the Mission.
Furtherm ore, the termin ology "special damages" was defined by counsel for the Ci ty as
"hard economi c damages." (Deposition of John Ravarino 210:24-25, Appendix Exhibi t 2.)
Damages for constitutional violations can be nominal or compensatory, the latt er being hard to
measure. (See Lega l Analysis, patt _

, infra.) When asked whether he was designated as the

damage expert or the person wi th the relevant infonnation on hard econom ic damages,
accountant John Ra varin o repl ied that he had not been des ignated as such, (Depositi on of John

4 See Plaintiffs' Designatioll of Expert \\fitness,
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Ravarino, 209 : 19-21, Appendix Exhibit 2.) and indicated he was not aware of damages since the
end of 2002. (ld at 211 :1-5.) Specific reference was made to non-economic damages claimed in
intelTogatories as pari of the record as well and counsel for the City indicated he understood. (Jd
at 212:11-2 1.)
49.

Plaintiffs have submitted special damage claims for the time period of October

1999 when they moved out of their long time location through 2001 when they were relocated at
the Central Christian Church, 370 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Depositi on Exhibit
19.)
These damages were submitted for relocation compensation under

Disputed Fact #49:

the federa l Unifonn Relocation Assistance Act and are not claimed under that Act as against the
City.
Plaintiffs have also submitted through response to IntelTogatories and depositions claims
for the following damages :
Preparati on of preparing plans and loss of deposits

$ 20,000.00

Lo ss of congregation

$ 50,000.00

Loss of sanctuary

$ 50,000.00

Wayne Wilson personally

$ 10,000.00

(Deposition Exhibit # _
50.

; Appendix Exhibit

.)

Pl ainti ffs' elaim for special damages co nsists of expenses involved

IJ1

mov lI1g,

abandonment of improvements to their prior location, loss of properiy in the move, lost
contributi ons and improvements to its new building. (ld.)
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Di sputed Fa ct #50:
56.

See Response to Di sputed Fact # 48.

Ravarino did testify, somewhat inexactly, that the expense figures for the time

period for which damages were being claimed did not in clude some items appearing to total
$45,456. (Ravarino Deposition, page 198 line 24-page 203 line 12, and Exhi bit 19.)
Di sputed Fact #56. After explaining whether an entry is listed as an expense or on th e
balance sheet, Mr. Ravarino went on to explain line-by-line which items were not included in th e
1999-2000 expense total.

(Deposition of John Ravarino, 199:2-23, Appendix Exhibit 2.) Th e

follow ing items are capitalized, and not expensed (Deposition of John Ravarino , 200 : 19-23; 20 1 :
12; 202 : 14-15; 204 : J 8-20; Appendix Exhibit 2.) :
RDA 00794 - Direct Costs for Di sconnecting, Di smantling, Removals,
Reassemb ling, Reinstalling Relocated Personal Propeliy
RDA 00798 - Fair Market Value (Depreci ated Value) of Leasehold
Improvements left behind
RDA 00802 - Actual Direct Loss of Tangible Propeliy
RDA 00804 - Purchase of Substihlte Property
T OTAL

B.

O mi tted Facts

xl

$ 5,017

$ 4,31 8
$ 1,200
$17,908
$ 3,418
$3 1,861

Documents referred to and relied upon are either already in the court files or are attached as
Exhibits to the Appendix filed with this M emorandum in Opposition. By this reference, they are
included in thi s M emorandum where referen ced.
Ordi nances
1.

From April 12, 1995, throu gh th e present, the City has had ordinances providing

mandatory definitions to be used in the City ordinances. Three definitions that will be focu sed on
in thi s memorandum inc1 ude the following:
"Place of worship" means a church, synagogue, temple, mosque or other place of
religious worship, including any accessory u se or structure used for religious
worship .
"Accessory use" means a use that:
(A)

Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to, and serves a principal
use;

(B)

Is customarily found as an incident to such prin ci p al use;

(C)

Contributes to the comfort, convenience or necessi ty of those
occupyin g, working at or being serviced by such prin cipal use;

(D)

Is, exccpt as otllerwi se exprcssly authorized by the provisi ons of
thi s title, located OIl the same zoning lot as such prin cipal use; and

(E)

Is under the sam e ownership or control as the pri n cipal use.

"Homeless shelter" means a building or portio n thereof in which sleeping
accommodations are providcd on an emergency basis for the temporarily
homeless.
(S LC City Code §§ 21 A.62.040) (Deposition Exhibit # 90; Appendix Exhibi t # _

xli

.)

On April 12, 1995, a comprehensive set of zoning revisions were adopted by Sal t

2.

Lake City. Churches were required to obtain conditional use pel111its in a residential zone.
Homeless shelters were continued to be defined and limited to the 0-3 and CG zones . (See
Deposition of Brent Wilde.

Appendix Exhibit 3.)

From at least Apri l 12, 1995 through the present, the City mandatory requirem ents

3.

necessary to invoke an administrative interpretation by the Zoning Administrator. (See
Depo sition Exhibit 94; Appendix Exhibit #

.)

From at least Apri l 12, 1995, the city has had mandatory ordinances providing

4

requirements that are applicable to public procedures.
Exhibit #

5.

(See Deposition Exhibit 54; Appendix

.)
In

1999, the City had mandatory ordinances regarding conditional use

applications and the processing of the same. (See Appendix Exhibit #

6.

).

The City o rdinan ces applicable during 2003 -2006 regarding requirements for

co nditi onal use appl ications and the processing of the sam e have changed fTom those in 1999.
(See Deposition Exh ibit 93; Appendix Exhibit 5).

7.

The City o rdinances defining the Community Counci l notice and reporting

process have been in place from April 12, 1995, through the present. (Appcndix Exhibit 6).

8.

In 1999 the City had mandatory ordinanccs goveming the City'S Board of

Adjustments. (Appendix Exhibit 7).
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9.

In 1999, the City had mandatory ordinances governing the Land Use Appeals

Board. (Appendix Exhibit 8).
10.

The applicable statutes and ordinan ces from 2003-2006 governing the City's

Board of Adjustments and di strict court review of the same on appeal are attached hereto.
(Appendix Exhibit 9).
11.

From at least April 12, 1995, the City has had in City ordinances, a mandatory

requirement that homeless shelters constituted conditional uses in the CO and D-3 zones. TIle
Mission was notified of the same by City Deputy Attorney Lynn Pace on August _ _, 1997.
(Appendix Exhibit 8).
12.

The applicable mandatory definitions from the Salt Lake County Code define as

follows the words "Church" and "accessory use":
19.04.120 Church.

"Church" means a building, together with its accessory buildings and uses, wh ere
persons regularl y assemble for religious worship, and which building, together
with its accessory buildings and uses, is maintained and controlled by a religious
body organized to sustain public worship. ((Part) of Ord. passed 817180: pri or
code § 22-1 -6 (paI1))
19.04. 550 Use, accesso ry.
"Accessory use" means a subordinate LIse customalily incid ental to and located
upon the same lot occupi ed by a main use. (Pri or code § 22-1-6(68))
There is no definition for a homeless shelter. (Appendix Exhibit -----.J
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13.

The applicable mandatory definitions from the Brigham City Code define as

follows the words "Accessory Use or Building," "Church," "Homeless Shelter," and
"Transitional Housing Authority":
Accessory Use or Building. A use or building on the same lot with, and of a
nature customarily incidental and subordinate to, the principle use or building.
"Church" A building, together with its accessory buildings and u ses, maintained
and control led by a dully-recognized religious organization where persons
regularly assemble for worship .
"Homeless Shelter" Charitable lodging or sleeping rooms provided 011 a daily or
other temporary basis to persons lacking other safe, sanitary or affordable shelter.
May also include a kitchen an d cafeteria.
"Transitional Housing Facility" A facility owned, operated or contracted by a
govemmental entity or a charitab le, nonprofit organi zation which provides fi·ee
temporary housing to homeless persons for at least thiliy (30) days while they
obtain work, job skills, or otherwise take steps to stabilize their circumstances. A
transitional housing facility does not include:
A.
B.
C.

A homeless shelter;
A dwelling unit provided to a fami ly for its exclusive use as part ofa
transitional hous ing program for more than thiliy (30) days; or
A residential faci lity for persons with a disability.

(Affidavit of Matthew Hilton '1__Appendix Exhibit 11 .)
Mission

11.

On Apri l 16, 1986, the Spectacula r Ministries of the Lord's Servants, filed

Articles ofIneorporatiol1 with the State of Utah, as a non -profit religi ous organization.
15 .

On July 26, 1988, the Utah State T ax Commission granted exemption fi·om

franchise tax to the Mission. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson

xliv

'13, Appendix

Exhibit 12.)

16.

Upon inquiry, the lntemal Revenue Service notifi ed the Mi ssion that it is their

practice to not require churches to apply for tax-exempt status bec ause it is automatically
gTanted. (D eposition of Wayne Wil son _ _ ; Appendix Exhibit I; Affidavit of Wayne Wilson '1]
Appendix Exhibit 12.)
17.

On May 23, 1997, the Spectacular Mini stries of the Lord ' s Servants filed a dba

wi th the State of Utah, using ' Salt Lake City Mi ssion' as its nam e.

(Deposition of Wayne

Wilson, 8:20-9:4, Appendix Exhibit 1; Affidavit of Wayne Wil son '1]17, Appendix Exhibit 12.)
18.

On July 18, 1997, the Utah State Tax Commission granted the Mission a sales tax

exempti on number because it qualifi ed as a religious or charitable institution. (558 MIS)
(Affidavit of Wayne Wil son '1]1 8, Appendix Exhibit 12.)
19.

On August 12, 1997, the United States Post Office granted the Mi ssion postal

privil eges as a non-profit organi zation. (56 1 MI S) (Affida vi t of Wayne Wilson '1]19, Appendix
Exhibit 12.)
20.

Th e reli gious min istries of the Mi ssion have been able to provid e the fo ll owin g:
1999

Ca(c~ory

Converts to Christ
Long-Tcnn
Recovery
Pantry food
distributed to
needy families
Goods provided
for needy famil ies
Holiday and other
meals provided.

2000

200 1

2002

24 5
10

300
IS

300
12

500
20

2UO

250

300

700

1500 people,
20,000 pieces
250 vo lunteers;
Thanksgiving
dinners combined

1500 people,
20,000 pieces
300 vo lunteers;
Thanksgiving
dirmcrs combined

1700 people,
25,000 pieces

5,000 people,
40,000 pieces
500 vo lunteers;
Thanksgiving
dilUlcrs combined
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300 volun teers;

Thanksgiving
dinners combined

3,000;
Christmas di rmcrs
combined 3,000;
Wrapped presenls
for various famil ies
900;
600

1000;
600

650

600 meals a day.

600 meals a day.

600 meals a day.

1500 meals a day

She lter Prov ided

Yes

Yes

Yes

YesfNo

Categor y
Converts to Christ
Long-TcnTI

2003
200
12

2004
250
IS

2005
300
20

2006 (Projected)
500
20

Recovery
Pan try food

100

50

50

500

500 people;
8,000 pieces
Thanksgiving
meals combined
2,500;
CIu-istmas dinners
combined 2,000;
Wrapped presents
for va rious
families 1,000;

200 people;
4,000 pieces
500 yolunteers;
Thanksgiying
dinners combined
4,000; Christmas
dinners combined
3,000;
Wrapped presents
for various
families 1,200;

500 people;
5,000 pieces
500 yolunteers;
Thanksgiving
dinners combined
4,700; Christmas
dinners combi ned
4,800;

400

400

200 people;
4,000 pieces
500 yolunteers;
Thanksgiving
dinners combined
4,700; Christmas
dilUlcrs combined
3,000;
Wrapped presents
for various
families
1,500;
400

100
No

100
No

100
No

100
No

Bible studies and

3,100;
Christmas dinners
combined 3,000;

6,000; Christmas

3,000
Christmas dinners
combined 3,000
Wrapped presents
for va rious families
900
500

Wrapped presents
for various families

dinners combined

5,000; Wrapped
presents for various

fami lies 1,500;

other group

sessions
Daily meals
served

distributed to
needy families
Goods proyided
for needy people
Holiday and other
meals provided.

Bible studies and
other group
sess ions
Daily meals served
Shelter Provided

400 vo lunteers;

(Affidavi t of Philip Arena

~

2 J, Appendix Exhibit 9.)
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Wrapped presents

for various
families 1,700;

1,000

Salt Lake City
21.

Defendant Salt Lake City is a municipality organized under the laws of the State

of Utah. (See Plaintiffs' Third Request for Judicial Notice _ _, March 20, 2006.)
22.

Deedee Conadini was mayor of Salt Lake City from January 1992 to January

2000. (See Plaintiffs' Third Request for Judicial Notice _ _, March 20, 2006.)
23.

Cunent Mayor Rocky Anderson has been mayor of Salt Lake City from January

2000, through the present. (See Plaintiffs' Third Request for Judicial Notice __ , March 20,
2006.)
Interfaith Participating Churches
24.

"In 1994 a team of 12 concerned advocates for homeless families began meeting

monthly to see if a national organization's program was possible for this valley, National lHN
[Interfaith Hospitality Network] Founder, Karen Olsen came to Utah to meet with us. Providing
a safe, temporary home to those without, was very impOIiant to us. We received National IHN
infollllation in regards to working with city and county officials to temporarily house homeless
families." (Deposition Exhibit 32) (Appendix Exhibit #
25.

.)

On or about March 23, 1995, Salt Lake County responded to Our Savior's

Lutheran Church regarding providing IHN temporary assistance to homeless families as an
"accessory use" under the county ordinances.
responded as follows:
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The Salt Lake County Zoning Department

The proposal is considered to be within the range of "accessory uses." If the
acti vity extends beyond the ch urch boundary to the extent as to cause com plaints
or interferes with neighborhood lifestyles, the church activity would be reviewed
on a case by case basis to resol ve problems. Care should be taken to assure that
each building is approved for life-safety issues with the Fire Department and the
building code officials.
(Deposition Exhibi t _ : Appendix Exhibit # . 214 M IS)
26.

On Apri l 27, 1995, Keith McDonald (a County inspector) established rules for

Our Savio r 's Lutheran Church to provide II-IN services for the homeless. (223 M IS) (Appendix
Exhibit #

.)

27.

On May 8, 1995, Ted Black (of the County Fire Department) inspected Our

Savior's Lutheran Church for providing IHN servi ces for the homeless. (224-225 MIS)
(Appendix Exhibit #
28 .

.)

On September 19, 1995, Salt Lake Interfaith Hospitality Network ("Interfaith")

was establi shed as a non-profit corporation by the State of Utah.

The Interfaith Mission

statement is as follow s: "Salt Lake Interfaith Hospitality Network is a non-profit organization
dedicated to supporting families during transitional times in order to ease the indi vidual family
and community concerns and challen ges of homelessness." (Deposition Exhibi t 32 ; Appendix
.) "[Interfaith] serves families wi th children.

Exhibit

This can be single or two parent

families." (Id.)

29.

During 1995, Jnt erfaith obtained IRS recogniti on of its Sal (c) (3 ) tax exempt

status. (id.)
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30.

During Mayor Corradini's administration, Roger Evans, head of the Enforcement

Division of the Planning and Zoning Department ("tile PZD"), investigated the practices of
Interfaith in Salt Lake County and IHN in Clark County, Nevada. (Deposition of Roger Evans,
13:6-14:14; Appendix Exhibi t 7.)
31 .

On or about December 26, 1996, Mayor Deedee Corradini "pledged supp0!1 of

the interfaith network church es."
Complaint,
32.

~

(Answer of Salt Lake City to Plaintiffs' Second Amended

24 at 4.)
Interfaith came to the PZD to obtain approval for a Participating Church on the

east side of Salt Lake City. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 11:22-13: 1; Appendix Exhibit 3.)
33.

Arrangements were made through the City Attorney, the Planning Director, and

Head of the Enforcement Division to allow churches in Salt Lake City to pa!1icipate in the
Interfaith network of churches and provide overnight services to the homeless as an "accessory
use" of the pal1icipating churches .

"There was a deternlination about where would the

'accessory use' - what would be a logical 'accessory use' threshold for that type of an 'accessory
or incidental use' of a church." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 20:2 1-25; Appendix Exhibi t 3.)
The parti cipating churches were not classified as "homeless shelters" restricted to conditional
uses in the D-3 and CG zones. (Deposition of Rogcr Evans, 15: 14-18: 18, Appendix Exhibit 7;
Depositi on of Brent Wilde, 10: 20-13:1 , and 13:12- 14: 23, Appendix Exhibit 3; Deposition of
Cheri Coffey, 37:20-38:7, Appendix Exhibit 4; Deposition of Wayne Mills, 15:16-23, Appendix
Exhibit 8.)

xlix

There were discussions in staff meetings of the PZD that focused on the
classification of those Participating Churches as "accessory uses" the overni ght services
provided by pmii cipatin g churches with Interfaith rather than homeless shelters. The practice
and policy apparently were not written down. (See Deposition of Brent Wilde, 20: 19-21 :6,
Appendi x Exhibit 3; Deposition of Cheri Coffey, 34:24-35:6, Appendix Exhibit 4.)

It was

unknown how or to what extent thi s definition of "accessory use" was conveyed to others in the
City.
35.

On January I, 1997, Interfaith began providing overnight services to the homeless

with six hosting churches. That year, thirty-six (36) famili es were ass isted.
Exhibit #3 1 : (Append ix Exhibit #
36.

See Deposition

.).

September 29, 1998, Mayor COITadini wrote Interfai th regarding service providers

for the homeless located in the same area as the Mission. She wished Vickie Newmann and the
Interfaith Hospitality Network "continued success," observing the "service you provide is
invaluable in assisting homeless families regain stabili ty and return as productive members of

our comm.unity." (See Deposition Exhibit #_: Appendix Exhibit #
37.

.)

At least as early as 1998, the City was aware of the practices of the Part icipating

Churches as outlincd in City documents 252 and 253 (See Deposition Exhibit #
Exhibit #

.)

: Appendix

(SLC Response to Plaintiffs' Final Set of Written Di scovery, Request for

Admission #7, page 3, Appendix Exhibi t ---.J
38.

At least eight chu rches within City limits were identified as pmiicipating with

Interfaith: St. Paul's Episcopal Church, First United Methodist Church, First Christian Refolllled

Church, First Baptist, Saint Catherine's of Siena Newman Center, Wasatch Hills Seventh-Day
Adventist Church, Wasatch Presbyterian, and Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, ("Participating
Churches") Id.
39 .

The Participating Churches were in exi stence at their present locations prior to

1995. Jd.

40.

None of the Participating Churches are located in the D-3 or CO zones where

homeless shelters are allowed as a conditional use. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 9: 17-10: 13,
Appendix Exhibit 3.)
4 1.

The Palticipating Churches were not individually evaluated by the City regarding

their housing of homeless people, nor was an administrative opinion issued regarding the
practices of Participating Churches with Interfaith to house homeless people. (Deposition of
Randy Taylor, 36:24-37:2, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
42.

No City documentation was provided regarding an administrative interpretation

regarding any Participating Cburch's worship as reflected in their involvement with Interfaith as
an accessory use. (Affidavit of Matthew Bilton,
43 .

'1 , Appendix Exhibit

11.)

On either March 12, 1999, or March 15, 1999, Vickie Neumann, Executive

Director of Interfaith, and Phil Arena of the Mission met with Randy Taylor, Zoning
Administrator of the PZD. (See Deposition Exhibit 92, Appendix Exhibit _ .)

44.

No City documentation was provided that demonstrated any submission to the

City of information regarding the organization or governance of the Participating Churches.
(Affidavit of Matthew Hilton, '1_, Appendix Exhibit 11.)
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45.

Notice of an administrative interpretation regarding a Participating Church's

involvement with Interfaith as an accessory use would have been sent to the respective
community cou ncil where the Church was located. (Appendix Exhibi t _.)
46.

The City "does not track or maintain separate fi les for accessory uses for places of

worship." (City's Respon se to Request for Documents, #5, October 7, 2005, at page 10.)
(Appendix Exhibit

~

"The City does not know how many may exist or where they may be

located." (C ity' s Response to First Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory #6, page 4, Appendix
Exhibit

.)
47.

When the staff repOli was prepared regarding the M ission's condition al use

application on the Rosewood Tenace property, staff was aware of the Interfaith Participating
Churches. (Deposition of Cheri Coffey, 34: 10-17, Appendix Exhibit 4.)
48.

The City is not Sllre that the pol icy regarding Patiicipating Churches would all ow

an accessory use in the Downtown and Gateway area of secu lar bu ildings assisting no more than
twenty individuals at one time on a life-threatening basis. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 59:4-9,
Appendix Exhibit 3.)
Homeless Shellers
49.

Undated and unacknowledged building requirements regarding homeless shelters

were in the files of the PZD and included the following:
a.

Conditional use in a D-3 or a CG Zoning District. The applicant must
apply for and receive approval from the PlaIll1ing Commission. As part of
the approval process, the application is required to go through a
notification process which includes the applicant meeting with the
community counci l in the district.
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b.

A fire sprinkler system is required when sleeping 20 or more persons.

c.

Two (2) exits are required when sleeping ten (l0) or more persons.

d.

Toil ets and sinks are required on a ratio of 1 per 8 occupants.

e.

Exit signs are requi red when two (2) or more exits are req ui red.

f.

Hard wired smoke detectors with a battery backup and interconnected are
required with a maximum spacing of 30 feet in all rooms u sed for sleeping
purposes.

g.

Natural or mechanical ventilation is required for all sleeping areas . If the
venti lation is natural it must be equal to 1120 of the floor area. If the
ventilation is mechanical it must provi de two (2) air changes per hour.

(Deposition Exhibit 51; Deposition of Roger Evans, 18: 16-18, 19:7-12, Appendix Exhibit 7;
Deposition of Randy Taylor 35: 18-36: 13 , Appendix Exhibit 5; Deposition of Brent Wilde, 41: 18, Appendix Exhibit 3.)
50.

The City imposed a moratorium because it was concerned about the concentration

and impact of certain types of activities and facilities. " ... there was concern about concentration
[of homeless shelters, transition al treatment centers, drug --- substance abuse and so on) and
impact and so on and the city counci l wanted to take some time to review thaI. " (Deposition of
Randy Taylor, 37: 16-23, Appendix Exhibi t 5.)
51.

The April 20, 1999, classification of the Mission as a homeless shelter, rather than

as a pennitted use only, required that a hearing be held before the community counci l.
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36:9- 13, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
52. .

Randy Taylor was unclear, as it related to a conditional Lise request, of how an

adverse impact on a neighborhood versus the city as a whole could be distinguished under the

li ii

current criteria. "I just --- J guess that the neighborhood, being part of the city as a who le, is ...
how J would respo nd to that." (Deposition o f Randy Taylor, 43: 11-19, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
53.

According to R andy Taylor, the recommendation of pl anning staff would change

if the City changed its policy and decided to concentrate services to the homeless, substance
abuse treatm ent centers, transitional homes, and the like. (Depos ition of Randy T aylor, 38: 19-24,
Appendix Exhibit 5.) Likewise, if the C ity changed its policy to encourage the concentration of
homel ess shelters, substance abuse centers, et cetera, et cetera, in the downtown an d Gateway
are, the pl anning staff wou ld find that it was compatible and did not have a material net
cumul ative adverse impact under this ordinance.

"Well, likely it would cause the staff to find

that it was compatible, perhaps, and did not have a material net cumu lative arlverse impact. " A
change in city policy could drive the finding of fact that it was comp atible and not adverse.
(D eposi tion of R andy Taylor, 41 :13 -42:2, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
Board of Ad justment Process and Actions
54.

Fro m Ja nu ary 14 - September 21, 1998, the Cathedral of the Madeli ne was

allowed to continue non-conforming use and request review by the Board of Adjustments unti l
an amcnd ed variance was granted by the Board of Adjustments co nforming with the Church's
use beyond that which had been estab li shed as an approved use. The process was "fairly normal
.. in compli ca ted cases." (Depositi on Exhib it 107; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 51 :8-52:10,
Appendix Exhibit 5.)
55.

After an adm inistrative ruling regarding an accessory use of the Jewi sh

Community Center was appealed by an objecting pa11y, the City P lanning and Zoning

liv

Department worked with both the Center and objecting pal1y during the pendency of the appeal.
(City 45-51; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 25:8-27:17, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
56.

On December 20, 1999, Randy Taylor, Zoning Administrator, suggested to the

Board of Adjustment that if the detennination of accessory use at the Jewish Community Center
needed revi sion, the Board of Adjustment was free to do so. (Depositi on of Randy Taylor, 75:713, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
57.

No church, except for the Mission, was classified as a homel ess shelter, from

1995 through the present.

(Deposition of Brent Wilde, 15:5-16:6, Appendix Exhibit 3;

Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36: 15-19, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
58.

There was no di scussion by the PZD before the November 15, 1999, Board of

Adjustments meeting about the possibility of the Board setting limits on church-related homeless
accom modations. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 75 :2-14, Appendix Exhibit 5.)

59.

The City has not given a reason why the practice of 'accessory use' for the

homeless shelter limit was not di sclosed to the Board of Adjustments.

(Deposition of Brent

Wi ld e, 23:24 - 24:5, Appendix Exhibit 3.)

GO.

Th e City has taken the position in vari ous situati ons that the Mission is bound by

the November 15, 1999, classification of the Board of Adjustments, that it was a homeless
shelter and a church. (Deposition of Brcl1t Wilde. 29:1 J-30:13, Appendix Exhibit 3; Deposition
Exhibi t 59)
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Enforcement Action Vis-a-vis the Mission as a Church at 466-468 W 200 S
61.

On May 3,1994, an amended three day-notice to quit was served on the Church.

The stated bias for the eviction was that the church was:
causing or suffering premi ses to be used as residence in violation of zoning laws;
causing or suffering excess numbers of persons to occupy the premises; causing
or suffering tenant's customerslinvitees to : loiter about premises and sidewalk
outside premises, engage in illegal drug use and/or transactions on or about the
premises, invade other tenants' leaseholds and intimidate other tenants and their
customerslinvitees, litter sidewalk outside premises and in front of other tenants'
leaseholds and other tenants ' leaseho lds with trash and urine, and intimidate
govemmental inspectors always from doing inspections of premises; an d serve
food or about the premises without proper licenses.'

62.

A trial was held on the amended notice to quit on May 16, 1994, before the

Honorable Michael L Hutchings.
During the tlial witness from the City, including police officers and staff of the
Zoning Depariment, sought to demonstrate to the court that it was illegal for the
[Church] to remain in their [buildi ng] and to care for the homeless at their present
location under the rules of the Salt Lake City zoning and rel ated matters ...
[G]enerally the couli found and the pariies' stipu lated that the [Church] could
contin ue what it was doing as a church, and continue caring for the homeless
provided celiain matters were improved as outlined in the written order of the
cotll1. Further, the couli found that the contract (lease) allowing them to remain at
the premises and conduct thei r business as a church was a legal contra ct.'

63.

On July 19, 1994, Judge Michael Hutchings issued an ordcr in an unlawfu l

detaincr action brought against the Mission indicating that the Mission could rcmain in its
premIses on the MB I and continue to provide servi ces to the homclcss.
_.)

5

Verified Complain t. September 8, 1999. Paragraph 17.
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(Dcposition Exhibit

64.

On December 24, 1996, Sherie Reich, an enforcement officer of the PZD,

received a complaint from poli ce regarding the Mission operating an illegal homeless shelter.
After speaking with a supervisor, she went to the Mission and gave Pastor Wilson a notice to
cease and desist that stated the following: "This stlUcture is only to be used as a church- no
sleeping at any spot on premises day or night. This is a violation of the SLC zoning ordinance,
pl ease cease and desi st or a citation will be issued." (Deposition Exhibit 20, App en dix Exhibit
.) In addition to the issues inherent in addressing the nature and uses of the church, this cease
and desist order was different than the norm because there was no time frame provided to cure
the deficiency. "[T]ypically, when there's a violation known, that the city in a lot of cases will
issue a notice an d order nuticing what remedies need to take place and urder that work be
accompli shed and done in a celiain time frame ... we would contact them if it was failure to
comply, and at that poi nt we would typicall y issue some kind of a criminal mi sdemean or citation
ticket or we would - along with voiding out the p ennit, is typically what we would do."
(Deposition of Roger Evans 31 : 13 - 32:4, Appendix Exhib it 7.)
65 .

On December 26, 1996, a crimin al citati on was issued to Pastor Wilson for

vio lating zonin g laws. (A Hidavit of Wayne Wilson ' 113, Appendix Exhibit 12.)
66 .

On December 27, 1996, zoning enforcement staff consistin g of Sherie Reich ,

Harvey Boyd, Scott Mikelson, and police visited the Mission premises and again told tIle
Mission to shut down its "homeless sheller. " (City 336, 342; Affidavit of Mallhew Hi lton

IJ

Verified Complaint. September 8,1999. Paragraph 19.
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67.

On January 13, 1997, B.L. Smith of the City Poli ce D epmi ment made a complaint

regardi ng the Mission to the City/Co unty Health Depaltment. (512-513 MI S; Affidavit of
Matthew Hilton"
68.

.)

On January 13 , 1997, Diane Keay of the City/County Di visi on of Environmental

Health and Dan W11ite of the City/County Health Depaliment visited the Mission. (370-371 MIS:
514 MIS; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton
69.

~_. )

On January 14, 1997, Diane Keay and Dan W11ite gave wri tten repolis of areas fo r

improvement to the Mission . (370-371 MIS; 514 MIS) Diane Keay' s repori stated:
There is a si gn posted on the south wall that says the facility is open 24 hours a
day. Pastor Wilson sai d that they are open 24 hours a day for the winter. I do not
believe that 'winter' is an emergency and the shelter is not operating only as an
'emergency' shelter. To my knowl edge, a clear definition of 'emergency' does
not exist at this time in enviromnental health regulations. According to Salt lake
City-County Health Department Regulation #3 Housing, em ergency housing is
defined as 'structures utilized for occupancy in an emergency th at are des ignated
by governmenta l authority as emergency housing.'
(370-37 1 MIS , Affidavit of Matth ew Hilton
70.

~_. )

On November 4, 1997, Roger Evans, Director of Building Services and

Licensing, notified the M ission that it wanted to make an adm ini strative inspection on November
4, 1997. (349 MIS) (Deposition Exhibit 11 5) (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton
71.

~_ .)

On January 13, 1998, the City Attorncy's Office requested that in specti on be

allowed "to insure that celiain life/safety measures are obsel-ved so that those ind ividuals wh o
stay at the church will not be in danger." (344 MIS) (Depos itio n Exhi bit 116) (Affidavi t of
Matthew Hilton

~_. )
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72.

On April 3, 1998, Sherie Reich inspected the Mission premi ses. (City 330;

Affidavit of Matthew Hilton

~_.)

Non-Enforcement Actio n Against a Tongan Church in 1997
73 .

On August 6, 1997, a Tongan Church that was illegally situated b efore April 12,

1995, was encouraged to work out options with the neighborhood, acquire more land so as to not
be a non- confonning use. It was not evident a referral was made referring the case to
enforcement. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 22:12-23 , Appendix Exhibit 5.)
Administrative Inspecti on at the Mission as a Church at 370 East 400 S
74.

On October 14, 1999, Mission counsel confinn ed with City Counsel that without

"missionary" ovemight status, churches are allowed in commercial zone without conditional use
pe1111its. At the same time, a request was made that the Mission could relocate to specific zones
within City boundaries without any further "conditional use pel111its, neighborhood hearings, or
other such delays." (Ex . #83)(422-2 3 MIS) Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~

.)

On October 30, 1999 , Cheri Coffey a1er1ed Craig Sp angberg regarding

75 .

enla rcement issue>

at tne

Mission located at Central Christi an Church. (Deposition Exhibit #56;

Cherie Coffey Deposition _ ;_ , Appendix #
76.

.)

On January 6, 2000, the Salt Lake City-County Health Department grants the

Mission ninety (90) days to rectify its listed items ofcorrectiol1. (644 MIS; Affidav it of Matthew
Hilton'l

.)
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77.

On January 21,2000, R. Stanley of the City Fire Depa11ment. provides thirty (30)

days' noti ce to Central Christian Church to correct violations or hazardous conditions. (337-338
MIS; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton
78.

~

.)

On Apri l 7, 2000, Sal t Lake City-County Health Department issued a permit to

Mission at Central Christian Church (339 MIS; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton

~_ .)

Administrative Interpretation

79.

Randy Taylor served as Zoning Administrator from 1994-2000. (Deposition of

Randy Taylor 6:18-25, Appendix Exhibit 5.)

80.

City ordinances required that certain procedures be fo llowed when issuing an

administrative opinion, induding that t.he opinion be requested by an applicant, based on certain
written, submitted facts as appli ed to specific propeliy, and a fee paid. (Deposition Exhibi t # 94;
Randy Tayl or Depositio n

81.

, Appendix Exhibit # 5.)

Randy Taylor did not recall whether the City PZD had a form to complete for

requesting an administrative interpretation. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 23 :23-24:5, Appendix
Exhibit 5.)

82.

At no time was the Mission asked by the City PZD to fo ll ow the requirements in

the City ord inan ces to obtain an administrative int.erpretation. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson, "58,
Appendix Exhibit 12.)

83.

The Mission did not file a request for an administrative interpretati on regarding

the Cohen property in 1999, or the Rosewood Terrace property in 1999, 2003, or 2004.

Ix

(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson,

~

59, Appendix Exhibit 12; Deposition of Wayne Mills 31:2-13,

Appendix Exhibit 8.)
84.

The Zoning Admini strator typically takes one to tlu-ee weeks to clarify what an

applicant's uses are; "two to three weeks probably is fairly routine." (Deposition of Brent Wilde,
46:3- 15, Appendix Exhibit 3.)
85.

Typically, before issuing the classification, if there is a question regarding state

licensure, the City would write a letter requesting a determination, generally obtaining one
within two to three weeks. The PZD would typically "want to see what the State had to say
first," before they issued a classification as to use.

(Deposition of Brent Wilde, 47: 12-23,

Appendix Exhibit 3.)
86.

A letter dated May 27, 1998, to Rabbi Zippel of the CHABAD LUBAVlTCH OF

UTAH was considered to be an administrative interpretation. (Deposition of Randy Taylor 13:312, Appendix Exhibit 5.) No notification was given to the community nor was notification given
of any aggrieved party's right to appeal. (Deposition Exhibit 96.) Then Zoning Admini strator
Randy Taylor did not recall whether or not Rabbi Zippel completed an application form for an
ad ministrative interpretation. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 23:23- 24:6, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
Brent Wilde was consulted regarding this letter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 21 :17-22:8,
Appendix Exhibit 5.)
87.

A letter dated July 6, 1998, to Zion's Lutheran Church was labeled as an

admini strative intcrpretation and was co nsidered to be such. (Deposition Exhibit # 97;
Deposition of Randy Taylor, 13: 13-20, Appendix Exhibit 5.) No notification was given tbat any
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aggrieved party could appeal. (Deposition Exhibit # 97.) The City did not identify "a parti cular
rcason" why this was not language was not included. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 13 :20 - 14: I,
Appendix Exhibit 5.) Then Zoning Administrator Randy Taylor did not recall whether Dr not the
Cllurch cDmpleted an application fonn for an ad mini strative interpretation. (DepDsition of Randy
Taylor, 15:9-17, Appendix Exhibi t 5.) No community counci l meeting was held. (Derosition
Exhibit 97.)

Brent Wilde was consulted regarding this letter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor,

21 :17-22:8, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
88.

Pastor Wilson or some of his staff talked with Randy Taylor about the Mission

being a church, with pali of its mi ssion being to feed and clothe the needy because to do so is
feeding and clothing Jesus, and, thereby, is an integral part of religious worship. (Deposition of
Randy T aylor, 29:25-30:5, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
89 .

Brent Wilde and Bill Wright, of the PZD, and Lynn Pace, of the City Attomey's

office, reviewed the admini strative interpretation letter of Aplil 20, 1999, before it was sent to
the Mission. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 45 :8- 11, Appendix Ex hibit 5.)
90 .

Randy Taylor perceived the Mission's case as being complicated because of

"Well, the level --- I don't --- you know, the level of services and so on to homeless and to -- and the substance ab use and all being considered conditional uses in most locations. So that's
what made it complicated to me." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 60: I 0-14, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
In addition, " ... to the ex tcnt that --- that as a church activities like substance abuse and homeless
services of various kinds would be considered allowed uses under the umbrella, if you will, of
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the church, that part of it was complicated to me."

(Depositi on of Randy Taylor, 61:2-6,

Appendix Exhibit 5.)
91.

There was a question

III

Randy Taylor's mind about the Mission's "religious

worship" beca use he di stingui shed between practices of a church and social service aspects of
the Mission. To Taylor, some aspects of the Mi ssion clearly appeared to be church and/or
worship activities; whereas, counseling, referrals, providing meals, and other social aspects could
be classified as activities in which a "mission" would engage - related, but distinctly separate
fTom worship .
Well, yes, there was some question in my mind. There was quite a bit of
discussion about mission versus church. And I didn't pretend to understand fully
what a mission is, but I had an idea. But they certainly sounded like a church in
many, many, many ways and did church-related things ... what I thought a mission
was was a --- you, know, the kinds of things that they do . They provide services
of various kinds to folks who need them, a lunch, a --- some counseling, some --some referral to help of various kinds . . .1 viewed it probably more as a --- you
know, you've got your church and the worship services, and then you've got the
social aspects on the side or along with that. And I viewed them as different
things, related but different.
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 75: 21-76:20, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
YZ.

On April 20, 1999, the City is sued to the Mi ssion a letter labeled Admini strative

Interpretati on that addressed the classification of the uses as the City und erstood thcm for the
Cohen propcrty.

Four days before the letter was issued, April 16, 1999, drafts of th e same

appear to have been writt en bv S il! Wlight, Pl anning Director. (Depos ition Exhibits 10 1 and
100; Depositi on of Randy Taylor, 20:6 - 21 :22, Appendix Exhibit 5.) As Zoning Admini strator,
Rand y Taylor was responsible fo r producing, signing, and sending letters; how ever, fairly often
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Mr. Taylor involved Mr. Wright in review, cOITection, and clari ficatio n. (Deposition Ex hi bits
101 and 100; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 21 :9- 22, Appen dix Exhibit 5.)
93.

A draft of the April 20, 1999, admin istrative interpretat ion letter irom Randy

Taylo r (# 2) was ed ited by Bi ll Wrigh t, Pl anning Director (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 20:6-14,
Appendix Exhibit 5.) The draft was dated A pril 16, 1999, and was prepared un der the name of
Bill Wright. (Deposition Exhibit 101)
94.

A subsequent typewri tten copy of the cOITections made by pen contain ed the sam e

Apri l 16, 1999, date but Bill Wright's identificati on as the signer was strick en. (Deposition
Exhibit 100; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 20 :21-23: 8, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
95.

The use of specific facts protects an applicant both from the City using extrin sic

evidence to evaluate their proposal as wel l as bei ng assured of the factual basis upon which an
appeal to the Board of Adjustments may need to be made.
96.

Randy T aylor did consider whether or not th e sheltering of tb e homeless

overn ight In an emergency situation could be "an accessory use" of the Mission's pl ace of
worsh ip.

His decision was based on the "magnitude of activi ty that seemed to be going on"

without distin gu ishing betwcen day and night activiti es. " Im can I don' t kn ow that mu ch abou t
what they wcre doing other than it was characteri zed as quite a bit of activ ity." (Deposit ion of
Randy Taylor 34:5- 19, Appendix Exhibit 5.)

He relied on "the descriptions given me in wri ting

and the discussions that he held, that he had. " (Deposition of Randy Ta ylor 36:20-23. Appcndix
Exh ibi t 5.) While he met with Philip Arena and his superiors Brent Wilde or Bill Wright,
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(Deposition of Phil ip Arena, 15:16- 16:4, Appendix Exhibit 6.), he did not recall ever discussing
with them how one would detennine whether or not "providing shelter to the homeless on an
emergency basis could be an accessory use of the church." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 35:1317, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
97 .

The request in the letter to have the Mission determine if it required licensure by

the State would not have made any difference in the "classification of the use" but it would have
made it easier to "detenl1ine those uses" of the Mission. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 49:2-50:5,
Appendix Exhibit 5.)
y~.

The April 20, 1999, letter contained a classification of proposed uses of the

Mission as a treatment shelter, which classification required state licensing. (See Omitted Fact #

1.) .
99 .

The April 20, 1999, letter contained a classification of the Mi ssion as a homeless

shelter, based on "the descriptions given to me in writing and the discussions that I held --- that I
had." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36:20-23, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
100.

l-1ad the April 20, 1999, admini strative interpretation not classified the Mission as

a homel ess shelter or substance abuse treatment home the Mi ss ion would have been able to
obtain a building pe1111it for the Cohen building.

(Deposition of Randy Taylor 33:12-34:5,

Appendix Exhibit 5.)
101.

The Mission was advised to refer to the City Attomey's to resolve unstated legal

questions. (Appendix Exhibit

.)
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102.

The City also indicated it "would be willing to assist you in the location of a more

su itable site that is consistent with th e city's preference for smaller facilities in decentralized
locations throughout the county." (Deposition Exhibit

). Other than to "broaden the base, the

geography," Randy Taylor did not know why the offer was made "througho ut the county" rather
than "throughout the city." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 44: 11 -45: II, Appendix Exhibi t 5.)
J 03.

The April 20, 1999, classification of the Mission as a h omeless shelter,

rather than as a permitted use only, required that a hearing be held before the community
counci l as to its proposed use.

(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36 :9- 13, Appen dix Exhibit

5.)
104.

The September 14, 1999 , adminish-ative interpretation letter was issued in

conjunction with the Mission's conditional use pennit application.

That was "not common ..

but in compli cated matters certainly it would be and could be done and was done. " (Deposition
of Randy Taylor, 59 :20-60:8, Appendix Exhibi t 5.)
105.

On September 10, 1999, tlu'ee drafts of a letter rega rdin g the potential use of the

Mission at the Rosewood Ten'ace Building (167 North 600 West) were prepared for Randy
Taylor' s signature. One provided the Mission was a chu rch, one provided the Mission was a
church and boardinghouse, and one provided the Mission was a church, boardinghou se, and
homeless shelter. (Deposition Exhibi t 106) These lettcrs were the results of discussions with
Brent Wilde, Bill Wright, and Lynn Pace. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 6 1: 15-62:5, Appendix
Exhibit 5.)

"To the best of [Randy Taylor's] knowledge, [the draft lettcrs] seem to represent
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how the Mission could have been classified at that time. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 62:6-14,
Appendix Exhibit 5.)
106.

"[MJost" of the "information from [Mission's counsel's] various correspondence"

sent to Randy Taylor was the "factual criteria" relied upon by the decision makers to produce the
September 14, 1999, letter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 62: 15-20, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
107.

The September 14, 1999, letter indicated that beyond the thiliy people li ving on

the premises, there would be no other individuals living or sleeping at the Mission except in
emergency or life-threatening instances. (Deposition Exhib it 2) Randy Taylor did not know why
this potential occurrence of providing help had not been sufficient to classify the Mission as a
homeless shelter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 65 :6-1 0, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
I don't know. It was going --- it was heading into a conditional lise process and-- and --- and obviously that service is an important one, and so I don ' t know why
it didn't trigger. It was stated there because it was stated in the infonnation given
to me, and so it didn't cause me to just automatically call it a homeless shelter.
On a real dire emergency sihlation when someone was going to stay out and
freeze and they were going to ... help them out, then, you know, that's why it got
stated in th ere.
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 65: 10-2 l, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
108.

The September 14, 1999, admi ni strati ve interpretation also indi cated that having a

hom eless shelter, or any other residential activity requirin g licensure from the State of Utah, was
forb idd en . No "adverti sing regarding any of these prollibitecl uses is allowed. Then if any of the
above are engaged in or advel1ised for, the City will initiate revocation of the conditional use
pennit or any other permi ts issued and take enforcement action ." (Deposition Exhibit 28)
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) 09.

This advertising prohibition was "not really common ... but that kind of th in g can

be added ... to reviews." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 68:25-69: ) 3, Append ix Exhibit 5.) Randy
Taylo r did not intend to "restrict advertising of the church but to restrict adveIiising that would
have impacted [on] having people stay ovemight on an emergency basis." (Deposition of Randy
Taylo r, 69:21 -71 :3, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
I was simply trying to indi cate, I believe, that --- that any reasonable person
would recognize that if someone shows up at 10:30 at night on the doorstep of a
church and is going to freeze to death if they're not given some kind of help that-- that they ought to be helped and --- but that would be --- but that would be an
emergency kind of a thing and a --- you know, not an every night, by the hoards
kind of a thing.

(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 70-12-20, Appendix Exhibit 5.) Randy Taylor "was simpl y saying
that that circumstance ought to be discussed [by the planning commission and the review body of
this application] with respect to their kind of services."
110.

~

70:6-11

Randy Taylor understood that had the Mission been a 501(c)(3) ch aritable

institution, rather than a church, and was going to maintain a boardinghouse or equivalent
nonCOnfOI1l1ing use of the Rosewood Terrace Building, that there would have beron no
requiremcnt that a conditional use peI1l1i t be obtained. The reason a conditional lise permit was
required was because the Mission was a church and tbe nonconforming use was in a resi dential
zone.

(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 66:9-67:20, Appcndix Exhibit 5.) (Deposition of Brent

Wilde 68: 1-12. Appendix Exhibit 3.)
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Pennit Depaliment
111.

A church must be in compliance with all City ordinances if a building pennit is to

be issued to remodel or make other changes to a church. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 63:12-16,
Appendix Exhibit 3.)
112.

On October 26, 1998, Pastor Wilson appeared at the Pennits & Licensing

counter and submitted a letter for 399 West Andrews Avenue as he understood Randy Taylor to
have requested the letter. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 234:22-237:3, Appendix Exhibit 1.)
Staff brought in Randy Taylor who told Pastor Wilson that he had to meet with the People's
Freeway Community Council (City 013, Deposition Exhibit 22), and "submit another letter
spellin g out how the use would be operated and managed. [Taylor] then told [Wilson] we would
then make a detemlination as to what category his use would fit into and refer him to the
appropriate process." (Deposition Exhibit # 22, City 11.) [Taylor] asked [Wilson] to revi se the
letter he had and be more descriptive as to his activities and use." (City 0391.)
113.

On June 25, 1999, Phil Arena and other individuals fi·ol11 the Mi ssion went to the

pellllit counter and asked if a church was a pel111itted use in a D-3 Zone. Paul Doer told them it
was and a set of plans were produced. The Mission was told it was a homeless shelter and not a
church; the Mission stated that it was a church. Doer told the Mission representatives that "i n
order to recei ve a building permit [they] would have to provide documentation authOIizing use
approval from the Zoning Admin istrator's office" and instructed them where the office was.
(Deposition Exhibit 108.) Randy Taylor recalls receiving the written memorandum reciting the
foregoing. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 53:4-14, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
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He does not recall

giving that kind of directive to Paul Doer. (Deposition of Randy T aylor, 52:14-25, Appendix
Exhi bi t 5.) No follow up was done with the Mission or anyone c1 se to clarify the practi ce.
(Depositio n of Randy Taylor, 53: 18-21 , Appendix Exhibit 5.)
Involvement Wi th Community Coun cils
114.

Appli cab le city ordinances stated the following regarding "Consul tation with

Neighborhood Organizations."
In order fo r an application for a Condi tional Use Pennit to be determined
complete, the app licant must include, when required by the Recognized or
R egistered Organi zation Notification Procedures, Title 2, Chapter 2.62 of the Salt
Lake City Code, a signed statement from the appropri ate neighborhood
organizati on that the applicant has met with that organization and explained the
developm ent proposa l for which approval is being sought. The s igned statement
shall be on a fonn provided by the zoning administrator. (Per 2 IA. I 0.01 O(B))
115.

At no time did the zoning administrator provide the Mi ssion with the form to be

signed verifyi ng that the presentation had b een made. (Depositi on of Wayne Wil so n
Appcndix Exhibit 1.) The PZD did not have such a

[01111

from 1999 - 2004. (Deposition of

Cheri Coffey 6:8-12; 17:8-1 7, Appendix Exhibit 4.)
11 6.

Notw ithstanding the foregoing, the Zoning Administrator was given the

discreti on ary authority to not require the submission of:

"A complete application" .. .. (8) A

signed statem ent that the appli cant has met with and explained the proposed use to the
appropri ate neighborh ood organi zation entitled to receive notice pursuant to Title 2, Chapter 2.62
of the Salt Lake City Code." (Append ix Exhi bit
117 .

).

Before 1999, the Mi ssion wanted to move to the Sutherland Building located at

405 South Redwoo d Roa d. Pasto r Wilson made a presentati on at the Poplar Grove Co mmunity
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Council.

A uniformed poli ce officer appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mi ssion.

After the presentation, chair indicated that the Mission would receive a letter of detennination in
about a week; thereafter, however, he refused to send the Mission a letter. In the absence of the
same, staff at PZD refused to allow Mi ssion to fi le an appli cation for a conditional use penn i!.
(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 23; Appendix Exhibit 12.)
11 8.

Before 1999, the Mi ssion wanted to move to 1515 South 400 West (f0I111eriy,

Travelers Aid Society; now, The Road Home).

Pastor Wi lson m ade a presentation at the

People' s Freeway Community Council. The Community Council offered to assist the Mission to
locate outside of their Community Council area, but would not approve the requested location.
One of the police officers who had come to tbe Mission offices and told the Mission that the
Mayor's Office wanted it shut down, appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mi ssion. The
Community Council never sent verifi cation of the presentation or its decision to the M ission.
Despite having made the presentation; thereafter, staff at PZD twice refused to allow the Miss ion
to file an appli cation. (See Affidavit of Wayne Wilson

~

24, Appendix Exhibit 12.)(AffidaYit of

Monica Wilson ,,6-8, Appendix Exh ibit 13.)
119.

Before 1999, the Mi ss ion wanted to rel ocate at 850 West 1600 NOlih (at the

Superfund site). PZD staff rdused to notify Capital Hill Community Counci l that the Mission
needed to be 011 their agenda to make a presentation , thereby justifying the Mission's belief that
the preparing of an applicati on would also be fut ile. (See Depo siti on Exhibit at _ _ .)
120.

In the early paJi of 1999, the Mission detel1l1ined it would like to acquire the

Cohen Building located at 580 West 300 South. At the time of the inquiry, a Church was a

lui

permitted use in the 0-3 zone where the property was located. A building pennit was requ ested .
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Randy Taylor, Zoning Admini strator, enco uraged the Mission to
make a presentation to the Rio Grande Community Council. (See Depos iti on Ex hibit at
Phil Arena of the Mi ssion mad e th e presentation.

-.-J

The presentation was disrupted by Marge

Harvey of the Mayor's Office who spoke out against the Mission. Unifonned poli ce officers in
attendance spoke out against the Mission as well.

The Mi ssion was asked to make another

presentation at the next meeting on Apri l 2 1, 1999.

12 1.

On April 20, 1999, the Mission again presented at the Rio Grand e Commun ity

Counci l. Brent Wilde of the PZD was in attendance and di sputed if not debated the Mission's
claim it was on ly a church rather than all of the use classifi cations co ntained in the A pri l 20,

1999, letter that were contrary to the use classifications explained by the Mi ssion. (Deposition of
Philip Arena, 16:25- 17:5, Appendix Exhibit 6. )

122 .

Occasionally, an appli cant may be directed to appear before a community council

a second time.
On occasion a cond iti onal use request will go to a community counci l, but there
may be addition al questions or inform ation that was not ava il able that the
community coun cil may have requested additi onal in formation before they make a
decision. So it's on occasion we wi ll have an appl icant go back a second time.
(Deposi ti on of Brent Wilde, 42: 12- 18, Append ix Exhibit 3.) (cmphasis addcd)

123.

Mr. Wil de was unable to pro vide the number of times in the last ten years that an

applicant has returned to the communi ty co un cil a second time. "I can 't give you a number. We
have a few pla1ll1ed developments that have gone back more than once.
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I cou ld find that

information but I just can ' t tell you." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 42:19-25, Appendix Exhibit
3.)

124.

On April 22, 1999, the Mi ssion obtained a li sting of all Community Council and

their respective chairpersons from the Mayor's Office. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 30
Appendix Exhibi t 12 .)

. 125.

During the middle of the summer, the Mission detennined it would try to relocate

in the Rosewood TelTace Building located at 168 North 600 West. The Mission was unable to
reach the Chainnan of the Fairpark Community Council during earl y August 1999 because he
had gone of vacation. Unbeknown to the Mission, the Fairpark Community Cow1cil meeting for
August 1999 h ad been cancel led because of vacation schedul es. The Mission notified the PZD
and City Attomey's Office of their inability to meet with th e Fairpark Comm unity Council and
the urgent need to begin processing their application for a conditional u se regarding Rosewood
Ten'ace properties. (Deposition Exhibit
I.

126.

)

Requirement to Present Before Appli cation Accepted

According to the ordinance, a conditional use appli cant was required to go to the

Commun ity Council pri or to submitting an application to the PZD. (Depo sition of Brent Wilde,

41 :3-6 Appendix Exhibit 3.) Notw ith standing this requirement, the Zoning Administrator has
di scretionary flexibility regarding the application proccss.
There has been some flexibility in terms of when an applicant might go, or if a
community council chooses not to schedule a particular request they don't go.
But if the community councils are contacted prior to a conditional use going to the
planning commission, and if the communit, co uncil desires to h" ve them on an
agenda for discussi on, we require th nt they go ... The ordinance requlI e' pre
applicati on. There has been some flexibility in that, given the circumstances.
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Sometimes there have been cases where we received an application and do not
send them.
(Deposition of Brent Wilde, 41 :9- 24, Appendix Exh ibit 3.)
127.

On August 3 I, 1999, the City Attorney's Offi ce notified the Mi ssion that

appearing before the community counci l was required before an application would be accepted.
(Appendix Exh ibit
128.

).

There have been times when an application has been prepared and the community

coun cil could not meet within a ' reasonable schedu le' because of summer vacations or holidays.
When this occurs, the PZD wi ll accept an application with the understan ding that the applicant
wi ll follow up with the community council at its next scheduled meeting.
There have been an occasion where, if --- if an appli cant has --- has thei r
application ready, a community coun ci l cannot meet within wh at wou ld be
considered a --- a reasonable schedule; we have received an application and
sch eduled with the community council after. Occasionally during the summer or
during the holidays the community council may not meet, so we have no
meeti ngs , so we get it in with the understanding they'll follow up and get to it in
the next meeting.
(Deposition of Brent Wi lde, 43 :9-2 I , Appendix Exhib it 3.)
A 'reasonable time' is generally considered to be wi thin a month . (Deposition of Brent Wild e,
43:22-44:5, Appendix Exhibi t 3.)

There is no set rule regarding community councils, but

appl icants must notify the commun ity counci l that they should be put on the meeting agenda,
which is gencrally prepared one or two weeks pri or to the scheduled mceting.
Generally they meet once a month, and they'll prepare their agenda. They all
. vary a bit but they'll prepare their agenda one or two weeks in advance ... No set
rule with community councils.

lxxiv

(Deposition of Brent Wilde, 44:3-7, Appendix Exhibit 3.)
129.

"Sometimes [PZD] would accept an application [for a conditional use pennit] if

we knew the applicant had been scheduled or was working to be scheduled on a community
council agenda ." (Deposition of Cheri Coffey, 25: 17-23 , Appendix Exhibit 4.)
130. · On June 6, 1998, and April 2, 2003, th e PZD used administrative discretion to
eliminate the need for a church to appear before a community counci l or participate in th e
conditional use process. (See Omitted Facts # #

, supra.)

W11en these specific cases were

excluded, in addition to those Participating Churches with Interfaith that were "excused" under
the "accessory use" doctrine, th e City could then claim that every case sent to the Commission
for a conditional use review, had been heard by the community councilor it was returned by the
Plmming Commission to do the same. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey 56:20-25, Appendix Exhibit
10.)
2.
131.

Nature of Presentati on

The obligation of the applicant is " simply to appear at the Community Council

and make a presentation." (Depo sition of Brent Wilde, 44: 11 , Appendix Exhibit 3.)
13 2.

The Mi ssion's presentations at various community coun cil s before 1999 (see

Omitted Facts ## 11 9, 120, ssupra,) were oppo sed by memb ers of the Mayor's offi ce and
uniform ed memb ers of the poli ce departm ent. (Affid av it of W ayne Wil so n

~

22, Appendix

Exhi bit 12 .)
13 3.

The Mission ' s presentati on at the Rio Grand e Commu nity Counci l on March 17,

1999, regarding the Cohen Prope11y was opposed by members of the police depa11ment and a
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representative from the Mayor's Office, Marge Harvey. (Deposition of Philip Arena, 19: 1920: 12, Appendix Exhibi t 6.)
134.

The Mission's presentation at the Rio Grande Community Council on April 21,

1999, regarding the Cohen Property turned into a debate with Brent Wilde of the PZD over the
nature of the Mission. (Deposition of Philip Arena, 16:25-17:5, Appendix Exhibit 6.)
Verification of Presentation
135.

PZD staff report a variety of means used to veIify an applicant's presentati on at

the community counci l meeting. "In most cases, but not always, a staff plaIUler will attend that
meeting. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 44: 14-15, Appendix Exhibit 3.)
On the occasion, where [staff doesn't attend], community councils will give some
written response with a community council recommendati on that provides
documentation .... [T]here's nothing set or fo rmal. On occasion, a staff member
may have to call the community council to get documentation the applicant was
there." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 44: 12-22, Appendix Exhibit 3.)
136.

"Occasionally, if it's fairly routine [a community council] will not have an

applicant come in. That, however, is the exception. The maj ority of the time, the commun ity
cou ncil will want to see the applicant, thcy would attend, and we look for documentation they' ve
becn there." (Depo sition ofBrcnt Wilde, 44:25 - 45:6, Appendix Exhibit 3.)
Use of Vote of Community Counci l
137.

On September 14, 1999, the Mission was notified by the Fairpark Community

Council th at a vote would be taken of those attending the Community Council meeting schedul ed
for September 23, 1999, to detelllline whether or not the Community Counci l would be in favor
of the Mi ssion's presen tation. No form from the Zoning Administrator or PZD, acl<JlowJedging
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that the Mission had made a presentation regarding the proposal, was disclosed to or provided to
the Mi ssion for the City Chair to complete. (Affidavit of Wayne Wil son,

~

37, Appendix Exhibit

12 .)
138.

On September 23, 1999, the Mission made its presentation regarding the

Rosewood Terrace Property. A vote was taken of persons in attendance and of those who were
residents of the Fairpark Community, one hundred sixty-eight (168) opposed the Mission's
proposed Rosewood Terrace property relocation; four (4) were in favo r.

(Deposition Exhibits

).
139.

City staff from Plann ing and Zoning attended the meeting and took notes that

included the vote totals. (Deposition Exhibit

---.l

The Chair of th e Community Council

subsequently notified th e City Planning and Zo ning Department of the vote. (City _.)
140.

The totals were included in the PZO staff report to the Planning Commission.

(Affidavi t of Cheri Coffey, Appendix Exhibit 10.)
141 .

Nonetheless City ordinances mandate that if a Community Council issues a repOli

to the PZD the vote must be provided.

Nonetheless, the City's Answer stated that "[c}ity

ordinan ces do not requi re a community cou nci l vote on the proposal." (See City's Answer

'1 39 at

7 .)
142 .

Staff reports have not been consi stcnt in reporting to the Planning Commi ssion

the vote of the Conununity Counci l whcn recording various church's conditional use pemlit
applications. (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton

'1Appendix Exhibit II.)
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143

The City opposed the Mission's noticed, and coun sel attended TRO request to

delete the reference in the staff report to the Planning Commission to the (I) use of the vote of
those attending the Community Council meeting September 23, 1999, taken by the Fairpark
Community Council, (2) comparison of pol ice calls to other churches with that of the Missi on,
(3) use of present intemet speech site to define future conduct and, and (4) fa ilure to produce the
backup infonnation for the listing by the police of the numerous telephone call s fro m the
Mission. (Appendix Exhibit

).
Discouragem ent Given To Mission and

Encouragement Given to Other Churches to Remain in City
144.

On January 30, 1997, Pastor Wi lson received a written response from the staff of

the City Counsel regarding his request for assistance in find ing a place for relocation. He was
refeITed to the PZD. Alice Steiner, Executive Director of the RDA, and Marge Harvey of the
Mayor's Office, were copied on the January 30, 1997, letter. (Wayne Wilson Depo sition
145.

)

The April 20, 1998, Adm inistration Jntelllretation letter stated, "We would also be

willing to assist you in the location of a more sui table site that is consisten t with the city's
preference fo r smaller fa cilities in decentrali zed locations throughout the county.'"

Years latcr,

Randy Taylor confirmed the offer to assist the Mi ssion in its rclocation in decentralized locations
throughout the 'cou nty,' (rather than the 'city') was an attempt to broaden the potentia l
geographic base that would be more suitab le for those providing serviccs to the homeless.
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 44: 15-45 :7, Appendix Exhibit 5.) The Mi ss ion understood the

, Salt Lake Cit y Depos itio n Ex hibit #2.
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, 146.

unsolicited response to mean that so long as the C ity's policy fa vori ng

decentralization of servi ces for the homeless was in place, no m atter what the Miss ion proposed
as paJi of a co nditional use permi t application, staff of PDZ would detemline it had a "negative
impact" on the City because it was in the geographi c area of the other ser vice providers.

147.

On June 30, 2005, City issued an administrative determinati on allowing the

Summum religion accessory use request, justifying the same, in pa11, by allowing the religion
"free exercise of religion." (City 33)

148.

In December 8, 2005, the Commission approved a conditional use permit fo r a

church known to be affili ated with Interfaith to allow ovemight stay (in the priest's residence
area) and move the location of the foodbank . There was neither mention of, nor analysis, in the
staff report or the minutes of the C::ommission of either accessory use of the Church.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
II.

C la l'ifying F in al Claims Again st th e C ity

The Plai nti ffs are not pursuing relocation and participation claims again st the City as
identified in the Fifth and Sixth Cause of Action. Plaintiffs are not pursuing agai nst the City any
claim of entitlcment to relocation assistance under the federa l statutes and regulations outlined in
the Seventh Cause of Action.
Ill.

Pl aintiffs' Con stituti ona l C laims a nd RLU JPA C la im
A r c Properl y Befor e th e Co urt

The City has claimed that all of Pl aintiffs' claims should be dism issed on ripeness
ground s because Plaintiffs (I) have failed to obtain a final, definiti ve, decision from Salt Lake

City officials, and (2) have not exhausted the administrative procedures. Und er the facts of this
case at th is juncture, these arguments are invalid.
A.

Claims for Equitable Relief

The Pl ain ti ffs' claims for equ itable relief arise from three sources: RLU IPA , the Utah
Constitution, and the United States Constitution. "As applied" claims under RLUIP A and the
United States Constitution are also asserted. Claims for violation of federa l constitutional rights
are asserted for declaratory relief and damages under 42 U.S.c. § 1983.
I.

The M ission' s Claims under RLU IPA are Properly Before the Couli

RLUIP A provides an independent basis for jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc. The
Act was not available to the Mission during its 1999 efforts to relocate plior t.o moving to the
Central Christian Church. Nonetheless, the Mission raises the eq uality portion of the statute to
the prescnt challenges faced by the Mission as it relates to present treatment of Participating
Churches with Interfaith vis-a-vi s the Mission.
The poli c ies, practices, and customs of th e City have interfered with the ability of
transient ho meless to reccive intervention in emergency, life-threatening situations in Salt Lakc
City. The present inability of the Mission to relocate under lawful regulation has impacted its
ability to engage in religious worship, "feed and clothe Jes us" by serving meals and caring
spirituall y for the homeless and poor, which in tum has resulted in a decrease of purchase or
acquis iti on of food stuffs and clothing by the Mission in Salt Lake City (see Omitted Facts #2 1,

supra).

In the meantime, these resu lts , and the pressure to conform and become as a

Participating Church with Interfaith, thc loss of a mecting place and congregation, an d major

2

disruption of its ability to feed, clothe and shelter the poor and needy have constituted a
substantial burden on the religious mission of the Mission and the religious practices of Pastor
Wilson. All of the foregoing has 11ad a direct impact on interstate commerce' Based on the
foregoing, the jUlisdictional authority for Congress to act has been satisfied.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither the Mission nor Pastor Wilson can satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements to invoke the protections of 42 U.S.c. § 2000 cc (a). Under these
provisions, the City
shall [not] impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person, assembly or institution - (A) in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of
fulihering that compelling interest."
However, a "land use regulation" is defined so that a challenge to government action must be
based on its impact of a "zoning or landmarking law" that limits how a claim ant uses or develops
property in which the claimant has an interest. 9 Because the Mission's present facilities are not
the subject of challenge (because they are inadequate in te1111S of a sanctuary for worship services
and shelter accommodations), the Mission is not able to challenge the City's ongoing con du ct
under 42 U.S.c. § 2000cc(a).
Non etheless, the COUli of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has lef1 open the opportunity
of not so restricting a claim ants juri sdi cti onal ability to claim discriminatory interference. "

• 42 U.S .C. § 2000 cc (a) and (g) .
See 42 USC. 2000cc-5(5); Praler v. eilY of Burnside, Kenllld.J', 289 F. 3d 417, 433-43 4 (6 '" Cif. 2002).
Midrash SherCll'di, Inc. v. Town afSul/side. 366 F .3d 12 14, 1229-30 (200 4) em , denied 543 U. S. 1146, 12 5 S.Ct.
1295,161 LEd.2d 106 (200 5).

9

IU
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Furthermore, subseq uent precedent allowed evidence of the risk of discriminatory enforcement
as bein g sufficient to deny granting a City summary j udgment di smissin g a RLUIPA claim vis-avis an ordinance that had already been applied to a plaintiff."
RLUIP A provides that "[ n]o goverrU11ent shall impose or impl ement a land use regulation
that discliminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of reli gion or reli gious
denominati on. " (42 U.S .C. § 2000cc (b)(2).) For reasons cited above, th e City has discriminated
agai nst the Mission in its implementation of its land use regulations vis- a-vis the Participating
Churches with Interfaith ..
Furth enn ore, "[n) o government shall impose or impl ement a land use regulation that . .
unreasonably Iiln its religious asscmblies, institutions, or structures within a jllliscliction." (42
U.S.c. § 2000cc (b)(3)(B). Requiring the Mission, as a church, to incur the expenses of finding,
locating, and tentatively securing a location as a pre-requisite to appl yin g for an adm in istrative
interpretation to clarify vague ordinan ces and customary unlawful City practices to dete1111ine
what (I) are the limits of pe1l11issible "accessory uscs ... for reli gious worship" and (2) whether
or not th at use is a "custom[ary)" aspect of "religious worshi p" is both an "umeasonable" an d
substantial burden on thc Mi ssion.
Based on the forego in g, Pl ai ntiffs' case docs state a claim under RL UI PA bccause
"restri ctions or distinctions are [)related to the religious characterization.""

Ind eed, the

legislati ve history of RLUIPA suggests that the Mission may properly cease applying until the
past discriminatory acts and unfai r delay regarding the Mission is reso lved . "This Act does not
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KOllikov v. O)'(lilge Coullty Florida, 410 F.3d 1317, 1330-1331 (II 'h Cir. 2005).

provide religious institutions wi tb immunity from land use regulations, nor does it relieve
religious institutions from applying for variances, special pennits or exceptions, hardship
approval, or other relief provisions in land use regulations, where available without
discrimination or unfair delay." As applied, the Mission has demonstrated "discrimination or
unfair delay.""
Having shown standing to not apply prior to challengin g City ordinances facially under
RLUIPA based on di scrimination, the facial claims raised as a matter of the establishment clause
as well as vagueness, inji-a, are incorporated herein by this reference.
2.

The Mission's Equitable Claims under the State Constitution
are Properly Before the Court

Plaintiffs agree that they do not have a claim against the City for damages under tbe Utab
Constitution. (See City Memorandum at 27-28.) While interpretations of the Utah Consti tution
are usually dependent on an exhaustion of administrative rem ed ies,

14

th e Mission is entitl ed to

equitable relief under the same even though appeals were not taken ii'om the Planning
Commi ssion 's decision of October 7, 1999, or the Board of Adjustments decision of November
15, 1999, on the ground s of (1) irrcparable harm , (2) futility, and (3) the occurrence of action:Jble

events sin ce that date.

12

Midrash Sherardi, inc. v. TOllln 0/ Swfside, supra, 366 F.3d at J 235

5

11 .

17.

a.

Ineparabl e Harm

The United States Supreme Court has stated that as against government actions, "loss of
First Amendm ent rights, even for limited peri ods of time, constitute ineparabl e harm." "

As

aga in st indi vidu als, the Utah Su preme Court has found the harm required for injunctive reli ef is
appropriate for the" 'purpose of protecting [others'] right to religious worshi p ",16 and "freedom
of religion in being penni tted to worship in peace and good order. ,,1 7
A chall enge to completed Ci ty conduct under both the fi'ee exercise and establi shment
clauses of Utah' s co nstitution was all owed by the 2003 Utah Supreme Court opini on in Snyder v.

Murray City Corporation."

In 1994, the City of MUlTaY did not have forma l pol icies governing

guidelines or restrictions on prayers in City Council meeting.

On request, the City Attorney

outlin ed them by letter. In respon se, Tom Snyder submitted a written prayer and asked to give it
at th e next sched ul ed City Council meeting. The City Attorney responded by letter and rejected
the prayer because it failed to meet the previously provided f,'1liclel ines .
Not long after the request was denied, Snyder fi led a civil rigllts compl ai nt
cOUJ1 again st the City.
summ ary

judf,~llent

III

federal

On September 13, 1995 , the federal distri ct coul1 granted the City

on the federa l and state claims. On October 27, 1998, the en bane Court of

Appeals fo r the Tenth Circuit affirmed judgment on the federal claims and di smissed slate

IJ
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CONGo REG.

S7774-0 1, 'S7776 (2000) Goi nl statement orSc ns. I-latch and KefUlecly on the Rcligious Land

Use and lnstituti onal izcd Persons Act of2000) .
"See PallerSOn1'. American Fork Cfly, supra, 2003 UT at 11111 8-20; 69 P.3d at 472-73.
Il Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.C!. 2673, 49 L.Ed .2d 547 (J976)
Hi See COIparation afthe President oflhe Church of Jesus Christ a/Lauer-day Saints v. IVaI/lice, 573 P.2d 1285,
1287 (Uta h 1978) (citation omi ti ed.)
CO/pollion of the Presiden t oflhe Church
(J 979).
]1

0/Jesus

Christ of Lalter-day Saints v. Walla ce , 590 P. 2d 343, 345
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constituti onal law claims without prejudice.

On March 29, 1999, the United Slates Supreme

Court denied appellate review. On August 3, 1999, Snyder filed for relief in state district court
under the Utah Constitution. Notwithstanding the delay, the Utah Supreme COUJi detem1ined in
2003 that the following equitable reli ef was appropriate:
If Murray City chooses to continue to open its city council meetings with prayer,
it must strictly adhere to the neutrality requirements set forth h erein and in Society
of Separationists. Under those neutrality requirements, Snyder sh ould be allowed
to offer his prayer. J9
Like Snyder, the Mission and Pastor Wilson are entitled to pursue their claims for equitable relief
under the Utah Constitution. (The Plaintiffs, however, do not waive an as appli ed claim for
declaratory and equitable relief under the Utah Constitution as well.) Allowing such claims to
proceed fOlward when a majority of the Utah Supreme COUli recently has indicated a willingness
to enteliain free exercise claims under the Utah Consti tution in a manner th at compOlis with the
pre-1990 Smith federal rejecti on of the compelling govemmental interest and strict scrutiny
analysis."
b.

Futili ty

If the Mi ssion was unable to secure the needed approvals from Salt Lake City, the
Mission's lease with the Rosewoo d Tcna ce Building expired October 15, 1999 . (See Affid avit
of Wayne Wilson,

~

,Appendix Exhibit 12, Omitted Facts If 11 2, 127, supra.) As such, any

appeal of the October 21, 1999, written rulin g of the City's Plmmin g and Zoning Commission, or
the November 15, 1999, Board of Adjustments deci sion , in tell11S of seeking reversal of the same

18

2003 UT 13,73 P3d 325.

19 Snyder v. A1urray

Cily COlpom/ion, supra, 2003 UT '13 1,73 P.3d at 332.
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(as distinct from a damage claim) would have been moot, and futile, either on administrative
appeal or in district court.

The fact that the exception of "capable of repetition but evad in g

review" doctrine co uld have been invoked as a discretionary matter by the district court does not
establ ish that the administrative bodies (Land Use Appeals Board or Board of Adjustments)
could or would have done so.
In addition, the Mission was already in court having chall enged certain aspects of the
staff report being submitted to the Planning Commission; having continued the chall enge, inFa,
there is no basis to require administrative exhaustion of remedies.

c. Future Events Are the Basis for Equitable Relief
Vari ous completed events demonstrate the need fo r equitable relief under the Utah
Constitution to prohibit their continued practice use.

These unlawfu l practices include the

following: (I) using the administrative interpretation process withou t complyin g with the
mandatory requirements by ord inance that protect an applicant authorizing to invoke the samc
(see Omitted Facts #3, 4, 81, 83, 106, supra); (2) failing to follow the mandatory ordinance to
provide the Mission with the required form the community counci l was to sign (see Omitted
Facts ## 82, 11 7, 139, supra); (3) failing to use discrctionary authority in the City ordinances to
facilitate the Mission's application fo r a conditional use pennit or building permit when the
autho rity was used to facilitate the appli cation of other churches and non-churches (scc Omitted
Facts ## 118, 128, supra); (4) using lawful authority to single out the Mission for enforcement

20

See SWle v Green. 2004 UT 76 PP 63 (Justices Durham and Nehring) 65-73 (Just ice Durrant and Witkins) 98 P.3d
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when other churches and non-churches were not trea ted the same (see Omitted Facts #62-74,
supra); (5) using th e Board of Adjustment appeals process to thwart rather than fac ilitate the

"reli gious worship" of the Mission as was done for other churches or entities (see Omitted Facts
#9, 10, 56, 87, 88, 96, supra); and (6) interpreting facially clear or vague provi sions of City
ordinances to thwari the "religious worship" of the Mission, whi ch interpretation were contrary
to the interpretati ons provided to other religions or entities.
3.

Mission's Claims under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 are Properly B efore the Court

Salt Lake City is a "person" against whom a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may
be brought. A claim und er § 1983 can include injunctive, decl aratory and monetary relief. A
"final, definitive decision from Salt Lake City offici als" has occurred because the Mission is able
to establish a "prima facie" case showing violations of the United States Constitution based on
City's previous, definite, com pleted actions to whi ch the Mission had no right of appeal or was
not a pariy. Injunctive relief and damages can be awarded based on the Mission's presentation
of "prima facie" constituti onal violations by co mpl eted City administrative conduct as to the
Mission, other reli gions or religious entities, and relevant secul ar entiti es or persons.
The Mi ss ion is unwilling to apply to have the City determine what its "use" is for a
paJiicular area because of the ongoing facially invalid standards and previous past unlawful "as
applied" challenges imposed on the Mission. Having been previously criminally prosecuted,
Pastor Wilson similarly has imposed "self-censorship" on vari ous aspects of hi s "religious

820, 834-837 .
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worship" unti l these matters are clarified. (See Affidavit of Wayne Wi lson

'149,

Appendix

Exhibit 12.)

fV.

Jurisdictional Basis for Damage Claim Against the City ' s Unlawful
Ordinances, Policies, and Customs

Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, the City is liable fo r facially unconstitutional ordinances,
impl ementation and interpretation of the sam e by policymakers, and the creation of customs
upholdi ng unl awful interpretations and applications to Pl aintiffs.
A.

Adopting Ordinances Creates Policies

The United Stales Supreme Court has stated that
it is plain that municipal liab ility may be imposed for a single decision by
municipal policymakers under appropliate circumstances. No one has ever
doubted, for instance, that a muni cipality may be li ab le under § 1983 fo r a sin gle
decision by its properly constituted legi slative body-whether or not that body
had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future-because
even a single deci sion by such a body unquesti onably constitutes an act of official
· 21
govemment po 1ICy.
The City's adopti on of definitions of "rel igious worship" and "accessory use" that allow the
government to defin e what is an "accessory use ... fo r religious worship" and allow what is
"customary" religious worship (City Code §§ 21 A.62.040) facially vio lates the Establislunent
C lause and are unconstitutionally vague.

Even though an "applied" prior restraint on fi'ee

exercise of religion is required when chall enging city ordinances that regulate matters normally
not associated with express ion, as the success of the challen ge presupposes the ord inan ces as
adopted provided excessive discretion to decisiolUllakers and failed to impose time constraints on

10

decision makers, it is proper to subject the City to liability for the effects caused by excessively
discretionary ordinances.
B. Binding Nature of Decisions of I'olicymakers

Actions taken by the Mayor and the City Attomey (and their respective offices) as
policymakers of the City as well as custom and practice of City dep7artments bind the City as
the responsible party for the Mission's "as applied" claims under the establishment clause, fi·ee
exercise clause, equal protection, and due process clause. The COUli of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has stated:
Where a city official 'responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
subject matter in question' makes a deliberate choice to follow a course of action
. .. fi·om among various alternatives,' municipal liability attaches to the deci sion.
Pembaur v. City a/Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483,106 S.C!. 1292,89 L.Ed.2d
452 (1986). Municipal liability arises even if the official's decision is specific to a
paliicular situation. 22
A ci ty official may be a policymaker for the City "in a particular area, or on a particular issue.""
\Vhether a city official has "fi nal policymaking authority" is a question of state law." There are
three elements to detennine whether an official is a "final POliC)~llaker":
(I) whether the official is meaningfully constrained 'by policies not of that
official's own making;' (2) whether the official's deci sions are final- i. e. are they
whethcr the policy decision
subject to any meaningful review; and (3)
purportcdly made by the official is withi n the grant of authority."
Under this standard , the Mayor and City Attorney all have becn

p o lic )~l1akers

for the City as to

celiain aspects of this case. Unlike the City Council whose policy decisions expressed as

21

22
23

24

Pembclllr v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480,106 S.C!. 1292, 1298,89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986).
Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193 , 1 121 (lO'h Cir. 1998)
McMiltia n v. Monroe COUllty, Ala., 520 U.S. 781,785,117 S.C\. 1734,1 737, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997).
City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik , 485 U.S. 112, 124, 108 S.C\. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988).
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ordinances may be faci ally challenged, the acti ons of the City Attorney, Ma yor, and those to
whom authority has been del egated, are norma ll y chall enged for reason of their application o f
the ordi nances in question.
I.

City Attorney and Office as Policymakers for the City

Under state law, a City Attorney "may prosecute violation of city ordinances" and "shall
represent the interests of the ... municipality in the appeal of any matter prosecuted in any tri al
co ul1 by the City Attorney. "" A city attorney "has the same powers in respect to violati ons as
are exercised by a county or di strict attorney" except as to certain matters of transactional
immunity."

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has already recogni zed that both the

City Attomey and the County Attorney are binding policy-making deci sion-makers as it rel ates
to criminal prosecutions for their respective governments.28

Thus, the decision to prosecute

Pastor Wil son in 1996 was made by a policymaker for the City.
The same discretionary poli cy making authority of a deputy County Attol11ey in
Washingto n County rel ative to FOLlli h Am endment opti ons choscn to follow in a civil proceeding
was also rccogni zed as being clearly sufficient to establi sh hi s actions as a policym akcr for the
County. " .iust as a deputy County Attorney can be a poli cymaker in a County Attorney ' s Offi ce
through delegati on, likewise, a deputy City Attorney can be a poli cym aker through delegati on.

" Ra"dle v. City of ALirora, 69 F.3d 44 1,448 ( 10" Cir. 1995).
" U.C A S 10-3-928( 1) and (4).
21 U.CA S 10-3 -928(3); see also U.CA S 17- 18-1.
" See DLS. v. Ulah, 374 F.3d 97 1,974-975 (I O'h Cir, 2004) ("II fo llows that a plaintiff can not show a rea l illIeat of
prosecu tion in th e face o f ass ura nces [by affi dav its o f city prosecu tor and co un ty attorney] of non-prosecu tion fro m
the governmen t merely by pointing to a single past prosecllti on of a different person for different conduct. ")
29 See 1.8. v. iVashington COLinty, 127 F.3d 919, 924 (I O'h Cir. 1997)
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The deternlination that the City Attorney is an autonomous policymaker as it relates to
choosing between lawful and unlawful positions is in accord with the City ordinance that
provides that the City Attorney "shall be the chief legal officer of the City," being "responsible
to the mayor and city counci l for the proper administration of the legal affairs of the executi ve
and legislative branches of city govenunent," with the "responsibility . . . to administer the office
of the City AttoI11ey in a manner that will enable the mayor and the city council to fulfill their
respective duties in a timely fashion." (City Ordinances § 2.08.040 A I and A 2.) The fact that
neither the Mayor nor City Council are prohibited from using City funds to retain "separate
counsel" enhances the understanding that while they mayor may not agree with the advice and
actions taken, they do not have the authority to ovenide the deci sions of the City Attomey (or
delegated by him to those of his office) as policymakers for the City ..

In addition to the criminal pro secution of Pastor Wil son, the City AttoI11ey and hi s office
developed, was aware of, and/or approved of the foll owi ng: (J) the creati on and appli cation of
the Interfaith church policies (see Omitted Facts #

, supra); (2) the insisten ce on administrative

enforccment investi gations to be brought aga inst the Mi ssion (see Omitted Facts #

, supra);

(3) the creation and issuance of the Apri l 20, 1999, letter labeled as an admini strati ve
intcrpretation lettcr (see Omitted Facts #

, s1Ipra); (4) the crcation and iss uance of thc July 2,

1999 , letter regarding what the Mission potentially was to be classified as (sce Omitted Fa cts #
, supra); (5) th e creati on and the issuance of the August 31, 1999 , Ictter continuing to mand ate

pre-application presentation to a community coun cil meeting before being all owed to submit a
conditi onal use ap plication (see Omitt ed Facts #
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, supra); (6) the creation and issuan ce of the

September 14, 1999 letter labeled as an administrative interpretation letter (see Omitted Facts #
, supra); (7) opposing the Mission's efforts to remove from the statf repOli the (a) the communi ty
counci l vote; (b) comparison of the Mission to other churches; and (c) relying on past truthful
statements and lawfu l condu ct of the Mi ssion to denigrate futu re statements and religi ous
practices to engage in "religious worship" within agreed upon conditions which restricted both
speech and advertising (see Omitted Facts #

, supra); (8) defining the iss ues for review before

the November 15, 1999, Board of Adjustments (see Omitted Facts #

, supra); (9) interpreting

the factual "change" necessary to justify reconsideration of the Mission's 1999 appl ication for
the Ro sewood Terrace Building (see Omitted Facts #

,supra); (l0) interpreting the Mission's
,supra); (1 I) lIsing the 1999 Board

status at the Central Christian Church (see Omitted Facts #

of Adjustment ruling to continue classifying the Mission as a homeless shelter for purposes of
re-subm ission of a request to use the Rosewood Terrace Building (see Omitted Facts #

supra); and (12) refusing to id enti fy the reasons that justified the City's di fferent treatment of the
Interfaith churches (see Omitted Facts #
2.

, supra).

The Mayor as a Poli cvmaker for the City

For the same reasons, the Mayor of Salt Lake City is a policymaker for the City as wel l.
The mayor shall be responsible for the proper administrat ion of all affairs of the
city with which the office is charged. The mayor's powers and dutics include, but
are not limited to ... [s]upervising the administration and enforcemcnt of al l laws
and ordin ances of the city ... and [a]dministering and exercising control of al l
departments of the ci ty."
(City Ordinances 2.04 .010 A & B, Appendix Exhibit

14

)

The adoption of a City policy to discourage concentrati on of transient homeless in the
downtown area was in place and was function ing vis-a-vis the Mi ssion as early as 1994 and
carri ed through all of the Corradini administrati on. Although the Anderson administration stated
the City policy regarding the concentration of the homeless services in the City has ch anged (see
Omitted Facts #

, supra) , the result of the actions of that administration had the sam e effect as

it related to the Mission fulfilling its religious mi ssion as had th e action taken by the Corradini
admini stration.
The City Mayor and her or his offices developed, were aware of, and/or approved of the
following: (1) a concerted effori to displace the Mission from its premises in 1994 (see Omitted
Facts II

, iiL/pra); (2) adoption of a process allowing Parti cipatin g Churches and Interfaith to

circumvent the admini strative interpretation and conditional use pem1it process and an omission
of admini strative inspections of these "accessory use" h omeless shel ters (see Omitted Facts #

supra); (3) the favoring of the "religious worship" of Interfaith and the Part icipating Churches
working with families li ving in Salt Lake City that were temporaril y homeless over the "religi ous
worsh ip" of th e Mission that also includ ed single persons, tho se with add ictions , or in need of
shelter to prot.ect themsclves against life-threatening weather conditi ons (see Omitted Facts #
supra); (4) the promotion of moratoria dcsigned to thwart the Mi ssion's relocat ion in the first

half of 1999 in the Downtown or Gateway district (see Omitted Facts #

, supra); an d (5) the

continu ed no tifi cation to the Mi ssion that its location b ased on use was restricted to the 0- 3 and
CG zones whcn no such restriction had not becn placed on the Mission during its stay at the
Central Christian Church.

J5

C.

The C ustomary Practices of the P lanning and Zon ing Depa rtm ent
Are Policies of the City

The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Secti on 1983 also refers to deprivations under color of a state 'custom or usage'
an d the Court in M onell noted accord ingly that ' local govemments, like every
other § 198 3 'person.' ... may be sued fo r constitutional deprivation visited
pursuant to govemmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received
f0l111a l approval through the body' s offt ci al decision making channels.' 436 U.S.
at 690-691, 98 S. C!. at 2036. A § 1983 plaintiff may be able to recover from a
municipali ty without adducing evidence of an afft nnative decision by
policymakers if able to prove that the challenged action was pursuant to a state
'custom or usage.'JO
Of course,
[i]n the same way that a law whose source is a town ordinance can offend the
Fourteenth Am endm ent even though it has less than state applica ti on, so too can a
custom with the force of law in a politica l subdivision of a State offend the
Fourteenth Amendm ent even though it lacks state-wid e application .'1
Otl, er cOU1is have arti cu lated when a de facto custom of a City is sufficient to establi sh
municipa l li ab ili ty.
Unli ke a 'policy' , whi ch comes into ex istence because of the top-down
affirmati ve decision of a policymaker, a custom develops [rom the bottom-up.
Thu s, the liability of the munici pality for customary con stitutional violations
deri ves not from the creati on of the custom, but ii·om its toleration or
acquiescence in it. "
" It is not necessary that [the govenunental entity have] en dorsed these poli cies or customs

through legi slative action for it to earry its imprimatur."l3 A " custom or usage" is attributab le to
th e govenu11ental body when the "duration and frequency of practice warrants a finding of either

Pembau r v. eilY o/Cil1eil1l1",i, 475 U.S. 469, 46 1 n. 10,106 S .C!. 1292, 129911.10,89 L.Ed.2d 452 ( 1986).
31 Adiekes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173, 90 S.C!. 1598, 1616-16 17, 26 L.Ed .2d 142 (1970).
"8rillol1 v. Malol1ey, 901 F. Supp. 444,450 (D. Mass. 1995).
33 Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 8 15 (6'" Ci r. 2003).
30
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actual or constructive knowledge by ... the governing body [or poli cymaker with responsibility
for oversight and supervision] that the practices have become customary among its employees.""
When th e departments or officials in question repeatedly act beyond their authorized scope of
authority, resu lting in a constitutional violation, the governmental entity has shown "deliberate
indifference ... even if unaware of the unlawfulness of the acti on.""
The following customs or policies were foll owed by the City' s Plmming and Zoning
Department ("PZD"), all in violation of the constitutional rights of the Mission: (I) use of the
admini strative interpretation process without complying with the mandatory requirements by
ordinance to invoke the same (see Omitted Facts #

, supra) ; (2) fai lure to follow the

mandatory ordinance to provide the Mission with the required fOlm the communi ty counci l was
to sign (see Omitted Facts #

, supra); (3) failure to use discretionary authority to faci li tate the

Mission's application for a conditional use permi t or building permit w hen the authority was
used to faci litate the appli cation of other churches and non-churches (see Omitted Facts #
supra);

(4) use of lawfu l authority to si ngle out the Mission for enforcement when other

chu rches and non-churches were not treated the same (see Omitted Facts #

, supra); (5) use of

the Board of Adjustment appea ls process to thwart rath er than facilit ate the " reli gious wo rship"
of the Mission as was done for other churches or entiti cs (see Omitted Facts #

, supra) ; and (6)

interprcting facially clear or vague provisions of Cit y ordinances to thwart the "reli gious
worship" of the Missi on, which int erpretation was contrary to the int erpretations provided to
other religi ons or entities.

3'

Spell v. McDa niel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4'" Cir. 1987).
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V.

Facia l C hallenges 10 C ity Ordinances

The Pl aintiffs chall enge the City's ordinances on facial grounds under the Establi shment
Clause as well as the Due Process Clau se on vagueness grou nds .
A. Facial Viol ation of the Esta bli shm ent Cla use
The City's ordinances must satisfy three requirements under the Establishment Clause of
the United States Constituti on.
First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its prin cipal or primary
effect must be one th at neither advances nor inhibits religi on .. . ; finally, the
statute must not fo ster an ex cessive entanglement with religion 36
On the face, the text of the ordinance violates the third prong of the Lemon test by excessively
entangling the City in detcnnining wh at con stitutes "religious worship," an "accessory use ... of
religious worship," and whether that accessory use is "customary" for that religious worship.
On their face, the City ordinances defining a church and accessory use require the
uncon stitutional entanglement of the City' S secular perspective as to what constitutes "reli gious
worship."
"P lace of worship" means a church, synagogue, temple, mosque or other place o f
religious worship, including any accessory use or structure used for religious
worship.
"Accessory use " means a use that:

CA) Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to , and serves a
principal use;
CB) Is customarily found as an incident to such prin cip al use;

l5

J6

FOllst v. M cNeil, 310 F. 3d 849, 862 (5'" C ir. 2002).
Lemon v. Kllrt:mClIl, 403 U.S. 602, 612-6 13 , 91 S.C!. 2105,29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (quotations and citat ions

om itted .)
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(C) Contributes to th e com fort, convenien ce or necessity of
those occupying, working at or being servi ced by such
prin cipal use;

(D) Is, except as otherwise ex pressly authorized by the
provisions of thi s title, located on the same zoning lot as
such principal use; and
(E) Is under the same ownership or control as the principal use.
(City Code §§ 21A.62 .040) As written, the "place of worship" can be interpreted as including
"any accessory use," "any accessory use ... for religi ous worship," or "any accessory use ..
used for rel igi ous worship." All three interpretations violate the third prong of the Lemon test.
As written, the ordinances, require excessive entanglement insofar as the PDZ is required
to determine these uses, especially when th e ordinance fails to define when, and by wh om, a
"customary" use is allowed to change. Thus any church introduci ng any new aspect of "religious
worship" (apal1 from doctrine) that included conduct, even if it were all confined to the existing
premi ses, would be at ri sk.

Letti ng govellUllent define the all owed parameters of "religi ous

worship" with ill-dcfined cri teria requires excessive entanglement of the Ci ty in the affairs of the
church, in violation of both the state and federal establi shment clauses. Conseq uently, Salt Lake
City's use of these definiti ons is facially both "umeaso nable an d ilTation al" and subject to a strict
scrut in y und er "substantive due process" analysis."

" Smith lnveslmelll Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252-253 (U tah Ct. App. 1998).
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The use of altern ate definitions - such as those used by Salt Lake County or Bri gham
C ity - dernonstrate the City cannot show it has used the least restrictive means to achieve its
express or impli ed plalUling and zon ing objectives (see Omitted Facts #

, supra).

In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed an o rdinance that exempted
reli g io us sol icitations so lely for "evangelical, missionary o r religi ous but not secular purposes."
Secular solicitations were defined as "not spiritual or ecclesiastical, but rather rel ating to affa irs
o f the present world , such as providing food, clothing and counseling. " The Seventh-clay
Adventist Church chall enged the regulation after being told it had to register to so licit because
some o f the monies being solicited would be "used for the purchase o f food, clothing and shelter
for those in need."

Without regi steling, the Church raised an "as applied" challenge to the

City's notifi cati on to the Church that the regi stration requirement applied to its solicitati on
effOlis.
The setting up of a city agency to make distincti ons as to that which is religious
and that which is secular s o as to sUb.ieCt the laner regulation js necessarily a
suspect effOli. It may be that applied to an organization wnich can be shown to
commit atrocities in the name of religion or with a religi ous cloak would present a
different problem. We do not, however, ha ve this cond ition here. The conception
of religi on entertained by the City in this very case was that it had to be purely
spiri tual or evangclical. Thus, the charitable activity of the church having to do
with the fccding of the hunb~'y or the offer of clothing and shelter to the poor was
deemed to be subject to regulation. This broad definition of secular is part of the
problem. Wllether a less vigorous constru ction would result in a different
conclusion is not, o f course, before us and is not a proper subj ect fo r us to
consider. In asllluch, however, that the challenge is to the ord inance as applied we
must conclude that the present effol1 is an invalid interference ..... RegJJlal ion
which burdens the free exercise of religion and p_oses a threat o f entan glemen t
between tile affaIrs ot Church and State must be j uslifl_ed _~Y a eo nlpdlin g state
Interest, Sil erberl v. Verner. j14 U. s. 39/i, 8j S. ct. / 1'}0, iO L. 6d. l a 965
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(1963), and there must neit exist less restrictive and entangling altematives, Walz
v, Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 90 SCt, 1409, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1970)."
Even though thi s deci sion was pre-Smith , the City's ordinance would be subject to a strict
scrutiny anal ysis because the chall enged ordinances are detennined and applied on a "case-bycase" basis, (see Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, Appendix Exhibit I 0,) or as applied to Interfaith's
Participating Churches, there is an exclusive "group" detenninati on of appropriateness as to prior
and future "accessory use" related to the "place of worship ,"

1.

Facial Violation of Prohibition on Vagueness

Plaintiffs challenge the ordinances of the City ordinances on grounds of vagueness, ,
Vague laws offend several impOItant values, First, because we assume that man
is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist th at laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly, Vague laws trap the iIU10cent by not
providing fair waming, Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to
be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them, A
vague law impem1issibly delegates basic poli cy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc basis and subjective basis, with the attendant
danger of arbitTary and discriminatory application,39

"A regulati on is voi d on its face if it is vague that persons 'of common intelligence must
necessaril y guess as to its meaning and differ as to its appl ication.' Connally v, Gen, ConsU', Co"
269 US 385, 39 1, 46 S Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed 322 (1926)."" For the reasons notcd above under

the establi shment clause claim, the City' S ordinances are also unconstitutionally vague.

38

39

40

Espi nosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 , 48 1-82 (10"' Cir, 1980) .
Flipside, supra, 455 U,S. a l 498; 102 S. CL a l 1193,
KOllikav v. Orange Caull I)' Florida, 410 F.3d 1317, 1329 (5'" Ci r. 2005).
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Notwithstanding the stated req ui rement to present to a communi ty co unci l before a
conditi onal use pennit may be accepted, Salt Lake City has all owed the zoning admini strator to
ha ve unbridl ed di screti on in determining whether to wai ve that requirement.
A complete appli cati on shall contain at least the following infonnati on submitted
by the appli can t, unless certain infonnation is determined by the zoning
admini strator to be inappli cable or unnecessary to appropriately evaluate the
appli cati on: ... (11) such further infomlation or documentation as the zoni ng
admini strator may deem to be necessary fo r a fu ll and proper considerati on and
disposition of the particular appli cation"
As used in the licensing context, similar language has been found to vi olate " unbli dled
discretion" prior restrain t requirements.

42

In addition, because of its inherent contradictory

nature with the opening authority of waiver, it fa ils to give notice of what waiver can be sought
for by an applicant.
VI.

"As A ppli ed" Challenges to the City Ordinances Brought by the P lain tiffs

Based on the foregoing conduct authorized by or known to policymakers of the
City, or establi shed customs, the Plaintiffs bring "as applied" challen ges on gTOunds of viol ations
of the establishment clau se, vagueness based on the due process clau se, "prior restraint" of free
exercise of religi on, fi'ee exercise of religion , denial of due process regarding the Board of
Adjustment ruling on November 15, 1999, and equal protection.
The Missi on is unwilling to apply to have the City determine what its "use" is for a

41

SLC Cil y Code § 21 A 54.060 8, 11.

See AlIl ericall Target Advertisillg,
34,148 L.Ed.2d 14 (2000).

42

1I1C.,

199 F.3d 124 1, 125 1- 1254 (J 0'" Cir. ) cen . dellied 53 1 U. S. 8 11 , 12 1 S.C! .
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particular area b ecause of the ongoing facially invalid standards and previous past unlawful "as
appli ed" challenges imposed on the Missi o n.

Having b een previou sly criminally pro secuted ,

Pastor Wi lson similarly has imposed "self-censorship" on various aspects of hi s " religious
worship" until these matters are clarified. (See Affidavit of Wayne Wil son ~ 49, Appendix
Exhibit 12.)

A.

Esta blishment Clause Violations

To the degree the facial challenge raised as a violation of the E stabli shm ent Clause is
faciall y rejected, the sam e claims are also raised in as applied context.
The City's ord inances, practices and customs must satisfy three requirements under the
Establi slunent Clause of the U nited States Con stitntion .
First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its prin cipal or pnmary
effect mllst be o ne that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; fin ally, the
statnte must not fo ster an excessive entanglement w ith religion'3
As administered, the City delegated governmental functions to a religious association In
violati on of the second and third prong of the Lemon test. As administercd, the City has favored
certain religions o r religi ous entities over the Mi ssion, thus violating the Establ ishment Clause.
1.

Improper D elegati on of Civic Authority to a Religious Entity

In 1989, the United States Supreme COUli observed that
[i]n the co urse of adjudicating specific cases, this COUl1 has come to understand
the Establislullent Clause to mean that government ... may not di scrimin ate
among persons on th e basis of their religious beliefs and practices [and] may not
del egate a governmen tal power to' a religious in stitution[.t 4
Lemon v. Kurloman, 403 U.S . 602, 612·613, 91 S.Ct. 21 05, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1 97 1) (qu otations and citati ons
omirted. )
" CoullIY oj Allegheny v, American Civil Liberlies Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590·91, 109 S.C!. 30S6, 106 L.Ed. 2d 472
(1989) (footnoles containing citations omitted.)
43
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The City's practice of (I) treating the services to the homeless provided by the Participating
Churches as coming within the practices and poli cies of the Interfaith with out further inspection
and (2) al lowi ng the Participating Churches to ci rcumvent the admini strati ve interpretation or
process of acquiring a co nditi onal use penni t based on representations of Interfaith vio lates these
constituti onal requirements.
We can assume that [Interfaith] would act in good faith in their exercise of the
[delegated] power, yet [the City'S practice] does not by its tenns require that the
[Interfaith 's] power be used in a reli giously neutral way. The potential for conflict
inheres in the situation, an d [the City has] not suggested any effecti ve means of
guaranteeing that the delegated power will be used exclusively for secu lar,
neutral, and nonidelogical purposes. In addition, the mere appearance of a joint
exercise of legi slati ve authority by Church and State provides a significant
symbolic benefit to reli gion in the minds of some by reason of the pow er
conferred . It does not strain our prior holdings to say that the [practice] can be
seen as having a "plimary" and "principal" effect of advancing rel igion 45
Furthermore, relying on Interfaith' s representations as being sufficient to all ow uninvestigated
conduct of member churches that on the face could merit enforcement of zoning requirements
mandating relocation of Participating Churches to other zones of the City, violates the third
prong of the Lemon test.
[The City's practice] emmeshes churches in the exerCIse of substantial
governmental powers contrary to our consistent interpretation of the
Establishment Clause; ' the objective is to prevent, as fa r as possible, the intru sion
of either [Church or State] into the precincts of th e other. ' Lemon v. Ku rlzmC/n, ...
We went on in that case to state:
Under our system the choice has been made has been made that govellU11 ent
is to be entirely excluded fi'om the area ofrel igious instruction and churches
excluded from the affai rs of governmen t. The Constitution decrees that
45

Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116,125- 126,103 S.Cl. 50 5,74 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982) (c itations and quo tations

o mitted.)
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religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the
institutions of private choice, and that while some invol vem ent and
entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.
Our contemporary views do no more than reflect views approved by the Court
more than a century ago:
The structure of goverrunent has, for the preservation of civi l liberty,
rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other
hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.
As these and other cases make clear, the core rationale underlying the
Establislunent Clause is preventing 'a fu sion of governmental and religious
functions.' The Framers did not set up a system of govenunent in which
important, discretionary governmental powers woul d be delegated to or shared
with reli gious instituti ons.
[The City's de facto delegation of authority to Interfaith) substitutes the
unilateral and absolute power of a church[ -related entity) for the reasoned
decisionmaking of a public legi slative [and admini strative) body acting on
evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant economic and
political implications. The challenged [practice) thus enmeshes [affiliated)
churches in the processes of government and creates danger of '[p)olitical
fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines,' Lemon v. Kurtzman, ...
Ordinary human experi ence an d a long line of cases teach that few entanglements
could be more offensive to the spirit of the Constitution. 46
Thus, the City's reliance on Interfaith's representations both as to what services are provid ed to
the homeless of Pmii cipating Churches and over time the safety of the environmen t in which
they are provided fails the tllird prong of the Lemon tcst.
2.

Objective Favoring of Other Churclles and Religi ons Over the Mission

In addition to the conduct of the City with Interfaith recited above, the fa ctual basis for
several of the Mission's claims includes the following conduct of the City vis-a-vis otber
churches as compared to actions taken by the City regarding the Mission.
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a,

Disparate Enforcement of Code

While functioning as a church and fu lfilling its ministry to the homeless, the Mi ssion was
subj ect to admini strative inspection s while other Participating Churches were not (see Omitted
Facts #

,supra) ,

b,

Di sparate Enforcement of Conditional Use Process

Without adm ini strative authOlity to do so, the City's PZD did not require the Zion's
Lutheran Church to apply for and complete the cond itional use process for a substantial
expansion of a conditional use, FUIihennore, none of the Participating Churches were required to
obtain a conditional use pemlit ei ther for an expansion of a pre-existing conditional use (through
a new "accessory use", fo r religious worship") or at least an administrative ruling (with notice
to tbe community counci l) that tbe invol vement with a facially applicable "homeless shelter"
definition was to be subsumed as an "accessory use," The Mission was never all owed any of
these options,
c,

Disparate Use of Board of Adjustment Process

The PZD treated the Mi ssion differently in terms of presentation and procedure to the
Board of Adjustmcnts than that Llsed with the Church of tile Madeline and the Jewish
Commun ity Ccnter. The appeals focused on the religi ous related entit ies' "secular" activities,
e,g, a schoo l at Church of the Madeline and a day care center at th e Jewish Community
Center. For these two ent it ies , the PZD and Board of Adjustments encouraged and allowed
(I) delays to obtain a clarifyin g legal opinion or modify an earli er ruling of the Board, as

.16 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, s1Ipra,

459 U.S. at 126-127 (quotations, citations, and fOOlnote omitted.)
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well as (2) a request made, after disclosure, for a Board of Adjustment decision regarding
what was considered to be an "accessory" use of the Jewish Community Center if it
disagreed with the assessment of Randy Taylor. In the Mission's case, the City would not
delay the hearing even though the appellant requested that the Board do so . In add iti on, the
Board of Adjustments was not notified by the City of the practice of considering the
providing overnight accommodations on a temporary basis for families by Participating
Churches with Interfaith to be an "accessory use" to their "place or worship" and not
requiring a conditional use pennit.
d.

Disparate Recognition of Value of Free Exercise of Religion

On June 30, 2005, a request for an administrative exception was granted to the Summum
religion.

One of the reasons relied upon to grant the same was to allow the church the "fi·ee

exercise of religion". (City 33) It is not apparent that at any time the Mission's "free exercise of
religion" was factored into the City's dealing with the Mission.
3.

Violation of United States Establishment Clause

In addition to the violation of the third prong of the Lemon test noted under the facial
challenge, when these examples of disparate treatment are taken together or individually, a
violation of Establishment Clause has been dem onstrated.

As applied to the M ission, such

conduct violates the first and second prong of the Lemon test.
a.

Abandonment of Secular PUI])OSe

As noted above, the City's ordinances have been interpreted as fa vori ng one perspective
of "religi ous worship" as an "accessory use" over other perspectives that are also understood to

27

be "reli gious worship ."

While the use is claimed to be secular in purpose by the City, the

continuation of the Interfaith favoring practice without amending the ordinances to clarify the
all owabl e p arameters places in question the purpose of the application of the City ordinances.
The proffered "purpose" of the legislati on is evaluated by an objective observer who is
presumed to know the (I) "hi story and context of the community," (2) " historical context of th e
[govemmen( action]", (3 ) "specific sequence of events leading to its passage", and (4)
"implementation" of govel1un ent action

47

' [TJhe question

"

IS

what viewers may fairly

understan d to be the purpose of the [action], ,,48 and whether it ""makes outsiders of nonadherents .',49 Based on the hi story of the City's interaction with Interfaith and the Mission, one
could sUI111i se that there has been an abandonment of a "true" secular purpose: "religious
worship" involving the poor and tbe needy is acceptable if it meets specific criteria, a dominant
one of which is that the person s come from the local community (and not be tran sient), be an
intact fam ily, and have no addictions. While such restraints may keep the "not in my back yard"
syndrome ("NIMBY") to a minimum whil e simultaneously reaping tbe benefit of pri vate charity
ass isting the homel ess rather than government, when impl emented in a way that favors such
"" religi ous worship," and no clear demarcation as to what is favored and unfavored secular
conduct, the original secular "pu rpose" of the ordi nance is disclosed in advance by ordinance,
policy or rule, the real purpose of tile applicati on of the terms is , at best, s uspect.
Lemon's "purpose" requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental
deci sionmaker- in this case, Congress- from abandoni ng neutral ity and acting
47 A4cCreCllJI County, Kell/l(cky v. Americ(ln Civil Liberties Unio ll o/Ken/ueh.)!, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2737 (2005).
(quotatio n omitted.)
48 Jd at 2738 (quotation omi tted.)
" Jd. at 273 5.
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with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters . .. [Ilt is
a signifi cant burd en on a religi ous organization to require it, on pain of s ubstantial
liability, to predi ct whi ch of its activiti es a secular court will consid er religious.
The line is hardly a bright one, and an organ ization might understandably be
concemed that a judge would not understand its reli gious tenets and sense of
miss ion. Fear of potential liability might affect the wayan organization carried
out what it understood to be its religious mi ssion. 50
Both the Mission and Pastor Wilson seek clarification of the City's requirements before
proceedin g forward.
b.

Favoring One Religion Over Another

"[TJhe 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal government ... can pass laws which ... prefer one religion over
another. "S I The "First Amendment mandates neutrality between rel igion and religion"s2

"

"Lemon's" purpose requirement aims at preventing [govemmentJ from abandoning neutrality
and acting with the intent of promoting a particular poi nt of view in religious matters."S]
Fa voring one religion over another, undennines the "understanding, reached ... after decades of
religious war, that liberty and social stabi lity demand a religious tolerance that respects the views
of all cit izens .... "S4 The express acts of the City favoring of the Interfaith' s view of "reli giolls
worship" over that of Pl ai nti ffs vio lates the second prong of tile Lemon test.

50 Corporation oJ lh e Presiding Bish op a/ lh e Church ojJesus Christ of Latler-day Saill ts v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
335-33 6,107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed .2d 273 (1987).
" Everson v. Board oj Ed"calion oj Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 5 11, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) rehearing
denied 330 U.S. 855 , 67 S.C! 962 (1947).
"Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104,89 S.C! 266, 21 L. Ed.2d 228 (19 68).
53 COIporatjon of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jeslis Christ oj Laller-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335,
107 S.Ct. 2683 , 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) .
"Zelman v. Simmons-Hoeris, 53 6 U.S. 639, 718,122 S.C! 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002).
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B.

Due Process Vagueness Cha ll enge

By showi ng the following six "vagueness" applications of the City ordinances to the Mi ssio n,
Plaintiffs demonstrate the validi ty of th e Plaintiffs' "as appl ied" chall enge.
First, in September 14, 1999, Randy T aylor originally found that the Mission's practice
of providing emergency she lter in life-threatening circumstances would constitute an accessory
Lise to the primary uses of a place of worship and a boarding hou se. He later reflected that "any
reasonable person" would have interpreted the ordinances that way so long as those in need did
not come in " hord es". (Deposition of Randy Taylor _ _ Appendix Exhibit 5.) On the other
hand, on September 8, 2003, the Mission was advised that the emergency overnight stay of a
single homeless person would qualify the Mission as a homeless shelter. see Omitted Facts #

supra) . It remains unknown whether or not the sleeping of persons at the Mi ssion dUling
Christmas Eve 1996 would be a violation as defined September 8, 2003.
Second, there was a significant di fference in perspective as to what was required to issue
and admin istrative interpretation.

This is significant because Randy Taylor insisted tha t he

fo ll owed the requirements of City ord inances regarding the submi ssion of Administrative
Interpretations. (Deposition of Randy Taylor _ _ , A ppendix Ex hibit 5.) Nonetheless, there was
no evidence that the mandatory, limit ing application procedures were foll owed when lssUlng
what he considered to be administrative interpretations (see Omitted Facts #

, supra.) Wayne

Mills, on the other hand, would not characteli ze his June 2 1, 2004 lettcr as being and
admi ni strative interpretation because, in part, Pastor Wilson never filled out the fon11 or paid the
fee. (Deposition of Wayne Mills 31 :2-13, Appendix Ex hibit 8.)
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3;J?')
__ on

Third, the impact of the change in city policy was viewed differently by different zoning
admi ni strators.

And again in 1999, the existing city policy regarding the decentralization of

services for homeless people was specifically relied upon as a basis to notify the Mission that its
proposal woul d not receive a positive recommendation. Later, under Mayor Anderson's
administration, the Ci ty changed its policy to reflect centralization of services for homeless
people. This is fraught with the potential to facilitate or fru strate the "religious worship" of the
Mission under one situation, the Mission's factual submissions from their 1999 request for a
conditional use pennit could be revaluated and considered again in 2003 . In another, the Board
of Adjustments ruling would effectively bar any appli cation submitted by the Mission without a
change in what it intended to do at the Rosewood Terrace facility.

Randy Taylor, zoning

administrator tluough 2000, testified that such a change in policy would provide the factual basis
necessary to allow for a re-evaluation of the Board of Adjustments determination in 1999 that
classified the Mission's proposed use at the Rosewood Terrace Building as a homeless shelter.
(Depositi on of Randy Taylor, 38: 12-24; 4 1:13-42:2 Appendix Exhibit 5). On the other hand ,
even on June 2 I, 2004, Wayne Mills, acting Zoning Admini strator, issued an infonnal letter to
the Mis sion indicating that because their was an absence of a "factual" change in the proposal of
the Mi ssion, precluded reconsiderati on of the Mi ss ion's prior submi ssion on the Rosewood
Terrace Building.

(Depos iti on Exhibit # __ ; Deposition of Wayne Mill s, Appendi x Exhibit

8).

Fou rth, on September 10, 1999, tluee draf1s of a letter regarding the potenti al use of the
Mission at the Rosewood Terrace Bui lding (167 North 600 West) were prepared fo r Randy
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Taylor's signature. One provided the Mi ssion was a church, one provided the Mission was a
ch urch and boardin ghouse, and one provid ed the Mi ss ion was a church, boardinghouse, and
homeless sheller. These letters were the results of discussions with Brent Wilde, Bil l Wright,
and Lynn Pace. "To the best of [Rand y Taylor's] knowledge, [the draft letters] seem to represent
how th e Mission could have been classified at that time. (See Omi tted Fact _ , supra.)
Fifth, certain words and phrases remained standardless or diffi cult to understand even for
Zoning Administrators. For example, Wayne Mill s indicated he co uld m ake a "new" review of
the classi fi cation of the Mission as a "homeless shelter" by the Board of Adjustment at the
Rosewood Terrace Building if the Mi ssion would submit a "new proposal" regarding the
propeliy showed there was a "chan ge" from the previous submission. The criteria to detenlline
if there was a "change" could be "anything".
Q
A

Q
A

What type - what criteria do yo u use to detenlline if there' s been a
change?
It could be anything, [ would have to see the proposal.
Tell me what you mean by anything.
It depends upon what is being prop osed.

(Depo sition of Wayne Mills 20: 13 - 18 . Appendix Exhibit 8.) Randy Taylor also struggled to
provide definite criteria to ex plain the meaning of an aspect of tbe City Code that had been
quoted in the April 20, 1999, administrati ve int crpretation letter to the Miss ion. When asked bow
a "negative impact" on the neighborhood was di stinguislled from the same impact on "the city as
a whole," he stated: " I just -- - 1 guess that the neighborh oo d, being pa rt of the ci ty as a whole, is
... how I would respond to thaI." (Deposit ion of Randy Tayl or, 43:11-19 , Append ix Exhib it 5.)
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Six th, equally criti cal to this case was that neither the interplay between an "accessory
use" of a church and a "homeless shelter," nor the difference between the Mi ss ion's church
functions, "religious worship," and services to the homeless, were understood by Randy Taylor
after months of review". Randy Taylor perceived the "use" classification in the Mi ssion's case
as being complicated because of "the level of services and so on to homeless and to --- and the
substance abuse and all being considered conditional uses in most lo cations ." (Deposition of
Randy Taylor, 60:10-14 Appendix Exhibit 5.) Pastor Wilson or some of his staff talked with
Randy Taylor about the Mission being a church, with part of its mission being to feed and clothe
the needy because to do so is feeding and clothing Jesus, and, thereby, is an integral part of their
religious worship . (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 29:25-30:5 Appendix Exhibit 5.)

As the

Zoning Administrator, "to the extent that --- that as a church activities like substance abuse and
homeless services of various kinds would be considered allowed uses under the umbrella, if you
wi ll , of the church, that part of it was complicated to me." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 61 :2-6
Appendix Exh ibit 5.) The compli cating lack of clarity was exacerbated by the question in Randy
Taylor's mind about the distinction between a mi ss ion and a church.

Some aspects of the

Mission clearly appeared to be church and/or worship activiti es; whereas, counselin g, referrals,
providing meals, and other social aspects would be classified by Mr. Taylor to be activitics in
which a mission would engage - related, but di stinctly separate from worship.
Well, yes, there was some question in my mind . There was quite a bit of
discussion about mission versus church. And I didn't pretend to understand fully
what a mi ssion is, but J had an idea. But they celiainly sounded like a church in
many, many, many ways and did church-related things ... what I thought a mission

"
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was was a --- you, know, the kinds of things that they do. They provide services
of valious kinds to folks who need them, a Iunch, a --- some counseling, some --some refelral to help of various kinds ... 1 viewed it probably more as a --- you
know, you've got your church and the worship services, and then you've got the
social aspects on the side or along with thal. And I viewed them as different
things, related but different.
(Depo sition of Randy Taylor, 75:2 I -76:20 Appendix Exhibit 5.)
Confli~ting

interpretations among those charged with enforcing zoning laws that impact

First Amendment freedom of religion is sufficient to establ ish a violation of RLUIP A and rel ated
constitutional doctrines of vagueness and unbrid led discretion that accompanies prior restraints. "
When a[n] [ordinance] implicates First Amendment rights, we may consider the
risk of arbitrary enforcement-the possibi li ty the statute will chill expression ....

[Konikov] presented evidence that tends to show that the law does delegate too
much authority to those charged with enforcing it. Two members of the Code
Enforcement division differed in their opinion of what frequency would trigger a
violation. According to Officer Caneda, two meetings per week would not trigger
a violation, but three probably would. George LaPOIte, the manager of the
division, on the other hand, opined that even one meeting per week could
constitute a violation. Although the officers do not make a fina l detennination of
violation, they have discretion to initiate an investigation into a possible violation,
which can lead to discriminatory enforcement. Because Konikov has produced
evidence that the Code has an inherent risk of discriminatory enforcement, he has
established the vagueness of the Code. For this reason, we reverse the di strict
court's grant of summary judgment on this claim."
As in this case the Mission has shown not a risk of arbitrary enforcement but actual,
di scriminatory enforcement a/or/fori the City's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

56 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that when "unbridled discreti on" is shown as a matter of prior
res traint anal ys is, th en fa cial unconstitutionalit y on grounds of va gueness as it relates to arbitral), enforcement has
been establ ished. See ACO RN ele. v. Tulsa.

" KO llikov v. O range Co unly FloridC/ , 41 0 F.3d 13 17, 133 0-1 33 1 (1 I" Cir. 2005).

34

C.

" Prior Restraint" of Free Exercise of Religion Challenge

In 1940, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held as un constitutional a state statute
that required obtaining a certificate from a government official prior to soli citing for a religious
cause.
It will be noted, however, that the Act requires an application to the secretary of
the public welfare council of the State; that he is empowered to detennine if the
cause is a religious one, and the issue of a certificate depends upon his affinnative
action. If he finds the cause is not tbat of religion, to solicit for it becomes a
crime. He is not to issue it as a matter of course. His decision to issue or refuse it
involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the fonnation of an
opinion. He is authorized to withhold his approval if he detennines that the cause
is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of detennining
its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and
included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth .. .58

(A 1975 Court opinion found that "[t]he elements of a prior restraint were clearly set forth" by
the foregoing language. 59) The 1940 COUli continued:
The line between a discretionary and a ministerial act is not always easy to mark
and the statute has not been construed by the State COUJi to impose a mere
ministerial duty on the secretary of tbe welfare counci l. Upon his decis ion as to
the nature of the cause, the right to solicit depends. Moreover the avai labi li ty of a
judicial remedy for abuses in the system of licensing sti ll leaves that system one
of previous restraint which, in the field of liee speech and press, we have held
inadmi ssible. A statue authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the
guarant eed freedom by judicial decision afier trial is as obnoxious to the
Constitution as one providing for like restraint by admini strative action ... 60
[T]o co ndition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views of
system s upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a detcll11ination
by state authority as to wh at is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidd en burden upon
the exercise ofliberty protected by th e constituti on ... 61

" CCIIl/lVell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 2 13 ( 1940).
"SoLllh easlel'll Promo tio ns, Ltd. v. Conl'Qd, 420 U. S. 546, 554 ,95 S.Ct. 1239 ,43 L. Ed. 2d 44 8 (1975).
60 Cantwell v. Sta te of Cunnecticut, 3 10 U.S . 296, 306, 60 S.C!. 900, 84 L. Ed. 2 13 (1940).
" Call/well v. State of Connecticut, 31 U.S. 296, 307. 60 S.C!. 900, 84 L. Ed. 2 13 (1940).

°
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A 1980 Court opinion characterized the J 940 opinion as holding the statute unconstitutional as
an "invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion.,,62 In 1990, the COUJi recognized the

1940 opinion as an example of a hybJid claim of fi'eedoms of speech and religion that merited
protection under a "licen sing system ... under which an admini strator had discretion to deny a
li cense to any cause he deemed nOJU"eligious.,,6J
However, laws dealing with zoning and the issuance of permits (as distinct from licensing
religious speech) require an "as applied" situation to bring the claim because they are presumed
to be removed from the regulation of First Amendment expression.
For example, a law requiring building pennits is rarely effective as a means of
censorship. To be sure, on rare occasion an opportuni ty for censorship will exist,
such as when an unpopular newspaper seeks to build a new plant. But such laws
provide too blunt a censorship instrument to warrant judicial intervention prior to
an all egation of actual misuse. And if such charges are made, the general
application of the statute to areas uJU"elated to expression will provide the COUltS a
yardstick with which to measure the li censor 's occasional speech-related
decision"
Fear of prosecution if religious beliefs were exercised and subsequently determined to not be an
"accessory use ... for religious worship" has limi ted the religious practice of the Mi ssion and
Pastor Wil son. Refusal of the City to publicly define what the "accessory LIse" stand ards are as
compared with th ose of a '11Omeless shelter" on ly has exacerbated the problem. (Affidavit of
Wayne Wilson , ~ 44 , Appendix Exhibit 12).

Village ujSchawnberg v. CiJi: ens jor A Beller EnvironmenJ, 444 U.S. 620, 629, IDa S.C l. 826, 63 L.Ed. 2d 73
( 1980)
63 Employment Divisio n. Deparlment of Human Resources a/Oreg on v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 88 1, J 10 S.CL 1595 .
108 L. Ed. 2d 87 6 ( 1990).
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I.

Unbridled Di scretion

The previous facial and six examples of "as applied" vagueness as it relates to noti ce and
standard of enforcement noted above are incorporated herein by this reference.

This is in

accordance with ex isting precedent establishing that the "vagueness" and "unbridl ed discretion"
und er a plior restraint chall enge are interchangeable."
2.

No Time Constraint for Pre- judi cial Review

The City does not have any time constraints under which it must issue an infonnal or
fonnal administrati ve ruling regarding a particu lar use on specific propel1y. The City has taken
longer to classify the Mi ssion vis-a-vis the secular categories u sed to detennine applicable "use"
than other entities. For example, while it nom1ally takes two to three weeks to detem1ine a use,
see Omitted Facts #

, supra, the incomplete classification of the use of the M ission in 1999

took at least five weeks (March 12, 1999, through Apri l 20, 1999). The informal requ es t for
classification as a church took at least thi lieen weeks (J uly 1, 1999, through September 14, 1999)
to receive an answer. Usi ng the second request in 2004 for an informal requ est fo r classifi cation
as a church, it took over seven weeks (May 3, 2004, through June 2 1, 2004) to recei ve a
response. The 1998 by Randy Taylor rcquest for more informati on regarding the And rews
Avenue location was accompanied by an open ended with no time constrai nt on when a use
wou ld be determined.

" 71Je Tool Box. Inc. v. City o/Ogden, 355 F. 3d 1236, 1242 (10'" CiT. 2004) qu otin g Cily
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 76 1, 108 S.C\. 21 38 , 100 L.Ed.2d 77 1 (1988).
" See A CORN v. Cil), o/Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 741 n.1 ( 1O'h Cir. 1987).
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0/ Lakewood v.

Plaill

The City never provided the Mission with the document to be signed by the
neighborhood counci l as part of the pre-appl ication process (see Omitted Facts #

, supra.)

There is no time constraint as to when the Zoning Administrator is to provide this document.
The Mission was required to re-present to the Rio Grande Community Council in April of
1999 as well as delay its filing of an application in August of 1999 because of the failure of the
Fairpark Community Council to meet that month (see Omitted Facts #

, supra .) There are no

time nor procedural constraints in the City ordinances addressing how these delays are to be
treated so as not to burden the religiously based applicant.
Pre-1999, the Mission was impeded in its effOlis to apply for approval when community
councils were either not scheduled (by PZD) or refused to issue velification of a presentation
(see Omitted Facts #

, supra.) On the face, there is no time constraint as to when the

neighborhood counci l or other entity must (1) hear the presentation of the church, (2) or act on
the church's explanation.
Based on the foregoing, the Mission may bring an action seeking relief against the City
for imposing a "pri or restraint on fi'ee exercise ofreligion".
D.

Violation of Free Exercise o f Religion

In 1993, the United States Supreme Court made the following statemcnt:
The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, and
upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from
animo sity to religion or distrusts of its practices, all officials must pause to
remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the lights it secures.
Those in office must be resolute in resisting impol1unate demands and must
ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are
secular. Legislators may not devise mechani sms, ovel1 or disguised, designed to
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persecute or oppress a religion or its practi ces. The law s here in questi on were
enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are vo id 6 6
As applied to th e Mission, the Mi ssion was impeded in its religious mi ssion by th e following
conduct approved by City policymakers: (1) the City followed the " unus ual" practice of havin g a
landlord seek to evict the Mission in 1994 as a nui sance in violation of zoning laws instead of
doing it themselves as was n01111all y done (see Omitted Facts #

, supra); (2) the City had staff

oppose or debate with the Mission during its presentation at every community council meeting
(see Omi tted Facts #

, supra); (3) the City took very ex tend ed periods of time to determin e the

Mission's use classification (see Part VI(B), supra); (4) th e City imposed the conditi onal use
pennit burdens on the Mission regarding the Rosewood Terrace Building. When had the Mission
only applied as a secular boardinghouse, it would never have had to go through the conditional
use process (See Omitted Fact #

, supra); and (5) the City used a non-applicable

determination by the Board of Adjustments to determine where to send the Mission fo r
relocation purposes (see Omitted Facts #
E.

, supra) .

Denial of Equal Protection

While equal protection claims under zoning provisions are n orm all y evaluated on a
rationa l basis test, the
'rational it y' in the law of equal protection is not in fact a single standard , though
the courts have been coy about admitting this. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Livil1g Cel1ter, lnc., 473 U. S 432, 105 SCI. 332349, 8 7 L. Ed.2d 313 (1 985), like
this a zoning case, and decisions following it ... identify a category of sensitive
uses or acti vities, where j udges are to be more alert for unjustifiable
di scrimin ation than in the u sual case in whi ch govcmm ent regul ati ons are
Church o/the Lllkumi Babalu Aye v. City a/Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547,113 S.C!. 2217, 124 LEd.2d 471
(J993).
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chall enged on eq ual protection gTO unds .... Previous decis ions of this co urt and
oth er co urts of appeals have recognized that the Cleburne line of cases expands
the boundaries of " rationali ty" review .. .. Churches are no less scnsiti ve a land
use than homes for the men tally retarded. 07
The reasons reviewed above establish a violation of equ al protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that of the Utah Constitution whose protections m ay be greater than the
federal. r,'
F.

Denial of Due Process By S ub seq uent A pplication of the November 19,1999,
Board of Adjustment Hearing Aga in st the M issio n
After the Mission' s departure fro m the Central Christian Church, it initiated dialogue

with the City both as to re-consideration of its request to use the Rosewood Terrace Building and
what "use" the Mi ss ion wou ld be classified as . On June 23,2003, the Mission met with Mayo r
Anderson and the Pl anning Director Luis Zunguze. On June 24, 2003, Phi l A rena submitted
addition al information regarding the Mi ssion to Director Zun guze.
After the owners of the Rosewood Ten'ace Buildin g confinn ed in writing to the Mission a
wi llin gncss to complete the transaction proposed in 1999, the Mi ssion met with PZD staff and
co un sel on November 8, 2003 .

V/hile the City' s policy on concentrating services fo r the

homeless had changed, counsel for the City informed the M iss ion that if its uses at the R osewood
Terrace Building had not changed, the Mission would rcmain class ified as a ho meless shelt er and
unab le to qualify for the 3-1 Zone. The Mission requ irements and chan ge in the City ordinance
to refl ect current practices regarding homeless.

"' Civil Liberries/or Urban Believers v. Cily a/Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 768 (2003) (Pos ner, J., dissent ing.)
"' See Blue Cross Blue Shield v. Slole, 779 P.2d 634 (U" h 1989).
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In response to the Mission's second request to the City to be consid ered as a church, on
Jun e 21, 2004, Zoning Administrator Wayne Mills infonn all y notified the Mission that without
showing a change in use, the Board of Adjustments classi fi cation woul d stan d and preclude any
relocation at the Rosewood Terrace Building because of th e previous classification of the
Mi ssion's proposal as a homeless shelter. On Jun e 21, 2004, the Mission and Attomey M ichael
Hutchings met with Mayor Anderson, City counsel, and the Planning Director in an eff0!1 to
address relocation effDli s. After the meeting, in response to the Mission's discussion of City
practices with Interfaith churches, on June 24, 2004, Vickie Neumann, Executive Director of
Interfaith, met with Wayne Mills, and on June 29, 2004, provided him with additional
information. On Jul y 19, 2004, the Mission and Attomey Michael Hutchings met again with
Mayor Anderson, City counsel, and the PZD, but they were unable to resolve the impact of the
Board of Adjustment lUlin g classifyin g the Mission as a "homel ess shelter."
After either the June 21,2004, or July 19, 2004, with Mayor Anderson, at his direction,
the City PZD staff provided the Mission with a map of the zones of the City where the M ission
co uld look to relocate. The map was restricted to the D-3 and CG zones of the City where
"homeless shelters" are a cond iti onal use. At no time has the City ever notified the Mission it
could locate in all of the areas where churches are a permitted use or conditional use. (See City's
Memorandulll at 19-20; Affidavi t of Cheri Coffey,

'I~

6, 7.) The Rosewood TClTace Building

was subsequently purchased by another party and the Mission lost the donation.
The City's use of the Board of Adjustment proceedings against the Mission is a denial of
due process.
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In 2005, the Utah Supreme Court re-affimled that the legal doctrine of res judicata refers
to the overall doctrine of the preclusive effects to be given to judgments .... '[R]es judicata has
two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.,69 As plinciples of claim preclusio n and
issue preclusion apply to administrative hearings:"

Whether the impediment of res judicata is

consid ered as a matt er of claim preclusion or issue preclusi on as to fact or law, as a matter of
Utah law, the Mi ssion is bound by neither as it relates to the Board of Adjustment ruling.
"Claim preclusion involves tbe same parties or their Pli vies and the same cause of
action.""

Collateral estoppel , on the other hand, "' prevents parties or their pri vies from

relitigating [factual or legal] issues which were once adjudicated on the merits and have resulted
in a final judgment These doctrines do not apply because tbe M ission was not in privity with the
City.
Neither the Mission nor tbe tben property owner requested or paid for an adm inistrative
interpretati on as required City Ordinance.
The Zon ing Administrator, subject to the procedures, standards and limitations o f
this Cbapter, may render interpretations, including use interpretati ons, of the
provisions of this Title .. . Applications for interpretations may be fi led only by a
property having need for an interpretat ion or by the propeliy owner' s agent.
(Sa il Lake City Code §§ 21A. 12.020, 2IA.12.030)

Contrary to the asserti ons of Randy

Taylor, as a matter ofl aw, he was unauthorized to issue either "admi nistrati ve letter" of Apri l 20,
1999, or September 14, 1999. Wi thout the authority the City's continued use of the same to

10

Brigham Young UniversifY v. Tremco Consu/lallfs, Inc., J 10 P.3d 678 ,686, 2005 UT 19 P 25 (citations
Career Service Rel'Iew Bourd v. Utah D eparlm ent a/Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 938 (U tah 1997).

71

BlIckner v. Ken nard, 99 PJd 842, 846, 2004 UT 78 ' 112.

69
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omitted.)

justify the acti on is voi d. " 'If a judgment is void, it is open to collateral attack' .... [T)he portion
of the [civil) decree that was vo id is not res judicata. ""
As a practical m atter, the City not on ly failed to involve the Mi ssio n in the
preparation of evidence to present to the Board of Adjustment, but it also chose to frame the
legal

issues in such a way that both the hearing and any subsequ ent appeal would be

outcome detennin ative against the Mission. For example, the Board of Adju stm ent di d not
address Rand y Taylor' s classification of the Mi ssion use as a "boarding house." However,
the Board did find that th e previous non-confomling use of the property continued as a non confomling use. If the Mission was really not a church, as the Fairpark Community Council
claimed, then the porti on of th e application releva nt to the non-confonning use would have
been co nsidered to be secular. If secular, a continuation of a non- co nforming use coul d be
applied and a bu ildin g permit issued to the Mission without a condi tio nal use permit hearing.
In addition, had the City's pra cti ces regarding "acces sory use" that were being
applied to the Participati ng Churches with In terfaith been disclosed to the Board by either the
City staff or counsel, an obvious exceptio n in practice to what by ord inance was defined as
"a homeless shelter" would have been evident. Co nsid erin g the na rrow limit ati ons Rand y
Taylo r had placed on the Church ' s protectin g the "homeless" onl y overni ght when in "life
threaten ing" situations, and limiting the Mi ssion's ad verti sing o f the homeless shelter
ava il ability at the loca ti on, the Board of Adju stments co ul d we ll have determined the

72

Farley v Farley, 19 Utah2d 30 1, 307, 309 , 43 J P.2d 133 , 137, 139 (1967).
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propo sed " use" simil arly co nstituted an " accesso ry use" of a church rather than a "hom eless

, inFa.

s heller". See Omitted Facts ##
VB.

DAMAGES

The argumcnts of the City that the Mi ssion' s has no claims for damages mi sstates
the nature of damages that can be awarded for injulies caused by a violati on of constitutional
ri ghts . Damages again st the City can be nominal or compensatory.
First, deprivation of any constitutional right merits an award of no min al damages. "
Common-law courts have traditionally vindicated deplivations of celtain
'ab so lute' rights that are not shown to cause actual injury through an award of
nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of such lights actionable for
nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the
impUIia nce to organ ized society that those rights be scrupulously observed[ .f4
Plaintiffs contend tJlat their previous application of facts to federal and state law establish a
prima facie case un der 42 U .S.C. § 1983 of depri vati on by the City of the Plainti ffs' First
Amendment ri ghts prot ected by the establi shment clause and iiee exercise clauses as well as the
Fourteenth Am endment du e process clause and equal protection clauses.
Com pensatory damages, on the other hand,
may incl ude not onl y out-of-pocket loss and other monetary h arm s, but also such
injuries as "impai rm ent of reputati on ... , personal humili at ion, and mcntal
angui sh and sufferin g." Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 u.s. 323, 350, 94 S.CI.
2997, 30l2, 4l L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). See also Carey v. Piphus. supra, 435 U.S " at
264. 98 S Ct.. at 1052 (mental and emotional distress consti tute co mpensab le
injury in §198 3 cases. ) ..

" See Searles v. VlIll Bebber, 25 1 F.3d 869, 879 ( I O'h Cir. 2001) cerl. denied 536 U.S. 904, 122 S.Ct. 2356, 153
L.Ed.2d 279 (2002).
"Carey v. PljJlllIs, 435 U.S. 247 , 266, 98 S.Ct . 1042,55 L.Ed .2d 252 (1978).
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*

*

*

*

*

Presumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a
supplement for an award that fu lly compensates the all eged injury. When a
pl ainti ff seeks (;Ompensation for an injury that is *31 1 likely to have occurred but
difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may po ss ibly be
approPliate. See Carey, 43 5 U.S., at 262, 98 S.C!., at 1051; cf. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greemnoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 760-76 I, 105 S.C!. 2939, 2946, 86
L.Ed.2d 593 (19 85) (opinion of POWELL, J) ; Gertz v. Robeli Welch, Inc., supra,
418 U .S., at 349, 94 S.Ct., at 3011. In those circumstances, presumed damages
may roughly approximate th e hann th at the plaintiff suffered and thereby
75
compensate for hanns that may be impossible to measure.
Regardless of wheth er damages are nominal or compensatory, Pl aintiffs would still considered to
be prevailing parties fo r purposes of this litigation.
When a court awards nominal damages, it neither enters judgment for defendant
on tl,e merits nor declares the defend ant' s legal immunity to suit. ... A judgment
in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's
behavior fo r the plaintiffs benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of
money he otherwise woul d not pay76

75
16

Memphis COn1l11l111l/), School Dis/rict v. EdwCII'd J S/ochllra 477 U.S. 299,106 S.Ct. 2537,91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986)
FalTor v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 1 12-113, 113 S.Ct. 266, 12 1 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).
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CONC L US ION

Having withdrawn with prejudice as it applies to the C ity (reserving the same against
the RDA,) claim s under the Fifth, Sixth and Seven th Causes of Action with for al l the
rea sons set forth above, the remaining claims [or equ itab le, declaratory and monetary relief
under RLUIPA, the Utah Constitution, and the United States Constitution are valid and
should be heard. Acco rdingly, the City's M otion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
DA TED this 24 th day of March, 2000.
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES

Matthew Hilton
Craig L. Taylor
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of March, 2006, J caused a (rue and correct copy of
the foregoing

(0

the fo ll owing:

Matthew Hilton
472 North Main Street
Kaysvi lle, UT 84037
Fax No. (801) 544-9977

. ·U.S . Mai l
~ Hand Delivered

_ _ Overnight
Via Facsimile

Vincent C. R ampton
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 8410 1
Fax No. (80 1) 328-0537

U.S. Mai l
~ Hand D eli vered
_ _ Overnight
Via Facsimile

John A. Snow
Van Colt, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O . Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0340
Fax No. (801) 534-0058

U.S. Mail
---;:::;;- Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight
Via Facsimile
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LYNN j-1. PACE, #5121
MORr-JS 0 HAGGERTY. #5283
451 South State Street, Suite 505A
Salt Lake City, Utab 8411 I
Telephone: (80 I) 535-7788
Anorneys for Defendant
. Salt Lake City Corporati on

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY MISSION , et ai. ,
Plaintiff
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY, et ai. ,

REPLY MEMORAND UM IN SUPPORT
OF SALT LAKE CITY 'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUD GMENT
(Oral Argument Requested)

Defendan t.

SALT LAKE REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY,

Civil No. 990908945
./ udge Jo seph C Fratto

Third-Party PlaintilT,
\IS.

McDONAI_D BROTHERS fNV EST MENTS .
a Utah general partnership,
Tbird-Party Defendant.

Defendan t Salt Lake City Corporation (tbe '·Citv") submits this Reply Memorandum
in suppo rt of its Motion for Summary .Judgment in this case.

To a large extent. Salt Lake Citis Motion for Summary Judgment is not disputed by
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 1110stly do not dispute the City' s Statement of Undisputed Facts. they only
add additional, mostly irrelevant facts uf their own. Similarly. plaintiffs do no t dispute the City's
legal argumcnts. lhey raise only tangential attacks. Perhaps most importantly. plaintiffs offer no
valid reasons why the bulk of the ir claims are not ripe. Most of this lawsuit CJn be dismissed on
that ground.
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3

S TATEMENT OF UNDI SPUTE D FACTS

The following facts of reco rd remain undisputed in thi s case:
1.

Plaimiffs are persons affilialed with Ihe Sail Lake City Mission (hereinajier

. " Pla imiffs" or Ihe "Mission 'J. Clnol7cienominUliolial religious group who provide service
primarily 10 Ihe homeless and impoverished (Deposit ion Exhibit 78; Sail Lake CilY Mission web
page. Appendix Exhibit A)

Although plaintiffs Jlurport

(0

dispute this fact, their statement is merely a longer versio n

of what the City stated.
2.

In 1999, Ihe Mission was located in a building at approximalely

~66

Sowh in what has become the Careway area of Sa il Lake City. The Iv/ission had a

Wesl 200

month~lo ~

monrh lease with its landlord (Depo sition Exhibits 6, 14)

Not disputed
3.

During the summer

uf 1999,

the Mission

'.I'

!andlord gave notice

10

Ihe Mission

Ihal il was terminating the Mission 's lease. (1d.)

Not di spu ted
4.

Laler Iha l year, the Sail Lake City lI edel'elojJI11 el1 1 Agency (Ihe "/IDA 'j

purchased Ihe property. (Deposition Exhib it 35)

Not disputed.
j.

The City and Ihe /IDA are separate gO \'em memal enlities. (U CA. §§ 1 7 B~.f-

]0 J and 67- 1a-6 j .;

No t disputed.

6.

The Cily was nOI re,ljJonsible/or Ihe lerminalion o/Ihe Mission's lease, for Ihe

purchase oflhe properly, ur Ihe needfor Ihe Mission's relocalion. (Deposilion

0/ Wayne

Wilson, pages 374-75, Deposilion o/Valda Tal'bel, page 63. Appendix Exhibils B and C)
Not disputed .

7,

The Missionfiled a claim/or reloCCIlion expenses againstlhe RDA, The

Mission never filed any claim/or relocCllion expenses againsl Ihe eily. (Deposi tion Exhibils
J 9, 26)

This fact is irre levant now that plaintiffs have withdrawn their c laims for relocation
expenses against the City, Nevertheless, p laintiffs admi t that they did not file a tim ely and
proper notice of claim with the City,

8,
relocalion

On several occasions, Ihe Mission inquired about various possibilities/or Ihe

0/ its /acilily and was in/armed as 10 the process Ihar would be required/or such

an application (Deposilion Exhibils 2 & J J)
Plaintiffs purport to dispute this fac t but do nol provide a citation to any record
evjdence,l

9.

The Cily alsu pro\'ided the Mission wilh blonk applicolion/orms. (Deposiliun

Exhibils 63 & 64)

The purported dispute of this Statement of Undisputed Fact cites to "legal analysis, Part 82: and
C. 80-82, infra, and attendant deposition'
" , However, the cited legal analysis and page
numbers do not exist. [n addition, the purported citation to the record is blank. Althouuh
Plaintilfs delayed filing thei r Memorandum in Opposition for an additional 10 days beyond the
deadline agreed upon . their Memorandum is lilled with blank citations to the reco rd, incorrect
citations to the record . andlo r citations to a non-existent exhibit. Specijically, Plaintiffs' Exhibit
9 is incomplete, and Exhibits 11 . 15.].7.33,38,42,43.44.71 and g4 are simply missing.
I

5

Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact stated. They add other facts, but the fact stated
stands .

JO.

On at least two occasions, pursuant to in/ormation provided by the Mission,

the Cit)' has issued an administrative classification of the ivfission·s proposed activities.
(Deposition Exhibits 2 & 28.)
Plaintiffs do not di sp ute the fact stated. They add additional ra cts but the fac t stated
stands undisputed.

11.

Th e Mission proposed to move into a building located at 580 West 300 South.

ThaI building was 10CCIted in :one D3. Based on the deSCription of the uses of the building, the
City determined Ihatl!?e A1ission would be a Place of Worship, which was a permilled use in Ihal
:one, and a Homeless Shelter, which was a conditional use. (Deposition Exhibit 2.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact stated. The reference to "th e April 20, 1999, letter
speaks fo r itseW does not dispute that the statement of fact correctly summarizes the le tt er.

J2.

The Missio nneverfiledfor a condilional use with regard to Ihe proposed /ocalion

at 580 West 300 Soulh. (Af/idavil of Cheri Coffey, 11 J5, Appendix Exhibit I )
Not disputed.
J3.

A permilled use is one Iha t is allowed merely byfilingfor a penn il and meeling

applicable City codes. (Coffey Al/idovil,

~ 3.)

Plai ntiffs do not dispute the fac i stated. They add add iti onal facts bu t the fact stated
stands undisputed.

1-1.

.4 condilionoilise is determined by Ihe Planning Commission afier considerolion

of on ClpplicCllion, slCiffreport, and afier a public hearing where the applicant can .Ipeak and the
community can speak
A conditional use is a use which has potential adverse
impacts upon the immediate neighborhood and the cit)' as a
whole. !t requires a careful review of its location, design,
configuration and special impact to det ermine the
desirability of allowing it on a pClrticular site. Whether it is
appropriate in a particular location requires a weighing, in
each case, of the public need and benejit against the local
impact, taking into account the applicanl 's proposals fo r
ameliorating any adverse impacts through special site
planning, development techniques and contributions to the
provision ofpublic improvemel1ls, rights of way and

services.
Any applicant who seeks a conditional use permit must appear before the affected
neighborhood's community council. (Coffey Affidavit,

~ 4.)

Plaintiffs do not di spute the fact stated . They add additional fact s but the fact stated
stands undisputed.
15.

Pursuant to City ordinances, the Mission was requ ired to present its proposal

jor a conditional use permit to the local Community Council to obtain non-binding input and
recomll1endations. (lei. and Deposition Exhibit 76)

Plaintiffs do not dispute the fac ts stated. They add additional facts, but the fact sta ted
stands undi sputed.
16.

All other appliconts/or a place ofll'urship hcn'e hern required to comply with

this proces.1 (C ity Docl/ment 327, Appendix Exhihit H)

Plaintifrs purport to dispute this fncl. but the record e\'idence cited (Paragraphs 1)8.
I 18 and 13:2) are non-responsi\'e to this issue. Accordingly. this rae\ remains undisputed and

7

s hou ld be deemed admitted.

} I.
codes

Permifled uses are oppropriole anywhere in [/ :;(JJ7e as lu ng as Ihe)' meet CilY

[-{oHlever,

sume uses ore conditional uses because, in genera l, Ihey may be more

appropriule in specific areas based on various Ihings including whar olher uses are in Ihe
vicinily, traffic pall ems. capacily Dfstreets, exisling infi-aslruclure, impocls(rOtJ1 Ihe subjecllvpe
of use on abulling properties, geographical featu res ele. These Ihings all pluy a role in
determin ing whatrypes of uses should be allowed in whar areas and whelher a condiriu/'Iaillse
should be allowed Due to the porel1lial fo r impaClS, a conditional use is required so Ihell each
use can be examined and a dec ision made on a case by case basis. (Coffey Affidavit,

'15.)

Not d isputed .

i 8.

Ultimately, a conditional use is determined by whelher Ihe proposed use is

compatible wilh Ihe neighborhood and will it have a material net cumulative ad,'erse impact on
the community or Ihe city as a whole. (Deposilion (if Randolph Taylor, p age -10 line 23-page-li
line 12, Appendix Exhibit D.)
Not dispu ted.

19.
j(J/lowing

Places of Worsh ljJ are allowed in Sull Lake City as a mailer of rig hi inlhe

~ones:

Commercial C IJ. CC, CS, CSHBD, CG, Downtown D- J, D-2, D-3. D--I:

G'aleway GMU; and Special P1Irpose RP, BP, J, U1. MU These

~ o nes

comprise appruximately

i 0.8% of Ihe area ojSair Lake Cily (wilhoUi including Ihe Cily Creek area) . (Co/fey AlJidavil,

6.;
Although Plaintiffs p urport to disrute Paragraph 19 . they cite to no reco rd evidence in

8

~

suppon of their dispute .
10.

Places oj Worship are also allowed as a condilional use in aLI residential cones,

in Ihe Neighborhood Commercial zone
A[ftdOl'il,

~

(C!I~

ond in Ihe Ugh! Induslrial Zone (M-J). (Coffey

7)

Although Plaintiffs purpo11 to dispute Paragraph 20, they cite to no record evidence

10

support the ir dispute.

21.

Under Sail Lake City ordinances, a homeless shelter is classified as a building or

port ionlhereofin which sleeping accommodCllions are provided on an emergency basisfor Ihe
temporarily homeless. (Toylo r Deposi!ion, page 8 lines 12-23; poge 34 line 23-page 14 line 3)
Altbough Plaintiffs purpo11 to dispute this fact, tbe only record of e viuence cited is a
recitati on of the definitions contained in the Salt Lake City Code. Accordingly, this fact remains
undisputed.
22.

Homeless Shellers are ,dlowed as a condilional use in the D-3 and Ihe CG coning

dislric ls. Salt Lake Cily has nol prohibiled Ihe laealion afhomeless shellers inlhe CilY. The
CilY has severul operClling homeless shellers. (Cojfey A[ftdavil,

~

8)

Plaintiffs do not di spute the fact stated. They acid addit ional facts, but the fact stated
stands undisputed.
Alone lime, Cit)' policy discouraged Ihe cOl1cel1lralion
Sllhs{CI !7Ce

~lhomeless

shellers,

abuse (reo/men l ce l7lers Lind similar uses in the !)Ul<\'l1fuwn und Guteway ar ea (the su

culled "l71urC//oriull1 "). However. Ihe policy did nOI/urbid sllch uses, provided Ihal an "pplicClllI
or Ihe Mi.l.lion uppliedji)/' C/ wl1ciiliol1Cd use permil. (/)epu,liliun ExhihiIS], -19. (J(J und Tuylur

9

Deposil ion. page 37.)
PlaintiJfs cite to no record evidence to support their first statemenL since the Hilton
afjidavit docs not exist. Plaintiffs do not dispute the facts stated. They add additional facts, but
the fact stated remains undisputed.

24.

Sail Lake City has regulated all homeless shellers. regardless o/their ownership

or a!filial ion (Coiley Affidavit, ~ i 0)
Plaintiffs dispute this fact, arguing that the City has not regulated church es that
paJ1icipate in the Interfaith Hospitality Network. However, the record evidence by Plaintiffs
co ntradicts that asse rtion. Sp ec ifi cally, Plaintiffs ' Fact 33 acknowledges that the limited services
provided by the 1l1lerfailh Hospitality Churches is regarded as an "accessory use" of those
churches, such that they are not classified as "homeless shelters ." Thus, Fact No. 24 as asserted
by the City remain s undisputed.

25.

The regulation a/homeless shelters is l770livated by wholly secular cancerns, nul

religious concerns. (Deposilion Exhibits 49. 88)
Although Plaintiffs purport to dispute this fact, none of the record evidence th ey cite
disp utes the Ci ty's allegation that the regulati o l1 of homeless shelte rs is motivated by wholly
secula r cOl1cerl1s. Accordil1gly, that ract remains undisputed.

::6.

in Seplember 11)99, /he Missionjiled

"'7

applicalion/or a conciilionul lise

perm/ljor " place uj'wur.lhip. The proposed toea/iun was Ihe /arme r Rosew()od Terrace
nllrsing home located al 158 .Nor/h (,00 West. Soil Lake Citv (hereinafier rej'erred 10 us
"Rosewo()d Terrace "). rDeposilion Exhibils -18. -8.)

to

Not disputed.

27.

Rosewood Terrace was loealed in :one SR I, a :oning caregol)' eSlOblished by Ihe

Cily which was a limiled reside11licd :one Ihal allowed Places of Worship only as a condilional
use. (Jaylor Deposilion, page 67 lines J 4-20.)
Not disputed .

28.

In general Places of Worship inheremly involve large numbers ofpeople

congregaling together with the artendantnoise and trajjic. Such a use has the potential to have
more negative impacls on reside17l ialneighborhoods andfewer impacts in lhe zones where
Places o.f Worship are permilled as a malleI' of right Thus, in many areas Places of Worship are
a conditional use

10

cdlow Ihe specific/acl based de lermination a/whethe r they are appropriate

for thaI area, particularly residenlial areas. (Coffey Ajjidovit,

~

9)

Plaintiffs do not d ispute the fact assel1ed . Although they add o th e r additional facts, the
fact asserted by the Ci ty remain s und isputed.

29.

Ploil1tiffs appliedfor and were heord regording

0

conditional use oflhe

Rosewood Terroce property where Ihey wished 10 IOCClle their Place of Worship. (Deposilion
Exhibils -18, 84 Clnd Coffey AUie/avil, 11 J-land Ihe a!/achll1enls Ihereto)
1)luiI1liffs do not dispute the fac l stated. They asserl other facts and arguments, but the
ract stated rem a in s undisputed.

30.

On OC/ober 7. 1999, Ihe Cily Plonning Commission denied Ihe Mission's

applicalion/or a COIle/ilionlil Lise pennillo reioc[l/e ils/acilily
BUilding

10

Ihe Rosewood Terrace

I'Illi11liff\' were l1ul grU/1Ied II col1dililJllul use III Rosewoud ferroce because orlhe

II

imjJacl on Ihe neighburhood ond Ihe inC/bililY

10

miligOie Ihm impacl. The Plw1I1ing Co mrnission

dClermined Ihal Ihe neighhorhood was I()oji-agile

10

supporl Ihe aClivilles proposed by Ihe

1\1issiol1. The Planl1lng Commission delermined Ihw Ihere were likely
ncighlJorhoodji-om Ihis proposed LlSC. the !l1ission plan wos
permanenl basis in

0

boarding hOLise {[/ Ihe sile as well as

10

10

10

be heavy imjJacls on Ih e

have 25-30 residcnls on a scmi-

bus in up

10

200 oflhe "homeless-

poor" al vorious times during Ihe day for a varieo' of counseling. rehobilitolion services,
religiOUS devolionols and chapel services. While il wasfeli Ihollhe !l1ission could conlrol whal
WCl1t on in ils bu ilding, it was dClermined Ihal il likely would not be able 10 cOl1lrol whal wenl

011

outside. This was based on objective evidence. In ils p rior localion the Missio ll Iwd a histOJY of
alieaSI 58 police calls per yeur Clnd os high os i 22 cedis per year. il was sletied by plainliffs "WI
Ihe 1\1ission would be pel/orming similar activilies inlhe Rosewood Terrace iocwion so il was
I'CIlionally delermined thallhe Mission would bring wilh illhis higher needfor police
inlerven lion. This wus ofparticular concern

10

Ihe neighborhood surrounding Rosewood

Terrace because Ihey were /lying 10 recover/i'o1J7 aClivilies which had required pulice inlhe
pas I. The neighborhood included Ihe Guadalupe neighborhood Clnd the Fa;ljJark community

Burh communities were working on reviving from prevhn{s rimes qldrug houses ond high u";me.
The goal was to eSlublish safe. slahie ond cohesive neighborhoodsfor which progress was being
made. It was determined Ihat Ihe impacl oflhe Mission wOlild reverse Ihat progress. Thus. the
Planning Commission concluded !i1Cl11he needfor Ihe condilioneil lise did nol oU/weigh Ihe
pOlemial impaC! on Ihe communily and il would 1101 be pOSSible 10 miligwe Ihe delrimen!Cl1
impaci Iho l Ihe Missiun wOllld impose upun Ihw/i'ugile neighborhood (Sail Lake Cily Planning

•

Commission SwffRepor/ allached 10 Ihe Coffey Affidavil, and Deposilion Exhibils 79 & 84.)

Although Plaintiffs have included a dispute to th is allegalion, that " dispute"
acknowledges tbe facts asserted.
31.

1n Seplember 1999, Ihe Communily Councilf/led an appeal challenging Ihe

Cily's adminislralive classification o/Ihe fvfission 's proposed aclivilies. (Deposi lion Exhibil

55.)
Pl a intiffs do not dispute the fact asserted, notw ithstanding thei r attempt to list it as a
"d isputed" fact .

111 cOf1neclio n wilh Iha l appeal, Ihe .Mission received nolice of, hud Ihe

32.

opporlunity Clnd, in/acl, did presenl evidence allhe Board of Adjustment hear ing.
(Deposilion Exhibils 81 & 41.)

Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact assel1ed . They add other additional facts, but the fac t
stated remains undisputed
1n Novembe r J999, the Board o/Acljuslmenl held Ihatlhe Mission's proposed

33.

activilies conslituled a pluee

(~rworship

and a humeless shelle r. (Deposilion Exhibit cf2.)

Plaintiffs do nol di spute the facts slated. They altempt to assen legal arguments, but the
fact as slaled rema ins undisputed.
34.

f'loinliff\' did nol limely oppeul Ihe Plunning Commission

'.I'

denia l o/Ihe

condiliolled use/or Ihe Rosewood Terrace locolion olihough Ihey could hove hy ojJpeulillg

10

Ihe

LUlld Use Appeals Bool'd Alier Ihul Ihe mol/er could have heen uppeoled IU Ihe COUI'IS. (Coifey
A/fidm'i l,

~

I i)
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No twithstanding its "dispute", Plaintiffs admit the fact as asserted by the City.
35.

The Mission did nOI file a limel), appeal of lh e decision oflhe Planning

Commiss ion or Ihe Boord ofAdjuslmenl. (Coffey Alfidavil, 11 J J.)

In their "d isp ute", Plaintiffs admi t the fact as asse rted by the Ci ty.
36.

P/ainrijfi had nOlice of and co uld have used Ihe condilionCiI use process fo r olher

10eOlions. Allh ough the Mission mode several inquiries 10 the City, il only.filed one
applicalion with the Cily, seeking to relocale ilsfacilities 10 Ihe Rosewood Terrace Building
locoled 0 1 158 Norlh 600 West. (Depositio n Exhibits 63, 64, Coffey Affidavil,

~

15.)

Plaintiffs have eited no record evidence in opposition of Fact 36 . Accordingly, those
facts should be deeme d admitted.
37.

[This paragraph inlellliollally left blank.}

38.

Plail1lijJs have 1701 beenjlagged in Salt Lake Cily comp ulers as being largeledfor

exira scrul in)" il is nol poss ible 10 jlag persons or associm ions, only properlies

CW7

be jlagged.

(Taylo r Depos ilion, page J8 line IS-page J 9 line 2: Deposilion of Roger Evans, pag e 7 tine J 3page 8 tine I, Appendix Exhibits D and. E.)

Pla in tiffs do not dispute the fact stated , thaI plaintiffs were not flagged in SLC computers
as being targeted for ex tra scrutiny. Although Plaillliffs assert other facts, the fac ts as slated by
the City remain undisputed .
39.

Plainlilfs ' proposa/for /he Rosewood Terrace b1lilding ",as, in pari, a Place

ul

Worship fo r people Hho did not live in /ha l neighborhood. plainli/J, slated Ihal/hey w01lld be
IJ7I.\ing in mosl oj/he IIs ers oflhe b1lilding (Depo.lilion Erhihil :8.)

1-1

Plaintiffs do nOl cite any record evidence in opposition to Fact No. 39, which should be
deemed admitted.

40.

Ultimately, plaintiffs relowted fheir Place of Worship, and carried ouffheir

proposed activities in conformity 'with their religious belief" in the Central Christian Church
located at 370 Easl300 Soulh in Sail Lake City. (Wi/son Deposition, page 267.)
Pl aintiffs do dispute a portion of Fact No. 40, asserting that the Mission was unable to
carryon its own worship services at the Central Cluistian Church. However, the record evid ence
cited reveals that church services were held "on a limited basis." (See Deposition of Wayne
Wilson, page 170, lines 16-25, Plaintiffs' Appendix Exhibit I), and that the Mission "was unable
to have its own worship services in the sanctuary of the church. (See Deposition of Wayne
Wilson, paragraph 48.) However, Plaintiffs' own evidence further indicates that during this
same time period Plaintiffs were able to co ndu ct bible studies and other group sessions. Indeed,
PlaintiHs' own evidence indicates that after moving to the Central Clui st ian Church, Plainti ffs
were able to increase virtually all of the services they provided. (See Exhibit 8 attached to
Affidavit of Wayne Wilson. ) Thus, the primary fact that Plaintiffs were able to continue their
religious activi ties of the Central Christian Church is not disputed.
41.

homeless have

The 20nin15 ordinances and Iheir regulation o(temporwJ' housing/or the
0

secular purpose, to limit the impact on neighborhoods to

0

reosonoble level.

(Cliffey Affidavit, 11/2)
Plaillli rfs have not cited any record evidence in opposition to Fact 4 J, which s hould
therefore be deemed admitted.
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n.

Several Salt Lake area churches parliclIX"e in Ihe Il7Ier/LJitit f/OSpilOlily

•

.fllelwork. (Depos ilion Exitihil 32.)

Pl aintiffs' purported dispute ac tually confirms the fact stated in Fac t No. 42 .
-13.
Pursuant

10

{hose il1lerfailit Hospitality ch urches operOie wilhin cerlain guidelines
Ihose guidelin es, each chur ch may house a maximum of 4-6 homeless families (a

maxim1lm of 16-20 persom) for one week, fou r orfi ve times a year on a rOlaling schedule.
(ld)

Plaintiffs have not cited any record evidence whic h suppo rts tbeir dispute of Fa ct No.
43. Indeed, Depos iti on Exh ibi t 32, ci ted by Plaint iffs in thei r re spon se, is dated Marcb 200 0.
cN.

The Cily is willing to allow lite .iV!ission or any olite r church to operale

according to Ihese same lnl eljailh Hospiralily guidelines. (C ily Response 10 Req uesl fo r
A dmission No.9, Appendix Exh ibit 6.)

Plaintiffs do not dispute the accu racy of the City's statemen t. Whil e Plaintiffs argue
th at they should not be required to operate according to the guidelines for the Inte rfaith
Hospitality Netwo rk, they have not disputed the fac t that the City wou ld allow them to do so
if they so desi re .
-/5.

The Mission itas ackno",ledged Ihal i l does nol inlend 10 operale ils "clivilies

]1Iil17in I/wse /l1Ieljailh J-IIiSpilOlily g1lidelines. (Wi/su n Deposil ilJn, pp. 390 -95.)

Although Plaintiffs purport to dispule Fact No. 45 . in thei r response they do not
dispute the fac ttil a t they do 110t intend to operate their act ivi tie s wi thin the guidelines used
by the Interfaith Hosp itality Churches.

16

-16.

Th e Religious Land Use and Jns lirZlt ionali~ed Persons Act was passed in

Seprembe r 2000. (Second Amended Complain!, " 129)
Not disputed.
-17.

VirruCilly all of rh e events described in the Mission's Second Amended

ComplCiint occurred before September 2000. (.')econd Amended Complain t,

n 9-88)

Plaintiils do not dispute the accuracy of the facts asserted in Paragraph 47, although
Pl aintiffs asse11 that additional conversations and meetings with the City occurred after
September 2000, those additional facts do not dispute the accuracy of the facts contained in Fact
No . 47.
48.

Plaintiffs have designQred aeeoun{[[nr John Ravarillo as their .ljJokesman on

damages. (Ravarino Deposition, page 209 line J 6-page 210 line 8, Appendix Exhibit F)
Plaintiffs purp0l1 to dispute Fact No . 48, but fail to cite any record evidence to support
their all egations. (The citations listed all refer to a blank exhibit number.) In addition, the record
ev id ence ci ted by the C ity contain s a specific acknowled gment by counsel for Plainti Ffs that Mr.
Rav arino was the o nly person who wou ld talk abou t damages. (See Deposition of John
Ravari no, page 209, line 16-page 2 10, line 8, City Appendi x F.) !\ccordin g ly, Fucl No. 48
should be deemed admitted .
-19.

Pleril1f ifJy herve su!Jmifl cd ,ljJeciol domage eleril17sfor rhe rime period of October

1999 when they muved OW ()/their long rime loearion rhrough 2001l1'hel7they were rel()cerred w
the Cel1trul Chrlsrian Chlireh,

ro Emr 300 Sourh, Sail Luke City,

19)

17

Utah. (Depositiun Exhihir

Again. Plaintiffs failed to cite any record evidence to Supporltheir alleged dispute of that
fact.
50.

Plaintiffs' claim/or .ljJecial damages consists o/expenses involved in moving,

abandonment ofimprovemel1ls to their priorlocatiol1, foss ofpropeny in the move, lost
COl'llribUlions and improvemel7ls to its new building (ld)

Plaintiffs purport to dispute Fact No. 50 based upon the record evidence cited in response
to Fact No. 48. However, as discussed above, Pl aintiffs have failed to cite any record evidence

in suppo rt of their disagreement as to Fact No. 48.
51.

Phtintiffs lost the feme on their old /o c(t{ion because of the actions of their

landlord und not Sull Lake City (Deposilion Exhibit 1-1, Wilson Deposilion, pp. 374-75)

Not disputed.
52.

During the period of time fo r which they claim special damages, the Mission hod

incume (maney coming intu the Mission) of $673,920.57. (Ravarino Deposition, page 19-1 line
15-page 19 7 line 25, and Deposition Exhibit 19, page RDA0(807)

Not disputed.
53.

The Mission hod expenses during that time period o/3e1'3, 793.66. (Rovarino

Deposition. page 197, and Exhibit 19. page RDA 0081 02 )

•
' The deposition actually has a typographical errol'. listing expenses as "283,000 some odd
dollars." The co rrect number is shown in Exhibit 19 that is being referred to. Using the correct,
higher number operates to plain tiffs ' benefi t. In addilion . Ravarino did tes tify, although with a
lack of precision, that the expense figures for the time period for which damages we re being
claimed did not include so me items totaling $ 45,4 56. Ravarino Depositi on. page 198 line 24page ~03 line 12 and Exhibit 19 .

ts

Not disputed
54.

The Mission hod nel income, or a nel swplus, of$19D,116.91. (1(avorino

Deposilion, page 198 lines 1-6, ond Exhibil 19, page RDADD810

Not disputed.
55.

During a comparable period oUlside of the lime frame fo r lvhich Ihey are claiming

.ljJecial domages, the Mission had income of $80.7,456.57, expenses of$563, 356.7 j, and 0
surplus of only $14-1,0.99.86. (Ravarino Deposition, poge 197 line 1-page 198 line 11, and
Exhibit j 9, page RDA 0.0.80.7 and 81 D)

Not disputed.
56.

Ravarino did lesli!y, somewhCll inexoctly, Ihatthe expensejiguresfor Ihe lime

period for which damages were being claimed did not include some iTems appearing to ToTal
$-15,456. (RCIvarino Deposilion, page j 98 line 24-page 20.3 line 12, and Exhibit j 9)

Plaintiffs do not directly dispute these facts . Rather, they come up with a differen t total
amount which is less than the City set forth . Ultimately, this fact is irrelevant because plaintiffs
do not co ntest that they have no special economic damages.
RESPO NS E TO PLAI NTIFFS' LI ST 01< OM ITT ED FA CT S

In their Memorand ulTl , Plaintirfs assert a voluminous list of what they represent to be
omit ted facts.' Due to the delay in receiving Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, and due
the voluminous nature or Pla intiffs' Statement of Omitted Facts, the City has not had an

'The list or omilted facts consists of 148 numbered paragraphs. comprising in excess of 39
pages.

ty

10

oppO I1Unil),

10

review every fact, IOgether Wilh Ihe record evidence cited in SUpp0l1, to verify the

accuracy of Plaintifis' allegations. Nevertheless, the Cit y has idelllitied numerous factual
a llegations which should not be considered based uponlhe abse nce of any record evidence cited .
or because the record evidence cited does no t support the factual allegat ions made.
With regard to alleged Omitted Facts that do have some support, the City disagrees with
many o f them. Nevertheless, for the purposes of th is Motion only, the City does not dispute
tbose facts because tbey are irrelevant, and do not create a genuine iss ue of material fact
precluding summary judgment. The additional om itted facts offered by Plaintiffs mo stly pro vide
background informati on, they do not pel1a in to the lega l issues raised by the City' s Motion for
Summary Judgment. This, together with the facI that the relevant facts set forth by the City have
not been successfully disputed, means tbat summary judgment should be granted .
4.

The documents referenced speak of public " hearing" procedures.

S.

Plaintiffs have cited to no record evidence to support the fact stated.

6.

The evidence cited by Plaintiffs does not suppOl1 the a llegati on made.

12.

No such ci tat ions (Chapter 19) exist within the Salt Lake C ity Code. Most

definiti o ns are found in Chapter 21A.62.040. In additio n, Plaintiff's ' s tatement thai th ere is no
definit ion for a homeless she lte r is incorrect. (Pl aintiffs' Fact I. )
J 3.

Plaintiffs have cited to no record ev id ence supporting their al legations . since rhe

Affidavit of Mall hew Hilton is non-existent.
J 4.

Plaintiffs have failed to ci te 10 any record evidence to su ppOl1 the allegation.

34.

Pl a intiffs have failed to cite to any record evidence to support rhe last sentence in

that paragraph.
3 6.

Plaintiifs have failed to cite to any record evidence to suppon those allegations.

41.

The evidence cited does not support the first statement made.

42.

Plaintiffs have failed to cit e to any record evidence, since the Hilton affidavit does

not exist.
44 .

Plaintiffs have failed to cite to any record evidence, since the Hilton affidavit does

not exist.
45.

Plaintiffs have failed to cite to any record evidence to suppon their factual

allegations.
4~.

The record evidence cited does not suppOJ1 the allegations made.

52.

The record cited does not suppOJ1 the allegations made .

59.

The City disputes the allegation set fonh in paragraph 59 because at the Board of

AdjLlstment hearing, Wayne Wilson discussed with the Board of Adjustm e nt the practices of the
Interfaith Churches. (See Deposition Exhibit 43 at pages 0544-0545.)
63 .

No record evidence cited .

64 .

The Ci ty d isputes the all egati on set forth in paragraph 64 because Pl aintiJTs

co nfuse the di stin cti on be tween a "n ot ice to cease and desist" an d a "notice and o rder."
80.

The Ci ty disputes the allegatio n set fo rth in paragraph 80 because they fa il to

distinguish betv..reen an adm ini strative interpretatio n and an administrative decisjo n. (See

Deposition Exhibit 94 and Sal t Lake City Coele Section
86.

~

1A62 .040 and Section 21 A 16010 .)

The City di sputes the allegati on set fo rth in paragraph 86 because the record

ci

ev id ence cited does not support all the allegations ll1ade.
87.

The Ci ty disputes tbe allegatio n se t fo rth in paragraph 87 because the rec ord

ev idc nce cited does nOl support the al legations made. Speci ficall y, Depos ition Exhibil 97 sta tes
lhat lhe Com munity Council provided a statement in suppon oflhe proposal.
92 .

T he reco rd evidence cited does not supp011 the state ment ma de. Speci fi cally , the

depos itlon testimony indicates that the handwritten notes are Bill Wright's , but there is no
indication tilat the letters were written by him .
95 .

No record ev idence ci ted .

98 .

The record evidence cited does not supp0l1 the statement m ade .

101.

No record evidence cited.

105 .

The documents cited do not supp0l1 all of the statements m ade. Specifically,lhe

representati on as to the proposed class ification of Plaintiffs' uses does not match the description
set fo rtb in the documents.
110

The City objects to tile fact set forth in paragraph 110 because it assumes facts

that a re not in ev iden ce . Specifically, it has not been established that a charitable organizatio n
woul d be a perm itted use in an SR- I zone .
116.
111''1.
119.

No reco rd evide nce cited . .

120 .

No record evidence ci ted.

125 .

No reco rd ev iden ce cited.

126.

The ev idence cited does not sllppon the faulla l stateme nts made. Specifica lly .

No reco rd evidence cited.

22

Cherri Coffey testified that when conditional use proposals were forwarded without having gone
to the Com munity Counc il iirst, the Planning Commission sent them back. (See Deposition of
Cherri Coffey, page 56, Plaintiffs ' Appendix Exhibit 10.)
127.

No record evidence cited.

13 0.

No record evidence has been cited to support the statements made. In addition,

the statement contains argument rather than facts.

138.

No record evidence cited .

139 .

No record evidence cited .

141.

No record evidence has been cited to support the statement made in the first

sentence.
142.

No record evidence has been cited to support the allegation, since the Hilton

affidavit does not exist.

143.

The City ack.nowledges that it opposed the temporary restraining order requested

by Pl aintiffs, but denies the remaining allegatio ns set forth in that paragraph. In addition.
Plainti1fs have fai led to cite to any reco rd evidence to suppOJ1 their allegations.
144.

No record ev idence ci ted.

146.

No record evidence cited .

147.

No record evidence cited. The City is unaware of any document or exhibit

identi1ied as "City 33 ."
148.

No record evidence cited.

A RGUME NT

r.

PL A INTIFFS' C O NST IT UTIONAL C L A IJVIS S HO ULD BE DI SMi SSeD.

A.

Summary Jud gmc nt Should Bc Gran ted Dismi ss in g All Of Plaintiffs'
Co nstitutional Claim s and RL UJPA Claim Becau se T h ey Are No t Rir e.
I.

RLUIPA Claims Are Not Ripe. In responding to the City" s ripeness

argument, Plaillli ffs admit that RL UI PA

WQS

not applicable to any of the events that occurred in

or prior to 1999, prior to the enactment orthe Acl. Thu s, the only claims to which RLUIPA
could possibly apply are to those decisions made by the City after September :WOO

1n tbe preseI1l case, tbe events which occurred after September

~OOO

are set forth in the

Affidavit of Wayne Wilson, paragraphs 56-70. However, beyond idelllifying those events.
Plaintiffs make no fu rther eff0l1 in tbeir Memorandum in SUppOi1 to exp lai n why their RLUIPA
claims are ripe forjudici al review. Indeed, an analysis of the facts of this case reveals that they
are not.

The only decision rendered by tbe City after September 2000 is set forth in a letter dated
.June 7,2004 addressed to Plaintiffs. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 57 and Wil son Affidavit, 1169.)
Plaint iffs did not make any effort to appea l tbat decision to the Board of Adjustment. (P laintiffs
have subl11itted nothing showing any appeaJ.) Plaintiffs have also made no attempt to modify
their proposed activities to comply with the requirements of City ordinances. (See City Fact
Nos. 44 and 45.) Plaintiffs have made no altempt to find another location for thei r activities in
either a D3 or CG zo ne where homeless shelters are allowed . (See City Fact No. 22) . Nor have
the plaintiffs Illade any altemptto file a new conditional use application. (See Ci ty Fact No. 36.)
As sueh. Plai ntiffs have f":tiled to ubta in a final decision fi'om the City as to acceptable activities

and 10cJtions.
In Murph\' v. New Milford ZoninQ Commission, 402 F.3d 342 (2 nd Cir. 2005), the cOUr!
dismissed the plaillliffs' claims under RLU IPA based upon a finding that the claims were not yet
ripe for judicial review. I n that case, the plaintiffs had been issued an informal letter by the city
advising them that the prayer meetings they were holding in their home violated zoning
regulations. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the attempt to enforce these zoning regulations
violated RLUJP A. In reviewing this issue, the Second Circuit Coun of Appeals dismissed the
case because the homeowners had not appealed the zoning violation to the local zoning board of
appeals and had failed to obtain a fina l decision from the ci ty on this issue.
Thus, the Murphys [plaintiffs] may not proceed in federal court until they have
obtained a final, definitive position from local authorities as to how their propel1y
may be used. Because such a decision has not yet been rendered, we lack
jurisdiction.. The zoning board of appeals possesses the au thority to review the
cease and desist order de 170VO to determine whether the zo ning regulations were
properly applied.
Hence, the Murphys' claims are not ripe .
ld. at 352-53 .
For these same reasons, P·lainti fTs..' RLUIPA claims in this case are also not ripe and
should be dismissed . Plaintiffs have not yet obtained a (in'll decision from the City as to the
decision reOected in the June 7, 2004 letter. Plaintiffs have also not obtained a final decision as
to whether or not any modification of their proposed activities would comply with City
ordinances. Fina lly . Plaintiffs have also nOl attempted to find another prOpeJ1y that might be
suitable ror Iheir proposed activities . and they have not fi led any other appl ications ror a
co nditi ona l use permit. Uncle r the se ci rcumstances. Plaintiffs have simply failed to obta in a final
decisi on rrom the CilY on any of these issues. and their claims for a violation or RLLlPA are

simply unripe.
2.

Constitutional Cla im s Are Not Ripe. There are essentially four situations

in this maner upon which plaintiffs base their Constitutional clalms. First plaintiffs sough t a
location for their Mission in Salt Lake City prior to the year 2000 but made only informal
inquiri es, never going through the conditional use process that Salt Lake City provides fo r the
location of a use in a non-permitted area (except once, discussed below). As to this situation,
because plaintiffs did not go through the conditional use process, plaintiffs did not obtain a final,
definit ive decision by Salt Lake City authorities. Second . plaintiffs sought a location for their
Mission in Salt Lake City after the year 2000. Again, they made only informal inqu iries, never
filing a formal application or going through the conditional use process and did not obtain a
final, definitive decision by Salt Lake City authorities . Third, plaintiffs did apply for one
conditio nal use with regard to the Rosewood Terrace propcl1y in 1999. However, plainti ffs do
not deny that they did not appeal the adverse dec ision to the Land Use Appeals Board as they
could have done. Thus, as to this situation. plaintiffs did not obtain a final, ddinitive decision by
Salt Lake City autborities. Fourth , plaintiffs did obtain a final decision from the Board of
Adjustmen t as to whether the uses to which they proposed to put the IZosewood Terrace pmDe11y
were a place of worship with an a ll owab le accessory use or a place of worship and a homeless

•

shelter. Only this fourth situation is ripe.
PlaintiJTs argue as to the iirst three situat ions that they can stililitiga le those situations
despite the lack of ripeness. First. they argue that they need not exhaust administrative rem eciies
before bringing Consti tuti onal claims (both lecieral and state) because they will su ffer irreparable
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harm. Memorandum in Opposition at page 6.' The problem with thi s argument is that
irreparable harm is not an exception

10

ripeness and plaintiffs fa il to raise a factual issue as to

whether they suffered irreparable harm.
The general ru le is that state Constitutio nal claims, including equi table claims, not only
must be ripe but a plaintiff must also exhaust admini strati ve remedies. See Utah Code AnJ1. §
10-9-100 1(1) [form er law]; Utah Code AIUl. § 10-9a-80 1(1) [current law j; Patterso n v. Ameri can
Fork Citv, 2003 UT 7,

~~

17-21,67 P. 3d 466, 471 (Utah 2003). Plaintiffs provide no Supp0!1

that irreparable harm will excuse a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Pl aintiffs cite to
Snyder v. Murrav Citv Crop. , 2003 UT 13,73 P.3d 325 but that case does not supp0!1 their
position because it was not a zoning case where the plaintiff had a defined process to foll ow to
obtain approval. Instead Snvder involved an individual who sought to present a prayer at a City
Council meeting. The prayer was rejected by the City Council and there were no other
admin istrati ve steps plaintiff needed to follow. Exhau stion was never addressed in the opinion.
In addi ti on, plaintiffs [ail to show that they will even suffe r irreparab le harm which
requires rejection of their argument. See Patterson, 2003 UT 13 at

~120 .'

In fact. plainti tTs'

The Ci ty notes that in di,cussi ng '·failure to ex bau st" plaintiffs do not di rectly address the issue
raised by the C ity . Tb e Ci ty did not contend that plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative
rcmedies, the Ci ty contended the claims were not ripe. Although similar, ripeness app lies even
where exhaustmllm8)' not because ri peness is more of a prudential concern and is well
recogn,zed In land use cases. See Murphy v. New Milford Lonine Com'n. 402 F.3d 342, 34735:; (2nd C II". ~005) discussed in the Ci ty·s Memorandum in Support.

4

' ··In support thereof, Patlerso ns offer on ly the cu rsory assertion that C it)' officials are hostile to
their rights and that they have "clearly pleaded sufficient facts indicating irreparable harm and
the futili ty of any future a\tempts Ito pursue admi ni strative remedies]." We decl ine the apparen t
invitation to peruse Patlerso ns' lengthy list of allegations in search of specific facts support in g
27

submission in opposition to summary judgment show they are not sufferin g irreparable harm ,
they continue to operate and provide service althougb perhaps at a lesser extent lhan they would
perhaps like. See, e.Q ., Memorandum in Opposition at page xlvi (converts in 2006 projected to

•

be 500,500 needy families distributed pantry food, 5,000 pieces of goods provided for needy
people, etc .).
With regard to the federa l Constitutional claims, this is not an exhaustion question. The
Ci t)' argued th at the claims were not ripe because plaintiffs have never obtained a fina l decision
from the City so there is nothing yet to chal lenge, the City's final decisionmaker could grant
their requests. Ripeness is different than exhaustion." Plaintiffs do not cite any suppO l1 that
irreparable harm wil l excuse a lack of ripeness and make no showing of irrepamble harm .
Plaintiffs' second argument with regard to ripeness is a claim that it would have been
fut il e to pursue a conditional use permit. While this is a recognized exception to ripeness ,
plaint iffs do not create a genuine issue of material fact on this point. With regard to their futility

their claims of irreparable harm and futil ity. We note only tllat allegations of unfairness in the
day-to-day relationship between Patlersons and City staff do not support a claim that the emire
admin istrative appeals process is inoperative or unavailable ,"
, Patterson stated " Indeed, Pattersons correctly point out that they need not exhaust their
administrative remedies before pursuing their federal § 1983 claims" citing to Felder v. Case\',
487 US . 131 , 147 (1988) . 2003 UT 13 at ~ 18. However, Patterson suggests tllalthis was
inapplicable to a ripeness challenge because it later stated "Because we upho ld the trial court's
dismissal of Parte rsons' § 1983 claims on the ground that no deprivation of a protected liberty or
propeny interest has occurred, we need not reach the questi on of whether or not those claims
were ripe fo r decision." 2003 UT 13 at 1128 n.3 . Felder also was not a case similar to this one, it
consid ered whether a state law requiring a notice of clai m prior to suing a goven1111ental emity
applied and held that such a state rem edy need not be exhausted before sui ng under 42 USc. 9
1983 in rederal or state COUI ·t. It did not reach the issue of ripene ss.

L{000
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claim . plaintiffs discuss only one anempt to relocate, to the Rosewood Terrace building, they do
not contend that seeking conditional uses for any other location would have been futile. See
Memorandum in Opposition al pages 7-8 . Wi th regard to Rosewood Te n'ace, plaintiffs' only
evidence of futility is their statement that the ir lease for that build ing expired prior to the time
they cou ld have appealed the decision to the Land Use Board. This does not show futility . "A
propeJ1y owner, for example, will be excused [rom obtai ning a final decision if pursuing an
appeal to a zoning board of appeals or seeking a variance would be futile . That is, a property
owner need not pursue such applications when a zoning agency lacks discretion to grant
vari ances or has dug in its heels and made clear that all such applicati ons will be denied."
Murphv v. New Milford Zoning Com'n, 402 F.3d at 349. P laintiffs have not set forth any facts
that the City's zoning agency lacked di screti on to grant variances or dug in its heels and made
clear it wou ld deny all of plaintiffs' applications. (In fact, plaintiffs could not prove thi s, they
never gave the City a chance to rule more than once.)
Plain tiffs' third argument against ripeness is that they deserve equ itable relief under the
Utah Constituti on to prohibit the Gon ti nued use of alleged unlawful practices. However, even
equi table state cla im s require adm in istrative exhausti on. Patterson, 2.003 UT 7, 1119.
[' o r the foregoing reasons, the Court should d ismiss all of pl aimi ffs' claims except as to
the decision from the Board of Adjustment as to whether the uses to which they proposed to put
the Rosewood Terrace property were a place of worship with an allowable accessory use or a
place of worship and a homeless shelter. The other matters will not be "ipe until plaintiffs pick a
location . apply for a conditional use. and obtain a Jinal determination on that. It is only at that
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lime that the Coun and the panies will know what would have happened and whether any
constilutional violations have occurred .
B.

S umm a ry Jud g m ent S hould Be G r a n ted Dis m is sin g Plaintiils ' Du e Pr ocess
C la im Bee:lll sc Sa lt Lak e C ity ' s Zo nin g Ordinan ces A re N ot A rbitra r y O r
Unreason a b le A nd Plaintiffs W ere Pro v id ed Th e O pp o rtunity T o Be H eard
W h en T he Ordi n a n ces W e r e A ppli e d T o Th em.

Plaintiffs do not disp ule Sal t Lake City" s arguments that its zoning ordinances as applied
to plaintiffs did not violate due process rights-that the ordinances are not arbitrary or
UllJ'easonable, that plaintiffs had notice and an oPPOliunity to be heard , and the ordinances were

•

not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner to the sole application for a condi tional use
that plaintiffs made. (In fac!' plainti ffs do not even address those arguments.)
Plaintiffs do PUl forth two other arguments about due process . First, they argue tllat rhe
ord inan ces are vague both facially and as applied. Plaintiffs do not state exactly why they
bel ieve Ordinance § 2IA .62 .040 is vague but allude to the fact that the Ord in ance requires a
determination of what is an accessory use that may perm issibly be undertaken at a place of
worship without apply in g for a conditional use based on genera l crileria .
The Colorado Supreme Court add ressed a simi lar situation and [ound that a zon ing
ordinance regulating where religious institutions could be located was not vague. The court set
forth helpfu l standards to address a claim of vagueness :
A statute is vague 011 its face if it is "impermissib ly vague in a ll its applications;"
lhat is, lhere is no conduct lhat it proscribes with sui'ficiem c larilY. Village ul
!-Joiii"an EI/(lIcs v Flipside. /-Iuffrnol7 ESfO/es, Inc , 455 U.s. 4~9, 495 , 102 S.C1.
1186.1191. 71 L.Ed.2d 362 ( 1982); People v. Milne, 690 P2cl829 (Colo. 1984):
L. Tribe, American CunsfilUfionol Law 1033- 35 (1 d ed. 1988) . A Slalute is vague
as applied if it dues not. with sufficient clurity . prohibit the con duct aga inst which
it is to be enforced. Pulmer v eify u/E1Iclid, -101 U.s. 544 . ':! I S.C1. 1563, ::'9

•

L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); L Tribe, supra at 1033-35 . A party may test a law for
vagueness as applied only with respect to his particular conduct; if a statute is not
vague as applied to that particular conduct, it will be enforced even though the
la w may be vague as appli ed to the conduct of oth ers. Hajjina/? ESIClfes, 455 U.S.
489, 102 S .Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Parker v. Levy, 417 U .S. 733, 94
S .Ct. 2547,41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); Milne, 690 P 2d at 836; L Tribe , suprct, at
1036 .
Citv of Colorado SprinQsv. Blanche, 761 P.2d 212,2 19 (Colo. 1988) (dismissing vagueness
claim).
In add iti on, in making this determination the Court sho uld keep in mind that the amount
of discretion afforded a zoning board in determining whether a particular land use is permissible
is exceptionally high because zoning is an inherenily discretionary system. See AT & T
Wireless PCS _ Inc. v. Winston Salem ZoningBd. of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir.
1999); Gardner v . City of Baltimore Mayor & Ci ty Council, 969 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that land-use decisions are a core function of local go vernment a nd that subd ivisio n
control is an inherently discretionary system) . The Court should also be mindful that
"[vJagueness challenges to statutes nol threaten ing First Amendment interests are examined in
light of the rac ts of the case

a\

hand; the statl.!te isjudged on an as-applied basis_" Mavnard v.

Car1\vri"ilt, 486U .S. 356. 361 ( 1988) .
The cha llenged ordinance is not unconstitutional ly vague o n its face. The ord in ance
adequatel y defines a " place of worship" and adcquately del in es an "accessory use," as well as
can be done in the zoning context:
"Place of worship" means a church . synagogue _temple , mosque or other place of
religious worship: inc l uding any accesso ry use or sl ru cture used for religious

\\ orshi p.
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"Accessory use" means a use that:
A. Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to, and serves a principal use;
B. Is customarily found as an incidem to such principal Lise;
C. Contributes to the comf0l1, convenience or necessity of those occupying,
working at or being serviced by sLich principal use;
D. Is. except as otherwise expressly authorized by the provisions ofrhis title ,
located on the same zoning lot as sLich principal use; and
E. Is under the same ownership or control as the principal use.
Thus, looking at the ordinance it can be easily determined that a chapel fo r weekly
services is al lowed, classrooms for Sunday School are allowed, kitchens to provide food for
church functions are allowed, and a retail store to sell donated items is not all owed as an
accessory use, it would not be subordinate nor is it customarily found as an incident to the
principal use as a place of worship. Even plaintiffs' proposed homeless shelter can be
determined on the face of the statute, in this case it was determined that the homeless shelter was
not "subordinate," it was a primary use taking it out of the category of an accessory use.
P la intiffs' further contention that the ordinance is vague because it has three potential
meanings is based on their omiss ion of words. When looked at as a who le, the ordinance states
clearly that a place of worship includes "any accessory use or structure used for religious
worship. "
Plaintiffs' as applied vagueness challenge is premised on what they say are six instances
o f inconsistent application of the City'S rules and regulations. Where th is argument fails is that
Lhe instances they cite were not linal determinations. While the decisions of certain lowe r level
administrators might have been inconsistent, al l vagueness problems as applied would have

•

disappeared had plaintiffs followed the process through to its end. For example. plaintiffs
complai n tha i zon ing administrator Randy Taylor did not undcrstand certain things ur found Ihe

YOlO

maller complicated . However, Taylor was onl y the first level of review, the matters were
clarified by the PlallJ1ing Commiss ion and ul til11mely decided by the Bo ard of Adjustment in the
only instan ce that the process was followed to a co nclus ion. See Statement of Und isputed Fact
Nos. 3 I -32 and the exhibits cited therein.
fin ally, plaintiffs argue that the zoning deci s ions imposed a prior restraint on their
activities and thus a higher standard applies to their vagueness chall enge. The cases plaintiffs
cite to inv olve permits to solicit for religious causes, plaintiffs do not cite to a si ngle case
applying a prior restraint analysis to a zoning law. Zoning cases are not examined under the
prior restraint doctrines if there is no absol ute ban on where a church can locate but instead
conditional uses are allowed if appli ed for. Citv of Colorado Springs v. Blanche rejected a
similar argum e nt because there, as here, the zoning ordinances did not flatly prohibit places of
worship, they allowed conditional uses . See 761 P.2d at 216 and n.5 C Here, as in City of
Englewood, the zoning o rdinan ce at issue is the "perm issive" type. A maj orit y of jurisdictions
have held these types of ordinances to be consti tuti o nal [ci ti ng cases]" and "Our conclusion that
Colorado Springs' permissive zoning scheme is constitutional is bolstered by the United States
Sup rem e Coun's repeated dismissal of appeals ii-om sta le co1ll1 decisions upholding the
constituti onality of zoning laws which restrict the location of religious institutions. The Court
d ismissed the appeals in th e rol lowing cases for wanl ora substantiul rederal question [citing
cases)'}
Plain tifTs raise a second due process argumen t. See Memorandul1l in Opposition al pages
~O--l4.

Plaintifls ,tate that the\ ·-initi ated dialogue "ith the Cit"·· to reconsider the J 999 request
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to lise rhe Rosewood Terrace Building and the City's determination that what they want to do is
a homeless shelte r rather tha n an accessory Llse . ['Iaimiffs complain that the City informed them
that i[t he proposed uses of the Rosewood Terrace building had not changed then the City ' s
determination thar they were a homeless shelter would not change. Pl ai nti ffs argue that the use
of the prior Board of Adjustment proceedings against the Mi ssion is a den ial of due process.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that in 1999 they received notice of, had the opPoltunity to and ,
in fact, did present evid ence at the Board of Adjustment bearing. Statement of Undisputed fact
Nos. 31 -3 2. Thus , plaintiffs received due process at that time. Af1er that point in time. plaintiffs
have not come forward with any changed circumstances, they have represented to the City that
they wish to use the propelty in the exact same way. See Memorandum in Opposition at pages
40-41 discussing renewed efforts to change their classifi cation as a homeless shelter but not
presenting any change of use. Not only was it consistent with due process for the City to not
change its pos ition, unde r well established law absent a change in circul11stances the City cannot
chan ge or alter its prior decision. See Root v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Twon of l'vladi so n,
565 A2d 14 , 15-1 6 (Con n. Sup. Ct. 1989) (a zoning board of appeal s is prohibited from
reve rsing a previous decision unless the facts and ci rcum stan ces have materially changed);
Rhema Chri st ian Center v. District or Colu mhia Board of Zoninfl Adj. , 515 A 2d 189. 193 (D. C.
App. 1986) ( traditional zo ning law incorporates the prec lusion concept. when a variance is
denied and the appl ican t resubmits the same or a su bstantially similar

~Ippli cati o n.

the app licant

must demonstrate lhat co nditi ons have changed).
Plaintiffs argue that the Ci lY in not cha ngin g its pos iti on is making an imp ro per

o

application of res j udicata because, they argue. plaintiffs were not parties to the ori ginal deci sion.
This is not true, the undisputed facts show that plaintiffs were a paliy because they fully
paliicipated in the proceedings and presented ev idence. ]-Iowever, even if this point were
accepted, that would not mean that there was a due process violation . Plaintiffs could have
sought a new, formal administrative interpretati on. As pari of this process they could have raised
their argument about res judicata not being applicable. They also could have raised the argum ent
they make in their Memorandum in Opposition, that they feel there were deficiencies in the prior
hearing before the Board of Adjustment because there was no presentation of the City practices
regarciing accessory use that were being applied to the Interfaith Churches. Even if a ruling was
made the same as the "informal" rulings they say they received hom PZD staff and counsel,
Administrator Wayne Mills, and the Mayor, they could then have gone to the Board of
Adjustment for a fina l, determinative decision from the City. The fac t that they did not pursue
this does not show a due process violation, it sho ws that the process was available but they just
failed to pursue it. In addition, it shows that the matter is not ripe .
C.

S ummary Judgment Sho uld Be G ranted Dis mi ss ing 1) I"intiffs' F"ce Exe r ci se
of Reli gio n C laim s Becau se T he C ity Is N ot Re g ulating Religiou s Belief, It Is
Reg ulatin g Co nduct.

Plaintifrs completely ignore the City' s arguments on this poin t, lilat Messiah Baptist
Church v. COUIllV o f Jeffe rso n, 859 F. ld 820 (10th Cir. 1988) ap plies a nd requires de ni al of
plainti ffs ' Free Exercise claims. In s1ead. pl ai nlJJfs raise irrel evant issues o r argul11t,nts made
undn other claims (for example. plainti ffs reiterate thei r vagueness challenge under the Free
Exercise heacii ng and claim \\ ithout support that there a re no time constraints for pre-judicial
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review). Plaintiffs also list five actions it perceive s as showing hostility to it and concludes that
th ese actions were motivated by its particular brand of religion . As to these, plaintiffs bilto
suppon by citati on to evidence that any of these things happened ' much less present any
evidence at all that religion was the moti vation. Because plaintiffs fail to dispute the City"s
arguments on tbis point. summary judgment should be granted dismissing the Free Exercise of
Religion claims.
D.

S umm ary Jud g ment S hould Be G ranted Dis mi ssi ng Plain ti ffs ' J~qua l
Protect ion/ Es tablis hment C lause C la ims B ecau se Sa lt Lak e City Has Not
Es tabli s hed A ny Religion , P laintiffs A re No t Bein g Treated Differ ently T han
Similarly S ituated Orga nizatio ns, A nd Any Difference In Treatment [s
Because They A rc Not Similarly S ituated.

Plaintitis claim that City ordinances are a fac ial violati on of the Establishment Clause
becaLlse there is an excessive entanglement of the City with religion because tbe City determines
for zoning purposes what constitutes religious worship, an accessory use of religiolls worship.
a nd whether that accessory use is customary for tbat religioLls worship. Memorandum in
Opposition at pages 18-19 discussing City Ordinance § 2 I A.62.040. Plaintiffs complain that any
c hurch introdu cing any new aspect of religious worship tbat included co nduct would be at risk.

This argument fails because Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 6 I 4 ( 197 I) itself
recognized that building and zoning regulations of necessity require some necessary and

' The City makes this statemcnt because the support cited by plail1liffs is "(see Oillined Facts it
slIpra)". Plaintiffs do not fill in any orthe blanks. Even if the C ity a nd the Court were to
read the 148 statements of Om itted Facts and fill in the blanks for plaintitfs. the exhibits upon
which those facts rely are often missing with a statelllcill mude ··To be supp lied.·'

~~,

permi ss ible contacts beTween the governmelll an d re ligion . The Ordinance" plaintiffs object to
has an acceptable level of enlanglement, it defines "places of worship" in very broad terms, not
attemptin g to pass on acceptableness of the proposed worship and does not req uire that the City
inquire as to the particulars of worship or pass judgment on acceptable forms. With regard to
"accessory uses," the Ordinance also has an acceptab le level of entanglement, it sets fo rth a
broad definiti o n making most subordinate uses accessory. Thus, the Ordinance is not on its face
unconstitutional.
Pl aintiffs apparently recognize thi s so they also raise their claim "as appl ied." As
applied, tbe Ordinance is equally valid . As app lied, the City has not determined what are and
what are not vali d religious worship practices of the plaintitfs. All the City does has done is
determine at what level the plaintiffs ' proposed conduct of housing the homeless went beyond
what the n eighborhood could suppOli and then declared that at that point that housing the
homeless was no longer an accessory use, it was a homeless shelter. The only real decisions the
City has made are purely secular. is hou sing the homeless on the proposed scale subordinate in
area, extent and purp ose to the proposed place of worship. The City has made no decision o n

""Place of worsh ip " mean s a church , synagogue, tern pie , mosque o r other place of
reli gioLis wo rship, including any accessory use or st ructure used for religious worship.
"Accessory use" means a use that:
A. Is subordinate in area. extent and purpose to . and serves a principal use:
B. Is cListomaril y found as an inciden t to such principal use:
C. Con tr ibutes to the comfort. convenience or necessity of those occupying, working
at o r being serviced bv such principa l use:
D. Is . except as otherwise expressly authorized by the provisions of this title. located
on the same zon ing lot as such principal use: and
E. Is under the same ownership or comrol as the principal use.
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whethc:r housing the homeless is a proper pan of worship . plaintiffs are free to practice that
conduct whether it is religious or not. they just have to do it in a zone where homeless shc:lte rs
are all owed. "A church has no constitutional right to be free from reasonable zoning regula tions
nor does a church have a constitutional right to build its house of worship where it pleases."
Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d at 826.
Plaintiffs also assen that the City has delegated governmental functions to a religious
association and favors certain religions over the Mission. The problem with this attack is that the
City has not delegated any decisions. As explained in the City's Statement of Undisputed Facts,
the City has determined that the housing of the homeless on a lim ited basis is acceptable because
of tile limited impact on the neighburlluutl. See Statelilent of Undisputed Facl Nos. 41-45. The
City has offered to allow any group to do this including plaintiffs. Statement of Undisputed Fact
No. 44. Th is is not done because of any religious reasons, it is clone due to the secular reason of
limited impact on the surrounding neighborhoods. Statement of Undisputed Fact No.4 I.
Plainti ffs seem to say that because they fallon one side of the line and the Interfaith
Churches on the other, the City has delegated to the lnterfaith Churches the right to set the cutoff
point for when housing the homele ss moves beyond an accessory use. This is not supported,
what is suppo rted by undisputed facts is that the line was drawn by the Ci ty for secular reasons.
there was no delegation to any religious group.
Pla in tiffs also seem to say that the City should not accept the Interfaith Churches
representat ions of what they are doing and whether they are within the parameters established.
As long as there is no evidence that the City has turned a blind eye to misrepresentations or
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violations (and there is no evidence whatsoever of either misrepresentations and violations or
ignoring such conduct) this simply does not state a violation of the Establishment Clause. The
cases pla intiffs cite do not support such a proposit ion.
Plaintiffs next argue that allowing limited housing of the homeless favors Interfaith
Churches over plaintiffs. However, the City has shown that it applies the same rules to all
groups who wish to house the homeless, as long as it is limited it is allowed. The City has
offered plaintiffs the same ri ght and plaintiffs even did this for a number of years in the Central
Christian Church building. Statement of Undisputed Fact Nos. 40, 44.
Plaintiffs also argue that they are being treated differently from the Interfaith Churches
because the Interfaith Churches house families from the area without addictiuns whereas
plaintiffs propose to house all including singles, transients and the addicted. They asse l1 that this
shows that the secu lar purpose has been abandoned. They also seem to complain that there are
no standards for when the homeless can be housed and when they cannot without obtaining a
cond iti onal use for a homeless shelter.
The p roblem with this argument is that it ignores the undisputed facts in this case. The
Cit)' has establi shed that there is a sec ular pu rpose behind its actions, the impact on Ihe
neighborhood. As long as there is limited impact,

housin~

the homeless is allowed without a

conditional use being sought and obtained. Housing fal1Jilies versus single men. local people
versus transients. the down

Oil

their luck versus addicts are all val id indicators of the likely

impact on a neighborhood. There are also standa rds lor when housing the homeless is clearly
acceptable. the Cit) has set furth that standard and uffered plaintiffs the opportunity to house the
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homeless on the same terms and conditions as the Interfaith Churches.
Plaintiffs a lso raise these issues as an equal protection challenge. raising perceived
instances of different treatment of them from other churches. Ench of thei r nrguments, however,
are withoutmeril.
Plaintiffs' first assen that they have been treated differently from the Interfaith Churches.
However, plaintiffs fail to point out that the interfaith Ch urches provide food and shelter to
individuals in need on a very limited basis with minimal impact to the sUlTounding
neighborhood. (Only 4-6 families, maximum of 16-20 people, for one week, four or five times a
year on a rotating schedule.) (See City Exhibit 32.) In contrast. plaintiffs were proposing to
house 30 people on a permancnt basis, together with meals fo r 60-80 people every day, which
would have a significa nt impact on the surrounding neighborhood. (See City Exhibit 78.) Thus,
nny discrepancy in treatm ent is based not upon the religious entity providi ng the service, but
upon the magnitude of the services provided and the impact to the community. In addition, the
C il Y has offered to al low pla illl iffs or any other entity to operate on the same limited basis as the
Interfaith Churches, but plaintiffs have declined to do so. (City Facts. 43 -44.)
PlaintiHs also complain thut the Zions Lutheran Church and several of the Inle rfaith
Ch urches have bccn allowed to expand existing conditional uses with on ly administrative
approval required. rather than complying with the Commun ity Co unci I and Planning
Commission process ordinar ily required for the approval of conditional uses. However.
plaintiffs' asscJ1ions undermine its own argument. In c:ach of the cases cited . administrative
approval was granled for the expansion of a pre-existing use. The standard lo r the expansion of

a pre-existing use is different than the standard for the approval of a new use. (See Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 70.) Thus, the mere fact that plaintiffs' attempt to estab lish a new conditional use was
required to utilize a process different than churches seeking an expansion of an existing use, is
not evidence of unequal treatment.
Plaintiffs also complain that the Church of the Madeline and the Jewi sh Community
Center were treated differently before the Board of Adjustment. Specific ally , plainti ffs allege in
the case involving the Church of the Madeline, the City encouraged and allowed delays, but that
in plaintiffs' case the City refused to postpone the Board of Adjustment hearing, even though the
appellant had requested the delay. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, pages 26 -27.J
Pl ai ntiffs ' argument on thi s point is disingenuous. In tbe [all of 1999, plaintiffs flied an
application for a temporary restraining order with the coul1, seeking to fo rce the City to process
plaintiffs' application without waiting for plaintiffs to make a presentation at the local
community council, because doing so would delay making a deci sion on plaintiffs' appli cati on.
(Plaintiffs' Fact J 43.) Although the court did not grant pl aintiffs' requ est for a restraining order,
the City became aware that plaintiffs were tim e se nsitive, and thus, in deference to plaintiffs'
in tcrests, the City denied appellant's request to postpone the Board of Adjustment hearing.
Thu s, if anythin g, plaint i ITs recei vcd treat ment that was preferentia l to the Church or' the
Madeline .
Plaintiffs also complain that in the Board of Adjustment case involving the .Je"ish
Community Center. the Board of Adjustment was provided an opportuni ty

10

c"aluate the scope .

nature and eX lent of accesso ry uses. However. the same 0PPol1unilY existed at both the Planning

~I

Commission a nd Board of Adjustment hearings in this case. At both of those hearings. plaintiffs
thelllseives introduced e vi de nce ale rting the Plan.ning CO lllmission a nd the Board of Adj ustment
to the practices of the Interfaith Churches. (See Depos iti on Exhibits 82 and 43. )
Finally. the Mission complai ns thal an administrative exception was granted to the
Summum Churc h in deference to its free exerci se of religion , asseliing that no such
accommodation has been granted plaintiffs. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, page
27.) This argument overlooks an impol1a nt distinction between the nature of the request from
the Summum Church and the nature of the request from plaintiffs. The S ummum Church made a
request for authorization to mUlllmify and store dead bodies as pm1 of its religio us activit ies .
Under City ordinances, the storage of dead bodies carulot occur anywhere in the City outside of a
cemetery. In contrast, plainti ffs ' request involves a place of w orship, boarding house and
homeless shel ter, which would be allowed in the 03 and CG zones. (See C ity fa ct No. 22.)
Thus, the religious activities of the Summum Church could not be accol11modated anywhere in
the City w ith out an exception. In contrast plainti ffs' religious activities can be accommodated
within the zo ning districts which provide for such uses.
Pl aintiffs ' equa l protect ion challenge is even weaker becau se, as plaintiffs admit, equal
protection is determined on a rationa l basis test. The City has put fo rth rat iona l reasons [o r any
differing treatment of plaintiffs from the Interfaith and other chu rches. Thus. plaintiffs' equal
protection cluims should be dismissed.
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II.

THE MJSS10 N HAS NO CLAIM FOR RELOCATION EXPENSES AGAINST
THE C ITY.
and

JJl.

THE M lSSION HAS NO CLA l M AGA 1NST THE C ITY FOR Tl-IJRD PAHTY
BREACH OF CONTRACT OR QUANT UM MEH UIT.

Plaintiffs abando n their Fifth, Sixth and Sevel1lh Causes of Action against the City .
See Plaintiffs ' Memorandum In Opposition To Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary
Judgment. page I. This would also include the claim in the Fifth Cause of Action for third
party breach of contract and quantum meruit. Thus, su mmary judgment shou ld be granted to
the City on these causes of ac tion, discussed at Points II and III of the C ity's Memorandum
In Support.
IV.

THE MISSION HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR A VIOLATION OF
THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALI ZED PERSONS ACT
OF 2000.

Even if SLlch claims are ripe, Plaintiffs have nevertheless failed to state any legitimate
cla im for a violation of RLU IPA.
As discussed above. Plaintiffs have acknowledged that they have no legiti mate claim
for a violation of RLUI PA l'or any events which occurred prior to Septembe r 2000 . Plainti ffs
have also acknowledged that they have no claim for a violation of Subsection (a) of
RI_UI PA. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition . pagcs 2-3.) Notwithsta ndin g thcse
admiss ions. howeve r, Pl aintiffs asscrt three RL UIPA claims .
First, P lain tiffs cl aim that the Ci ty has vio lat cd Subsectio n (b)(2) of the Act bv
di!>crimimlling agains t the Miss ion in its implementation of its land use regulations vis-il-vis
the participating illlerfaith Churches. (See PlaiI1liffs' Memorandum in Opposition . page
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This argument, based essentially on equal protection grou nds, is without merit. The record
evidence indicates that the Interfaith Churches operate on a much smaller scale and with
much less impact upon the community than would Pl aintiffs. (See City fact No. 43 and City
Exhibi t 32.) Specifically, the Interfaith Churc hes house a maximum of 4-6 homeless ram i lies
(3 maximum of 16-20 persons) [or one week, four or live times a year, on a rotating

schedule. Meals are prepared only for those stayi ng at the church. In contrast, Pl aintiffs'
proposed activities would involve approximately 30 people living on-site ),ea r ro und,
together with daily breakfasts for approximately 60-80 people, man)' of whom would be
bussed to the site. (See City Exhibi t 78.) Thus, Plaintiffs' complaint that they are treated
differently than the Interfaith Churches is simply based upon the fact that their proposed
activities, and the impact of those proposed activities upon the community, are dramatically
different.
Moreover, the City has offered to allow Plaintiffs to cond uct activities on a scale
similar to those conducted by the Interfaith Churches. Plaintiffs have thus far declined that
offer. (See City fact Nos. 44-45.) These facts are insufficient to forl11 the basis of a claim
for discrimination unde r RLUIPA.
Plaintiffs also clail11 the City has violated Subsection (b)(3) or RL UIPA by imposing
regulations that unreasonably limit religious assemblies, institutions o r structures .
SpeciJ;c,dly . Plaintiffs assert that it is unreasonabl e for the City to require PlaintiJTs to incu r
the expense of finding, locating and temotively securing a location as a prerequisite to
apply ing for an acim ini stra ti\e interpretation. (See Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Oppos iti on .

page 4.) This argume nt is presumably based upon the City's ordinance oUllining the process
for obtain in g an administrative interpretation. (See Deposition Exh ibit 94.) This argument is
also deficient.
In making this argument, Plaintiffs apparently confuse the distinction between
adm ini strati ve interpretations (discussed in Section ~ 1.A.12.01 0, et seq. of the City Code)
and administrative decisions (defined in Section 21 .A.62.040) . While City ord inan ces
inciicate th at only a property owner or the owner's auth orized agent may seek an
administrative interpretation, there is no limitation as to who may request an administrative
decision. Appeals from both admin istrative interpretations and admi ni strati ve decisions are
heard hy the Board of Adjustment. (See Section 21 .A.12.040D and 21.A.16.01 0.)
In the present case, Plaintiffs requested and received several administrative
interpretations or decisions, including a letter dated April 20, 1999 (Ci ty Exhib it 2), a letter
doted September 14, 1999 (C ity Exhibit 28) and a letter dated June 7, 2004 (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 57). Pl aintiffs could have appealed any of th ose decisions to the Board of
Adjustmen t, but elected not

to

do so. In any even!. however, the administrative processes set

rorth in City ordinances cio not impose an unreasonable lim itation on Plaintiffs' reli gious
assembly, institution, or structure.
Pl uinti lTs ' final Jrgumenl is thJt the City has vio lated RLU1PA due to past
"'di scrimination or unfair deluy." Plaintiffs do not cite any control ling legal authority ror that
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proposition." As to discrimination. Plaintiffs have never cited any evide nce to suggest that
Plaintiffs are treated differently than other non-religious entit ies. Thus, the onl" evidence of
nny discrimination offered by Plaintiffs is their argumen t thnt they have been treated
differently than the interfaith Churches . For the reasons discussed above, those differences
in treatment, based upon signiiicant differences in practice and impact, do not constitute
disc ri mi n ati on.
Plaintiffs also have failed to produce any record evidence demonstrating unreasonable
delay. During the course of this case, the City issued several administrat ive decisions, a
decision on Plaintiffs' request for a conditi ona l use permit, and a decision on the appea l fi led
by the local Community Council. None of those decisions was unreasonably delayed.
(a) April 20, 1999 Administrative interpretation: Issued 39 days after first meeting
on March 12,1999. (See City Exhibi t 2 and Affidavit of Philip Arena, paragraphs 3-8,
attached as Exhibit 9 to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.)
(b) September 14, 1999 Administrative dec ision: Issued 13 days following the filing
of Plaintiffs' conditional use application on Septembe r I, 1999. (See City Exhibit::>8 and
City Ex hibit 48.)
(c) October 7,1999 Planning Commission decision on cond itional use applicJtion:
Isslled 36 days following the filing of the application. (See City Exhibit 48 and Ci ty Exhibit
84)

"The authority cited by Plaintiff's in suppOrt of this position is an isolated sta temeJ1l from the
legislative history cuntained in the congressional record. Such a statement of indi"idual
legislators is at best advisory only.

(d) N ovember IS, 1999 Board of Adjustmen t decision o n appea l of City
administrative decis ion: Issued 42 days after appeal was filed. (See Ci ty Exhibits 42 and
55 .)
(e) June 7, 2004 Adm ini strative decision : Issue d 35 days following wri tten request
o n M ay 3, 2004. (See P lai ntiffs ' Exhibi t 57 and Deposition Exhibi t 61.)10
The se time periods required fo r issuing City decisions, ranging hom 13 to 42 d ays ,
given the complexity o f the matters at issue and the requi rements for providing notice of
public hearings, are not unreasonable and do not provide a basis for claiming a violation of
RLUIPA.

V.

SHOULD ANY CLA TM SURVIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY J UDGMENT
SHOULD BE GRANTED THA T PLAINTIFFS HA VE NO SPEC IAL
DAMAGES.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that th ey have no evidence of special damages (economic

losses).
Plain tiffs argue that they can show at trial, if that occ urs, that the y have nom inal
damages. The City does not disagree with thi s, the Ci ty has moved for summary judgment only
as to specia l, econom ic dam ages of whi ch plain ti ffs have none.
Plaimiffs also argue th at they can show a t tri al general damages such as impairment o f
reputation. personal humiliation, mental angui sh and suffering or ·'p resum ed" damages. Again.

10 Although PlaintiiTs sent a letter to the City dated Ju ne 24 . 2003 (Deposition Exhibil GO), thai
letter merely provided ··some basic ill/ormation about the Sal t Lake City Mission.'· Ii did not
request any response from the City. I'lail1lilTs did not make such a request until their letter of
May 3. 2004 (Deposition Exhibit 61).
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the City does not disagree with this (although this will be an issue potentially subject

10

a

directed verdict. The City seeks a ruling at thi s time only that plaillliffs have no special.
econol11 j c damages.

CONCLUSJON
For all the reasons set forth above, the Mission's Second AJ11ended Complaint fails to
Sla te any cognizable claim fo r relief aga inst the City. Acco rdingly, the City's Moti on for
Sumll1ary ./udgment should be granted. and all claims which the Mission asserts against the
City should be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 3 I 51 day of March, 2006.

e;;L?U=
MORRIS 0 HAGGERTY
Attorneys for Defendant
Sal t Lake City Corpo ration

CERT1FJCAT E OF SERV1 CE

J hereby certify that on thi s 31 st day of March, 2006, I caused a true and co rrect co py of
the foregoing to the following:
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Overnight
Via Facsimile
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U.S. Mai l
Hand Delivered
Overnight
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Matthew Hilton
472 N orth Main Street
Kaysville, UT 84037
Fax No. (80 1) 544-9977
Vincent C. Rampton
Jones, W aldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City , UT 84 101
Fax No. (80l) 328 -0537
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John A. Snow
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
SO South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Sal t Lake City , UT 84145-0340
Fax No. (80 1) 534-0058
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Hand De Ii vered
_ _ Overnight
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Tab 3

Salt Lake City Attorney

Craig Tay lor and A ssociates
Craig Taylor (#4421)
Matthew Hil ton (#3655 )
472 North Main Street
Kaysville, UT 8403 7
Telephone: (801) 544-9955

Attorn eys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Salt L ake City Miss ion , et. aI. ,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE C. WILSON
)
v.

)

Salt Lake City, et. aI. ,

)

Civil No. 990908945

)

Judge: Joseph C. Fratto

Defend ants

Salt La ke Redevelopm ent Agency,

)

Third-Pali y Pl aintiff
)
v.

)

McD onald Broth cr s In ves tm cnts, a
Utah Gc n cr al Part"ncr ship,
Third-Paliy Defendants .

)
)

COMES NOW Wayne C. Wilson, under oath a nd penalty of peljury, and states that the
following is true:
am over eighteen years of age, of sOll nd mind and body, an d make this

I.

affidavit based on my own personal kllowledge and as Pastor and Execlltive Director of the Salt
Lake City Mission.
2.

On April 16, 1986, as a church, the Spectacular Ministries of the Lord 's

Servants, was recogni zed as a non-profit, spiritual corporati on by the state of Utah. The purposes
stated in the Articles of Incorporation are a reflection of God's reli gious vision to me. The
corporation at present is in good standing.
3.

On July 26, 1988, the Utah State Tax COimnission granted exemption from

franchise tax to the Mission. A copy of the notice of this decision is attached hereto as Exhibit I.
4.

Upon inquiry, the Interna l Reven ue Service notified me on behalf of the

Mission that it is their practice to not require churches to apply for tax-exempt status because it is
automatically gran ted. It is my understanding that counsel for the Mission has teleph on ica lly
confi rm ed the same.
5.

Beginning January IS, 1994, the Mission opened its doors at 466-468 West

200 South, Salt Lake City. The propetiy on which the Mission premises were located was owned
by McDonald Brothers In vestments , a Utah general partnership.
6.

During April and May of 1994, the Mission was served with a Notice to Quit by

our landlord McDonald Brothers In vestment. The Amended Eviction Not ice dated May 3, 1994,
stated that a basis for the Notice to Quit was that the Mission was "causing or suffering premises
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to be used as residence in violation of zoning laws." On May 19, 1994, an agreement was
reached in co urt, with the Jud ge, that provided the Mi ssion could continue doing what it was
doi ng as a church, and continue caring for th e homeless provided certain matters were improved
as outlin ed in the written order of the court . After the trial was over o n May 19, 1994, James
McDonald told me~that he was sorry the proceedings had been brought and that he had been
pressured by city officials to do

S0.

The Mission received a 'ibul1ding pennit from the city to

proceed forward with the renovations ordered by the court.
8.

The RDA relies on the provisions of UCA § 78-36-3 (1)(d) to state that the

Mission was in unlawful detainer. That sub section states that
[a] tenant of real property for a tenn less than life (like the Mission's month-tomonth tenancy) is guilty of unlawful detain er: ... [w ]hen he assi gns or sublets the
leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits or permi ts
waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on
or in the premises, or when he suffers, pennits, or maintains on or about the
premi ses any nui sance, in cluding nui sance as defined in Section 78-38-9 and
remains in possession after service upon him of a three days ' notice to qui!.. 1
9.

After the reso luti on of the judicial proceedings in 1994 brought by MB I against

the Mission for unlawful detainer, the Mi ssio n was allowed to rema in in the MBl premises.
10.

At no tim e subsequent thereto was the Miss ion served with a three days' notice

to quit by MB I under U.C.A. § 78-36- 3(d).
11.

At no time thereafter did the Mi ssion or Pastor Wilson

Lease[] premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commit[] or pe11l1it[]
waste on the premises, or set[] up or can'Y[Y] on any unlawful business on or in
the premises, or suffer[], pennit[], or maintain[] on or about the premises any

, U.C .A. § 78-336-3(1 ltd) .
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nuisance, including nui sa nce involving controlled substances, gamb ling, crimin al
activity, parties that interfere with the comf0J1abie enjoymen t of life or p ropcl1y,
pro stitution, and criminal fireanns (all as defined in Section 78-38-9).
J O.

On May _ _ , 1994, although the city did not appear to agree with the Icgal

arguments and factual representations my counsel had made for me, the criminal charges wcre
dismi ssed by the city. I understood that then city attomey Roger Cutler was aware of and spoke
publicly regarding the dismissal.
J J.

Subsequent to the criminal charges being di smi ssed by the City, I continued to

notify the police depar1ment of criminal conduct that I, and the staff o f the Mi ss ion, would
observe occurring o n the block between 400-500 West and 200 South. A significant number of
phone calls made from the Mi ssion to the police department were made by persons seeking
refuge in the Mission. It is likely that thi s oceun'ed because there were no public telephones
within this one block area. I sensed irritation w hen I talked to some of the officers regarding
these complaints, but the majority suppolied police chief Ortega's request that citizens report all
crime of which they were aware.
12.

On December 24, 1996, I was given a Notice of Zoning Vi olation by Sherie

Reich. After receiving the Notice, I called Harvey Boyd ofthe City 'S enforcem en t di vision of the
planning and zoning department and inquired about its cnforcement. I-Ie told me not to

WOlTY

about it. A co py of the Zoning violation is hereto attached as Exh ibit 2. That night Traveler' s
Aid (Road Home) sen! over a mother and her baby child to the Mis sion to secure emergency
shelter. A pol ice officer brought. by another person released from the hospital with no place to
go.
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13.

On December 26, 1996,1 was given a Criminal Citation by zoning enforcem ent

official Kent Mickelson for violating the City Zoning Ordinances by maintaining a homeless
shelter. A copy of the Criminal Citation is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
14.

On December 28, 1996 Sherie Reich, Kent Mickelson, and Harvey Boyd came

to the mission and told me I had to close down my homeless shelter.
15 .

Beginning on January 15, 1997, I was represented in the criminal proceeding

regarding the Zoning violation by the present Counsel for the Mission in this case. I understood
Judge Hutchings ruling in the 1994 unlawful detainer proceedings established a lawful nature of
my presence at the Missions address . I also understood the result of the court proceedings to
mean that engaging in religious worship tluough presentations in the Mission

and outreach

ministties to "feed and clothe Jesus" by ministering to the needs of the homeless and poor,
regardl ess of family status, addiction, or residency, was lawful at the Mission 's location.
16.

On May _, 1997, the City Prosecu tor's Office dismissed the criminal charges

against me.
17.

On May 23,1997, the Spectacular Ministries of the Lord 's Servants filed a dba

with the State of Utah, using ' Salt Lake City Mission' as its name.
18.

On July 18, 1997, the Utah State Tax Commission granted the Mission a sales

tax exemption number because it qualified as a religious or charitable institution. A copy of the
notice of this decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
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19.

On August 12, 1997, the United States Post Offi ce gran ted the Mi ssio n postal

privileges as a non-profit orga ni zation. A eopy of the notice of thi s decision is atta ched hereto as
Exhibit 5.
20.

On August 14, 1997, the Mission' s counsel and I met with Lynn Pace of the

City Atto rney's Office to learn about the requirements to locate a homel ess shelter in the city. On
August 20, 199 7, Mr. Pace wrote a letter to the Miss ion ' s counsel ex pl aining that such

lISCS

were

li mited to the D-3 and CG zones of the city. In addition he reconfilllled the ex isting pol icy of the
city again st further concentration of homeless services
within one geographic area. For that reason , it is more likely that your client
wou ld obtain approval of a proposal if his proposed shelter were located outside
of the downtown area si nce there is already a large shelter and several suppOli
facil ities in that area.
Nonetheless, the City Attorney assured the Mi ssion's counsel that:
[i]f your cli ent has a specific proposal he would like us to review or if he would
like to have a general discussion as to the range of poss ible sites, we would be
happy to discuss that matter with him. If you and you r client would like to
discuss thi s matter, please contact me so that we can arrange an appropri ate
meeting time. In contrast, if your client would like to meet with out attorneys,
pl ease have him contact Brent Wilde at 535-6180, who has assured me that he
wil l make himself available to meet with your client.
A true and accurate copy of th is letter from counsel is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
2 1.

By the winter of 1998, the Mission was acti vely looking to relocate to a

pellllanent location that the Mission could purchase.
22.

The Miss ion's presentations at vari ous community councils before 1999 were

opposed by members of the Mayor's office and uniformed members of the police depal1men t.
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23.

Before 1999, the Mission wanted to move to the Sutherland Building located at

405 South Redwood Road. I made a presentation at the Poplar Grove Community Counci l.

A

unifonned police officer appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mission. After the
presentation, chair indicated that the Mission would receive a letter of detennination in about a
week; thereafter, however, he refused to send the Mission a letter. In the absence of the same,
staff at PZD refused to all ow the Mission to file an application for a conditional use penni!. I
have produced to the city true and accurate copies of documents marked with numbers 0708 MIS
to 0737 MIS that show efforts of the Mission to prepare for the submission of a conditional use
pennit appl ication and presentation to the Community Council.
24.

Before 1999, the Mission wanted to move to 1515 South 400 West (fonnerly,

Travelers Aid Society; now, The Road Home). I made a presentation at the People's Freeway
Community Counci l. The Community Council offered to assist the Mission to locate outside of
their Community Council area, but would not approve the requested location.

One of the

officers who had appeared at the Mission offices and told the Mission that the Mayor's Office
wanted them shut down appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mission. The Community
Counci l never sent verification of the presentation or their decision to the Mission. Despite
having made the presentation, thereafter staff at PZD twice refused to allow the Mission to file
an application. I have produced to the city tme and accu rate copies of documents marked with
numbers 0746 MIS to 0756 MIS that show efforts of the Mission to prepare for the submission
of a conditional use permit application and presentati on to the Community Council.

Page 7 of 23

25.

Before 1999, the Mission wanted to relocilte at 850 West 1600 N0l1h (ilt the

Superfund site). PZO staff refused to notify Capital Hill Community Council that the Mi ss ion
needed to be on their ilgenda to make a presentation; thereby, justi fying the Mission's belief that
the preparing of an application would also be futile.

26.

In the early part of 1999, the Mission detennined that it would like to acquire

the Cohen Building located at 580 West 300 South. At the time of the inquiry, a Church was a
permitted use in the 0-3 zone where the property was located. A building pennit was requested.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Randy Taylor, Zoning Administrator, encouraged the Mission to
make a presentation to the Rio Grande Community Council. Previously the Mission had
requested a building pennit for the renovation of the Cohen Building located at that address , but
had been delayed in receiving a response because the city wanted to clarify what classification of
use they would assign to the Mission at that location. While the Mission was infom1ed that
attendance was not mandatory, in an effOli to cooperate, we agreed to attend the Rio Grande
Community council meeting on Mareh 17, 1999. Phil Arena of the Mission made the
prcsentation. The prescntation was disrupted by Marge Harvey of the Mayor's Office who spoke
out against the presentation. Other uniformed police officers in attendance spoke out against the
Mission as well. The Mission was asked to milke another presentation at the next meeting on
April 21,1999.
27.

On Apri l 20, 1999, staff of the PZO brought to the Mission an administrative

interpretation of the uses of the Mi ssion at the Cohen propeliy located at 580 West 300 South.
The admini strative interpretati on letter cl assifi ed the Mi ssi on as being something that required
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state li censure as well as a homeless shelter. We had been visited by th e State Department of
Human Services Office of Licensing on April 13, 1999, for an inspection requested by the City
PZD. On April 19, 1999, the li censin g offi ce wrote the Mission a letter that indicated licensure
was not applicable to our religiously based activities. A true and accurate copy is attached hereto
as Exhibit 7. We received thi s letter on the morning of April 21, 1999, and immediatel y faxed a
copy to the PZD and the office of Ma yor Corradini.
28.

Notwithstanding our commitment to make a second presentation at the Rio

Grande Community Council on the night of April 2 I, 1999, after the Mission and I read the letter
from Randy Taylor at PZD, we felt that it would be futile to apply for a conditional use permit
regarding the Cohen property. We concluded this for two reasons. First the location of our
church needed to be accessible to those persons in need of spiritual and temporal assistance.
Because of the city policy opposin g the concentration in the city of any additi onal services for
the homeless, it seemed that no matter what we submitted regarding our relocation, the staff
would find th at our proposal would have a negative impact on "the city as a who le." Second the
letter co ntain ed an unsolicited offer to assist the Mission in relocati ng in Salt Lake County
(instead of assisting us to remain in the city.)
29.

On April 2 1, 1999, the Mission again presented at the Rio Grande Community

Council. Brent Wilde of the PZD was in attendance and di sputed if not debated the Mi ssion's
claim it was only a church rather than all of the use classifications contained in the April 20,
I 999Administrati ve Interpretation letter th at were contrary to the use classifications explained by
the Mission .
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30.

On April 22, 1999, I obtain ed for the Mission, by facsimile from the Mayor's

Office a li sting of all Community Councils and their respective chairperson.
3 1.

Check # 2375, dated June 4, 1999, was subm itted by the Mission to MBI as the

$600 June 1999 rent payment and cleared the Mission's checking account on June J I, 1999.
The month-to-month tenancy was redefined by agreement among the parties and MBI's
acceptance of check # 24 J 3, dated June 17, 1999, for the rent payable for July 1999. Although
the check did not clear the Mission 's bank account unti l July 9, 1999, the acceptance of the
check in June J 999, and subsequent cashing of the same prior to the execution by MBI and RDA
of the July 2 1, 1999, Sale and Purchase Agreement, was sufficient to establish a tenancy that
began on July J, and according to the Parties ' agreement dated July 3 I, 1999, continued through
September 30,1999.
32 .

DUling the middle of the summer, the Mission detem1ined it would try to

relocate in the Rosewood Terrace Building at 168 North 600 West located in the Failllark
Community Council area. I was unable to reach the Chairman of the Failllark Community
Council during early August 1999 because he had gone of vacation. Unbeknown to the Mission,
the Faiq}a rk Community Council meeting for August 1999 had been cancelled because of
vacat ion schedules. The Mission's counsel and J notified the PZD and City Attomey's Office of
the Mission's inability to meet with the Fairpark Comm unity Council and the urgent need to
begin processing its application for a conditional use regarding Rosewood Terra ce propeliies.
33.

At no time did I or the Mission receive /Tom staff of the plalming and zoning

depaliment of the city the f0l111 that I was to give a community council chairperson to execute so
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as to acknowl edge that the Mi ssion had made a presentation regarding a proposed conditional
use by the Mi ssion in that paliicular area of the ci ty. At no time until the Mission's coun sel
became involved in the Mi ss ions conditional use permit application of September 1, 1999,
(regarding the Rosewood Terrace Building) did I understand that the community council did not
have the authority to withhold approval or prevent the Mission from applying for a conditional
use penni!. My experiences of being opposed at these presentations by individuals identified as
being city emp loyees of the Mayo r's office or police department led me to believe that approval
of the community council was a prerequisite to filing a conditi onal use permit application with
the city.
34.

On June 25, 1999, when Philip Arena requested a permit application for the

Cohen property, staff at the permit counter was uncooperative, knowing that the Mission could
not obtain a pemlit on the "Cohen" property without clearance from Randy Taylor, Zoning
Admini strator. The experience of Philip Arena on June 25, 1999, at the PZD permit counter
closed the door on the Mi ssion ' s efforts to recei ve city approval and relocate at the Cohen
propeliy.

Based on the foregoing, the Mission concluded it would be futi le to proceed with a

conditional use pell11it applicati on on the Cohen propeliy.
35.

I believe th at had the Mi ssion been allo wed to file an applicati on during the

August 1999, it is likely th at what the Mi ssion perceived in the staff report as bcing reli giously
discriminatory against ti,e Mi ss ion (and raised in either the Moti on for a temporary restrai ning
order, or at the October 7, 1999, presentati on by Mission' s counsel befo re the Comm ission)
could have been addressed and resolved so as not to violate the co nstitutional rights of the
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Mission. Because of the extrem ely negative publicity encouraged by city employees in the
Fairpark Community Council area, the Mission and I did not deem it worthwhile to postpone the
Comm ission's hearing on our proposal until the following month.
36.

The September 14, 1999, administrative interpretation letter was neither

requested in accordance with City ordinances nor expected by the Mission. The Mission's
counse l had infol111al1y asked for clarifi cat ion regarding the impact of non-state licensure on the
zoni ng administrator's April 20, 1999, letter. If the September 14, 1999, letter was wr itten in
response to that request, it took _ _ weeks for the City to issue the advice.
37.

On September 14, 1999, the Mission was notified by the Fairpark Community

Counci l that a vote would be taken of those attending the Community Council meeting scheduled
for September 23, 1999, to determine whether or not the Community Council would be in favor
of the Mission's presentation. No fonn from the Zonin g Adm ini strator or PZD was disclosed to
or provided to the Mission for the City Chair to complete, acknowledgin g that the Mission had
made a presentation regarding the proposal.
38.

As to the federal relocation assistance, the RDA never provided the Mission

with a "notice of intent to acquire" or " notice of el igibility for relocation assistance," prior to
"commitment of Federal financial assistance" or "initi ation of negotiation" as defined by the
federal regu lat ions impl ementing the federal Uniform Relocation and Assistance Act. The RDA
failed to provide the Mission "as soon as feasible" with "a general written descliption of the
displacing agency's relocation program" at all, much less in mandated detail and notification of
right to appeal the Agency's determination of an application for assistance.
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39.

The RDA failed to provide the Mission with services as mandated, including,

through a personal interview, (1) detennining the relocation needs and preferences of the
Mission, and (2) providing an explanation of (a) the relocation and other payments or other
assistance for which the Mission may be eligible, and (b) procedures for obtaining su ch
assistance.

The RDA failed in its continuing duty to provide infomlation on available

commercial properties and locations as well as minimizing the hardships of the Mission by
providing "such other help as may be appropriate."
40.

The Mission filed a claim with the RDA seeking payment for actual reasonable

mOVIng and related expenses as required by 49 CFR 24.303 and reestablishment expenses
required by 49 CFR 24.304.

Because of the failure of the RDA to provide proper notice of

eligib ility, th e RDA Defendants failed to allow the Mission to demonstrate the need for advance
relocation payment.

The RDA failed to provide "reasonable assistance [to the Mission] to

complete and file any required claim for paymen\."
41.

H ad the Mission been notified of its right to seek an advance relocati on

payment, it woul d have done so and received the benefits thereby. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson

~

) Havll1g failed to piovide the MISSIon wlth proper notrce, the MISSIOn carmot be charged
with failure to give notice to the RDA of a "self-help" move because it never was notified by the
RDA as required to do so . Having failed to give proper notice of the ability to file a claim in
advance, the RDA can be charged with a failure to review tIle Mission ' s claim in an "expeditious
manner" and "promptly notify the Mission as to any additional documentation that is required to
SUppOli the claim." If the RDA disapproved all or pari of the advance payment claimed by the
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Mission, they were under a duty to "promptly notify the claimant in writing of its det ermin ati on,
the basis for its determination, and the procedures for appealing that detennination. " Finally,
having failed to give notice of the right to request an advance relocation payment, the RDA
fa il ed to m aintain adequate records of their treatment of the Mi ssion's request for relocati on
assistance.

42.

RDA 's proffered fa ct #42 clarifies thi s statem ent, stating "[ o]n October 9, 1999,

the Mi ssio n finally vacated the Subject Property." For clarifi cation regarding the factual basis
indicatin g an absence of need to vacate the property June I I , 1999, see response to Di sputed Fact
# 32, inji-a.

43.

Vv'hile the City Attollley's Offi ce forwarded a copy to Mi ssion's counsel of the

October 4, 1999, appea l filed by the Fairpark Community Council, to the September 14, 1999,
administrative interpretation; neither I nor the Mi ssion were notified by the ci ty of (1) the
appell ants request to postpone the November IS, 1999, hearing, and (2) the o pti on to app eal the
Bo ard of Adjustments ruling within thirty (30) days after the time the deci sion was made.
The PZD staff never consulted with me nor with the Missi on regarding the needed eviden ce
on ap peal or how the appeal wou ld impact the Mi ssion. [n addition, counsel for the Mission
received a copy of the minutes of the Nov ember 15, 1999, meeting after the time for appeal
had run.
44.

The Mission and I believe that had the City invo lved the Mi ss ion in the

appea l, an d had the City desired to assist the Mi ss ion's efforts to remain in the city, the
issues of the appea l co uld have been more favora bly framed as follows: (a) The status of the
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boardinghouse would have been specifically addressed and co nsidered for approval. Had the
missionary training (disciple of Christ) program been approved as an ongoing non-confomling
use, there would have been no need for a conditional use pennit because it would not have been
required had the boardinghouse been used for secular purposes. (b) Had the Board of
Adjustment found the Mission to be a church or "place of worship," and the City 's pract ices
regardin g "accessory use" and the Participatin g Churches with Interfai th been disclosed to
the Board by the City staff and/or counsel, an obvious excepti on in practice to what by
ordinance was defined as "a homeless shelter" would have been evid ent. Considering the
narrow limitations Randy Taylor had placed on the Church 's protecti ng the "homeless" only
overnight when in "life threatening" situations, and limiting the Mi ss ion 's advertising of the
new locati on, the Board of Adjustments could well have detennined the proposed "use"
similarl y constituted an "accessory use" of a church rather than a "homeless shelter. "
45.

Even had the Board of Adjustments denied the refr arned issues, the record

woul d have been established to facilitate an appeal. As it was, the City's fr aming of the
issues in such a 'way as to preclude consideration of these factual and le gal questions made an
appeal based
46 .

011

the City's record of ev id ence futile.
In the meantime, the Mission had relocated in tbe basement of Central Christi an

Church at 370 South 400 East. After significant expense and eff0l1, the Mission was able to
renew part of its religious worship and service to tile community.
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47.

As pal1 of compliance to C ity ordin ances the Mission was inspected by the City

County Hcalth Department, the Fire Department, Divi sion lor Building Code Enlorcement, and
police officers on a frequent basis.
48.

Despite the success the Mi ssion experienced at this new location , it was unable

to have its own worship services in the sanctuary of the church. Notably, however, the Missi on,
staff, an d voluntcers were ab le to provide emergency overnight temporary hOllsing lor the
homeless at the Central Christian Church, as well as other religious services. An ou tline o f
estim ated totals of persons assisted by the Miss ion for the years before, during, and after the
Missions stay at the Central Christian Church are included as Exhibit 8 to this affidavit. These
totals reflect the sp iritual and temporal expression of officers, staff, vulunteers, and members of
the congregation who reached out to others as they worshiped Jesus Clmst by feeding, clothing,
providing shelter and t.he hope of the Gospel to tho se in need.
49.

The Mission and I believe that being required to restrict and redefine its

religi ous mission to fit within categOIies that do not reflect its biblically hased Mission is an
affron t to God. Nonetheless, neither I nor the Mi ssion desire to engage in civil disobedience and
desire to have our rights and duties under the past and current city ordinances declared and
clari fied.
50.

The Mission does not facially object to opera. il.1g within limits declared

app licable to certai n uses and properties by fire, health, and related authorit ies, as well as
objective criteria arti culated in City zoning regulations. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson,
482:2 I -24; Exhibit 9.)
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51 .

Interfaith and its Parti cipating Churches serving the homeless "share our faith

by action, not by words, bringing hope to those without." My religious convictions and those
shared by the Mission also illu strate :hat "faith without works is dead," (James 2: 17), but offers a
different perspective on what it means to "feed Jesus [and] clothe Jesus," believing "[e]ven as ye
have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." (See Matthew 25: 40.)
52.

While perhaps based on "logical" assumptions, the City's ad hoc detenninations

of what constitutes acceptable amounts of "religious worship" of a church by offering to allow
the Mis sion to confonn to the Interfaith "standard" ignores key aspects of differences in the
perspective of the two religious groups regarding religious worship that focuses on issues beyond
numbers of people assisted and duration of stay.
53.

The Interfaith guidelines operate not only in terms of numbers of homeless

sheltered, and the duration of the stay, but also as to who is served. Interfaith only serves
families (single- or two-parent families with children); the Mission serves families and
indi viduals.

Interfaith will not serve those with addictions; the Mission will.

lnterfaith

implicitly was understood to focus on residents of the City and Salt Lake Valley; the Mission
also serves those

W110

are transient, those initially not residents of the City or Valley. The

Mission will not turn away a homeless person in a life threatening position (twenty degrees
(20 °) or below outside) when there are no other avai lable options in the City; Interfaith has
no provi sion for such ass istance.
54.

Th e Missi on also has strongly resisted efforts to use government fund ing for

s ocial service providers. To imply or require affiliati on with an entity that serves God an d the
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homeless with Caesar rather than separating the two is no t part of the Chri sti an m issio n of
the Mis s ion. (See Depo siti o n of John Ra varino, 10 8:2 I -24, Exhibit 10.)
55.

The Mission and I believe that even assuming the City wo uld approve the

Mi ssion's "accessory use" of our religious worship within the numeric restrictions and timeframe
esta bli shed by the Participating Churches with Interfaith, the Mi ssion is still discriminated
again st because no Partici pating Church with Intcrfai th either (I) has bcen required to
in dividually app ly for the approval, or (2) be subject to City regulation rega rdin g the sam e
afterwards.
56.

Co ntrary to the City's claim s, several meetin gs and in terchanges wi th City

staff including M ayor Anderson occu rred on May 3, 200 I , June 23, 20 03 , June 21, 2004, and
Ju ly 19, 2004.
57.

Oth er meetings with counsel and ranking staff of the PZ D occurred on

September 8, 2003. Notes from the meeting in Dep ositio n Exhibit 11 refl ect aspects of the
discussion held September 8, 2003.
58.

At no ti me was the Mission asked by the City PZD to follow the requirements

in the Ci ty ordinan ces to obtain an administrative interpretation.
59.

The Mission did not file a request for an admi ni strati ve interpretati on regarding

the Cohen property in 1999, nor the Rosewood Terrace propetiy in 199 9, 2003, or 2004 .
(Deposition of Wayne Mills 3 1:2-13, Exh ibit 12.)
60.

On June 30, 2002, the Mi ssion moved out of the basement of the Central

Chri stian Church because it could not afford to pay the continuall y esca lating rent.
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On July 5,

3 \\ ~

2002, the Mi ssion relocated its administrative offices at 342 West 200 South.

At this new

location, the Mission was unable to hold church services or prov ide homeless ovemight servi ces
in emergency, life- threatening conditi ons.
61 .

After the Mi ssion's departure from the Central Christian Church, it initiated

dialogue with the City both as to re-consideration of its request to use the Rosewood Terrace
Building and what "use" the Mi ssion would be classified as regardless of the location. On
62.

June 23, 2003, Phil Arena and I met with Mayor Rocky Anderson and Luis

Zunguze, Plann ing Director, to di scuss issues associated the relocation of the Mi ssion a short
meeting addressing the desire of the Mi ssion to relocate in the Ro sewood Terrace Building.

On

June 24, 2003 , Phil Arena forwarded additional information regarding the Mission and its
programs to Lui s Zunguze. (672-674 MIS) On both June 24, 2003, and July 13 , 2003 , Matt
Hilton wrote Lynn Pace and asked regarding procedures to amend City ordinances regardin g the
homeless. (467-472 MIS) Neither of the City Attorney's responses of Jul y 25, 2003, nor August
19, 2003, addressed the Mi ssion's inquiry regarding amendment of the City ordinan ces and
poli cies regarding the homeless. (473-4 77 MIS)
63.

On Septemb er 5, 2003, the owners of the Rosewoo d Ten'ace Propeliy

reconfinned to the Mission in wliting that they would like to complete the transaction proposed
in wliting in 1999.
64.

On September 8, 2003, Phil Arena, counsel for the Mi ssion, Lynn Pace, Louis

Zunguze, Cheli Coffey, Brent Wilde, and I met at the City Offices. Duri ng that m eeting, the
Mission raised the following issues: (1) City administration has changed its policy on use, need
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for homeless services, and their locatio n. The Miss ion wanted to know what the policy now was.
(2) Is there was any way to determine that the Mission was just a church and recogni ze the non conformin g use of the locat ion? (3) The owners o f the Rosewood Terrace Buildin g will donate
the same to the Mi ssion as a one million five hundred thousand dollar ($ 1,500,000.00) donat ion.

(4) At the Central Christian Church location, the Mission fed four hundred (400) people a day as
a church and were to ld they did not impact the area. (5) Homeless do not go to shelt ers that are
not downtown; home less stay downtown. (6) If the Miss ion tightened up the cond ition under
wh ich the persons cou ld be there who aren' t in the discipleship, woul d they still be a homeless
shelter? and (7) Is the City aware the other shelters in 0- 3 and CG zones al low anyone in the
Winter Overflow to keep them fi·om freezing?
65.

Louis Zunguze wanted to know how the M ission (a) classified its use, (b) what

it was proposing to do , an d (c) indicated he wanted a fOJ1l1al proposal. Matt Hilton indicated that
"[il f the C ity al lows providing shelter for families on a temporary basis, then the City shou ld
pass a policy that includes this as [being] o. k. in defini tion of churches." Lynn Pace responded
that "[i]f you open [yo ur] office etc. to someone who needs shelter [i s different than] advertising
sheller fo r the homeless." Lynn Pace stated (a) if the proposed use had not changed the Mission
would still be looked at as a homeless shelter; (b) have to demo nstrate ch ange in circumstanccs
before can ask for same thing again, and (c) the City will class ify the use.
66.

Brent Wi lde indicated that (a) if people stay th ere temporarily, overnight, the

M ission would be a homeless sheller, and (b) the people in the discipleship program may be
looked at di fferentl y but don't know.
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67 .

On October 23,2003 , J submitted a written request to Louis Zungune that the

Mission be classified as a church. J received no response.
68.

Subsequently, the Mission met with PZD staff and counsel on November 8,

2003. While the City' s policy on concentrating services for the homeless had changed, counsel
for the City informed the Mission that if its uses at the Rosewood Terrace Building had not
changed, the Mi ssion would remain classified as a homeless shelter and unable to quali fy for the
S- J Zone. The Mission requested that changes in the City ordinances be made to reflect current
practices among Interfaith churches regarding sheltering of the homeless.
69.

On May 3, 2004, I again submitted a written request to Louis Zungune that the

Mission be classified as a church.
Administrator Wayne Mills.

Louis Zungunze referred the matter to acting Zoning

In response to the Mi ssion's second request to the City to be

classified as a church, on June 21, 2004, Zoning Administrator Wayne Mills infonn ally notified
the Mi ssion that without showing a change in use, the Board of Adjustments classi fi cation would
stand and preclude any relocation at the Rosewood TelTace Building because of the previous
classi fi cation of th e Mission's proposal as a homeless shel ter. On June 21, 2004, the Mission
and Attorney Michael Hutchings met with Mayor Anderson, Cit y counsel, an d the Planning
Director in an eff0!1 to address relocation efforts. On July 19, 2004, the Mission and Attomey
Michael Hutchings met again with Mayor Anderson, City coun sel, and the PZD, but they were
unable to resolve the impact of the Board of Adjustment ruling class ify ing the Mi ss ion as a
"homel ess shelter."
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70.

After either June 21,2004, or July 19, 2004, at Mayor Anderson's ciirecti on,

Cheri Coffey, of the City

rzo

staff, provided the Mi ssio n with a map of the zoncs of the City

where the Mission could look to relocate. Ms. Coffey's attached notes reflected an emphasis on
the restrict ion of the Mission's locati on to the 0-3 and CG zones of the City. The map was
restricted to the 0-3 and CG zones of the City where "hom eless shelters" are a conditional lise.
Mayo r · Rocky Anderson informed the Mission that its use classifi cation would restri ct its
locat ion to 0 -3 and CG zones. At no time has the City ever notifi ed the Mi ssion it could locate in
all of the areas where churches are a permitted use or conditional use. (See City'S Memorandum
at 19-20; Affidavit of Cheri Coffcy,

'1'1 6,7.)

The Rosewood Ten-ace Building was subsequently

purchased by another p arty and the property was not donated to the Mission.

Fear of p rosecution if religious beliefs were exercised an d subsequently determined to not be an
"accessory use ... for religious worship" has limited the religi ous practice of the Mission and me.
Refusal of the City to publicly define what the "accessory lise" standards are as compared with
those of a "homeless shelter" only has exacerbated the prob lem.
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DA TED thi s

(j -- day of March, 2006_

C:J(Lr~l/OA)c~
Wayne 1Fi1son
.

,

COUNTY OF DAVIS)
: ss
STATE OF UTAH
)

l:i,

On March
2006, Wayne C. Wi lson, known to me, personall y appeared before me
and swore under oath and penalty of perjury that hc had executed the foregoing affidavit and that
the statements contained therein were true,
DATED and EXECUTED this March
NOTARY PUBLI C

ROBYN J, NEWBOLD
2 290 East 3225 North

l ayt o n . Utah 8 4040
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My CommISS ion Expues
June 15 . 200 6

STATE OF U T A II
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EXHIBIT 1

UTArt STATE TAX COMMISSION
160 L8st Third 50 uth
581t Lake Clt V, UtBh 8413 4
R. H. Iilln l>en , Chll innon
Ruger O. Te w, Co mlT1\~ s IO!lCr

Clydt! R. Nichol s, Ir. ,
execullve Di rector

loe lL Pa checo ,

July 26, 1988

CtIlHruhSIUJlt'1

C, Ululne DOv\B , CoI1ll1lIs5\()I1Cr

Account No. 12023 6
,layne C. Wi Ison
P.O. Box 250 #16249
Draper , Utah 84020-0250
Re:

Spectac ular Mi ni strie\ of the

L0 r

d' !

Ser"ant~

Gentlemen:
Articles of incorporat ion , which were filed with the Divisi on of
Corporations by t he subject corporation , have been examined and it is ou r
opinion that the corpo r ation i s exempt from corporation franchise tax under
the provisions of Section 59-7-105 , Utah Code Annotated 1953 , as amended.
This corporation fra nch ise tax exemption doe s not extend to Utah sales and use
tax,
This exemption shall be effective so long as corporate acti viti es are
confined to those as authorized by the Articles of Incorporation. In the
event the activities exceed or dev iate from' th e powers granted by the
Articles, this exemption shall cease to have effect and the co rpora ti on may be
I iable for the franchise tax .
In the event of any I.R.S, ru li ng , audi t, redetermination , etc . a copy
must be forwarded to the State Tax Commission for revie w,

Charles Arnold , Supervisor
Corporation s Group
Re venue Accounting
Telephone No. (801) 530-6257
CF.421mp/1719 r

Blolne W Smith, Dlfector

• Ope rati ons Division
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EXHIBIT 2

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
Building Services an d Licensin g
451 SOUTH STATE STREET ROOM 406
SALT LAKE CITY UTI

INSPECTION REPORT
Address

Lf(0 't?

Inspection
Kind

o Bldg.
o Mech.

W

2CC S
o Elec .
o Plbg.
o Preinspection
~Oning

[] Sign
[] Soecial
Slage

re

o Complete
[] Issued SlOP Card

D

[] Double Fee

o Unable 10 Make Inspeclion

Wilh Work
Make Necessary
Corrections

t

Reas~lor

~rtiliCllle

01 Occupancy

.". 24 Hour Notice Required •.•

C No! Required

_1_
\ _ : 5:>( ~ments:

a e

A

o Rou tIne

Cc

/ \
Type of Inspecti o n

o Underground
o Rough
o Clearance

\

C Temporary _ _ Days

Time

C II d

[J

o

Bond B

o Con cre
[J Sleel
o Colum n!
[] Pr oy r. s!
o Sheelr a

o

'- Shell Only

..

0

[] Final
OVoid
Ci
Reinspection Req.

S Permanent

---= \

-,

1 cf,~r~f~\" ~ I

'1(,

:>. <J

Inspec on

o Footing
[] Foundalion
o Frame
o Insulalion

[] This Inspeclion is Required . Call 535-6436
Mornings 7:30-8:30 10 Schedule Inspeclions
-

-l

z...

Contractor

[] Housing

o Work Approved
o Work in Violalion
o Do Not Proceed

o Partial

Dale

Prior Viol ations Not Correc ted

[] Work Musl Be Compleled
Within

Days

.- -

To

p~ ee,_ r,~

or

I SSII? J
\
SUIL L II~tI ell y 1"" L>tI t h) !

- - ._--_ .-

---_.

2 1'),1'

:

EXHIBIT 3

HOUSING / ZONI/-.
District

N",PECTION REr

1T

' l _ _ Final _ _ _ _ Next Action Due _ __
-"V---",,-

_,ALT LAKE CIT"-CORPORATION
Building Service .nd licenSi ng
451 S. State St. , Room 406
S.L.C., Ut. 84111
535-643

Address

Case N umber

-4'
INSPECTIONS:
Complaint
Operation Paint Brush
Business License
Apartment License ... .. .. .
PERSONAL CONTACTS:
Phone Call
Ottice
Visit
LETTERS:
Warning Letters ............... . .
Certificate of Non-Compliance
Citation/Summons threat
Other Let1ers
CIT A TlONS/SUMMONS:
Citations
SUMMONS

.

.....

Initial
o IIC

0 110

o
o

liB
IIA

o PCP
o PCO
PCV

o
o LWL
o LCN
· 0 LCS

~
OL

SC
CSS

Progr~s

D-lPC
o IPO
o IPB
o IPA
NOTICE AND ORDER:

. ... 0 NAO

EXTENSIONS:

... 0 EXT

CERTIFICA TES :
lien
.. . . . . ... . . . .
. . .. . 0 RTL
Non-Compliance
. ... 0 RTN
HEARINGS:
HAAB Board
. . . . . . 0 HHB
Board of Adjustment ... . .. . ....
. 0 HBA
Court ... . ..... .
. .. . 0 HCO
PROPERTY OWNER: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

. . . ....--. ....
'-

Datemme
/·-:7

INSPECTIONS:
Complaint
..... . .. .
Operation Paint Brush ... . . . . . . .
Business License
. . .... .. ..... .
Apartment License . . ..... .
PERSONAL CONTACTS:
Phone Call ...... .
Office
Visit
LETTERS:
Warning Letters
Certificate of Non-Compliance
Citation/Summons threat
Oth er Letters
CITATIONS/SUMMONS:
Citations
SUMMONS

I:

Compliance
o ICC
o ICO
o ICB
o ICA

Initial
IIC

o
0 110
o liB
o

IIA

o PCP
o PCO
o PCV
o

LWL
o LCN
o LCS
o L/

p.- CSC
tJ CSS

Case Number

c...

7

,/j/

Progress

o IPe
1:JIPO

o

IPB
o IPA
NOTICE AND ORDER:

Compliance
o lCC

o

ICO

o lCB
o lCA

.0 NAC
EXTENSIONS:

.. 0 EXT
CERTIFICA TES:
lien ...
. 0 RTL
Non-Compliance
. 0 RH
HEARINGS:
HAAB Board
. 0 HHf
Board of Adjustment
. 0 HBf
Court ..
. 0 HC(
PROPERTY OWNER: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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UTAH STATE TAX COMlVIlS SlON
2 10 North 1950 Wl.:st
M LciJl:lel

O.

SuIt Lake

Leu v lt L

IN Vul Ovesun .

Governor

Il.lchB.rd B McKeown, CUWlOllSSlonf! r
Joe B. P"c hcCQ, Cu nH"I ~SH.IIl Cr

CIt)',

Utah 8<1134

Cf llllfUlhn

Alice S),Cl.l fCr, CO f1lrni SS IUII~r

Ol ene S Walker
LI~U"""b n ( ('.ovc n 'Dr

Rodney O . Ml1 r rclli, EHcull " c D ire ctor

Jun e 18, 199 7

WAYNE C WI LSON
SP E CTACUL~~ MINI STRIES
468 W 200 S
SALT LAKE UT 8410 1
RE:

Religious/Charit ab le Sa les Tax Exemp ti on Num ber N 11 839

D ear Si r:
Based on the information s ubmitted, we have detennined tilat your organization qua lifies as a reli gious
or cha ritable ins ti tution and is exempt from sal es/usc tax iJn both purchases an d sa les o f tangi ble personal
property and related serv ices, s ubj ect to the following qual iiications:

I) 11,e exemption only applies to purchases and sales fo r reli gious , charitable, or other purpose
sanctio ned by Sectio n 50 I (c)(3) oftbe Intemal Revenue Code. Individual s affd iated with th e
organi zation are not authorized to exempt purchases for th eir own personal use.
2) Purchases and sales pertaining to "unrelated trades or businesses " as deiined in 26 USCA ,
Section 5 13 are n ot exempt and are subject to U tah sales and income tax provis ions.

3) Sales of food or drink items to the general public are subject to tax unless sold at an isolated
or occasional fund raiser, bazaar, etc. Food sales may also be subject to the " res taurant" tax in
counti es where this tax is imposed.
4) Purchases of constructi on ma terials as tangible personal property are exempt. Con tra ctors
may purchase tax-exempted cons lnlction ma terials on behalf of an exempt organi zati on.
Contractors should contact tJle Tax Commi ss ion for addi tional inJomlation.
Please refer to the enclosed general instructions for tnfonnillion on exemption certi fIcati o n, sales
tax refund procedure, and record keepulg requirements.
lJyou have illly quest ions, please contact me at (SO l ) 297-7507 , 1(800) GG2 -4 335, Ext 7507
or rax (80 I) 297-7697.

~ruIIY,

,

u4£1?P¥Jl~
Da;tCI¥n~~~
Cus tomer Service Divisio n

Jf you

en accommodation IHlder litt AmerICan's wlrh D!sabl!rtlf!5 Act, cor.:Il C{ tlt r Tw; COmmiSSIon 01 (801) 297 -3811 or
Tclc w mm unlcatl OT! Dculce fur th e Dw( (TUD) (80 I) 297-38/9 I'l ~ asr allow th rer war/lln.g days {or a response.

flCl!d

EXHIBIT 5
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- 0 STATES POSTAL SERVICE
,phis. TN
38165-9599
08 1l2/ 9 l

Authorization No.

06~71 2 2 - RB S

11 •• 11 111111111111 ,1111111,1111111111 1.111111.,11111" 1111 1111

SPECTAC ULAR HIN STRIES OF THE LORDS
SERVANTS
~6 8 W 200
S
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
8~IOI- 11 13

) ear Postal Custo mer:
(our

application

for

nonprofit

standard mai l

rate

mailing

privilege s

ha s

b e~n

3Pproved.
Effective 0 8/ 05 /97, you r organization is authorized to mail at t he
1onprofit standar d mail rates at SAL T LAKE C I TY , UT
8~199.
: v e rything you present for mailing under this authorization must be prep a r e d
in accordance with the postal regulations that gover n this c l ass of mail .
rherefore , please note the following requirements, as specified in E670. 6 of
t he Domestic Mail Manual:

All ma tter mailed at the
the author ized nonprofit
the authorized nonprofit
of the mailpiece or in a
mailed.

P seudonym s

or

Nonprofit Standard Mail rates must identify
organization. The name an d return address of
organization must be either on the outside
prominent location on the material b e ing

bogus names

of persons

or

organizations may n o t

be used. If the mailpiece bears any name and return address. it mlJst
be that of the authorized nonprofit organizat i o n.

-11is authorization does not extend to mailings made at post offi c es other
-ha n the one named above-:-Also, please note that under E670.5 o f the Do me sti c
\ail Ma nual , yo ur organization is authorized to mail only its own matt e r at
:hese rates.
You rn a
not dele ate o r lend the use of
our non rofit stand a rd
ta il au t horiza 10n
a an
a
er
olng so cou
e s u~n
e revoca 10n a
your au
' r io r ta your first mailing, please contact the above-named post office to
-nsure all applicable fees are paid .
Additionally, you must mail under this
lu t horization at least once every two years. Unless you do so, your no n pro f it
_tandard mail rate authorization will be revoked for nonuse.
f

you have not already done s o, please contact the post office named a b ove
entry of your mail under this authorization.

a di sc uss

' LEA SE ClTE YOUR AUTHORIZATION NUMBER AS GIVEN ABOVE IN ALL FUTURE CO RP.ES-OIIDENCE WITH US, INCLUDING REQUE S TS FOR ADDITIONAL MAILING POI NT S.
h ank yo u for

your

business.

d >J a r d W ike r
ana g er
ate s

and Cla s sific a ti on
\

S ervi ce

Cente r

EXHIBIT 6
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OEE O E E C:CR RA OI N I
LAW D E P ARTMEN T

A

August 20, 1997

\

RECEfI!:cr' ".
AUG 2 2

Matthew Hilton
P.O. 781
Springvi lie. UT 84663

19~;-

...... ~~

J

fi7'

.:3'-: .
Re :

Location of Homeless Shelters in Salt Lake City

Dear Matt:
This letter is in response to our meeting on August 14,1997 . At that meeting, you
and your client requested that I provide you with some information regarding the
requirements o f the Salt Lake City Zoning Code with respect to the establishment of
homeless shelters. Specifically, you inquired as to where homeless shelters would be
allowed in Salt Lake Citv and what circumstances govern the establishment of such
shelters.
I have discussed this matter with Brent Wilde of the Planning Division. Hom eless
shelters are allowed uses in the CG and D -3 zones as conditional uses . You and/or your
client could review the Sal t Lake Ci ty Zo nin g Maps either at the Business License
counter, in Room 215 of the City & County Building, or you could purchase a set of
maps for $40 .00. No homeless shelter can be approved unless it is in one of those two
zoning distri cts.
In addition, homeless shelters are only allowed, even witmn those rwo zones, as
condit io nal uses. In order to obtain a condition al use permit, your client would need to
file an application. a copy of which is enclo sed, and would need to attend a Community
Council meet ing to explain you r proposa l to the neighborhood and to appear before a
hearing o f the Salt Lake City Planning Commission. The Planning Commission grants or
denies conditional use permits based upon a list of specific factors identified in the Salt
Lake City Zoni n g Code. A list of those facto rs is also enclosed for your review.
Al though your clien t mav apply fo r the establishment of a homeless shel ter anywhere
within a CG or 0-3 zone . City policy discourages the high concentration of homeless
shelters with in one geographic area. For that reason, it i:; more likely that your client
wO'.;:d obtain approval c·r a proposal If his proposed she lter were located outs ide of the
do wntown :lre:l since the re \s alre::ldv a large shelter and several suppon facilities in thaI
a re~.

-CLEPHCNE: 801

~ :::;!;o·7-Be

. . . . ):.:

;;:>, .... .. .. ... ,.

'-

Bal· ~3~· 76 ""O

'\ 354MIS

Matthew Hilton
August 20, 1997
Page -2If yo ur client has a specific proposal he would like us to review, or ifhe would
li ke to have a general discussion as to the range of possible sites, we would be happy to
discuss that matter with him. If you and your cl ient would like to discuss this matter,
please contact me so that we can arrange an appropriate meeting time. In contrast, if yo ur
client would like to meet without attorneys, please have him contact Brent Wilde at 5356 180, who has assured me that he will make himself available to meet with your cli ent.
I hope this information is helpful tD you. If yo u have any funher questiDns Dr
cDncerns, ple:lse let me know.

;;::y~)~
t/~~;PACE
Assistant City Attorney

LHP:isw
cc : Brent Wilde
Bill Wright
(\r L998 4 \ LCrrr RS \htlton le ite r Ie nome less shel lers· nug.

~O.

1997 doc)

1355MIS

EXHIBIT 7

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE OF LICENSING
Douglas 8 . We:o!t
O~fI"''''' D.. ~c~nr

120 Nortll 200 WO$I, Suile 303

PO Box <15500

!tela 0 Or ;l m

Sail Lake City, ULlh 0<: 1<15·050 0
(801) 5J8· /,2;!2

D;r~cll"

i::

~

.'In equal oppol1unity cmploy cr

Jl.pril 19 , 1999

Rev. Wayne Wilson
The Salt Lake City Mission
P . O. Box 142
Sal t Lake Cit y , Utah 84110-0142
RE: LICENSE NOTICE
Dear Rev. Wil son :
The Department of Human Services, Office of Licensing, conducted
an on -si te review at the Salt Lake City l"1ission fI.pril 16, 1999.
The Mission does no t provide human service treatment as described
i n the licensing law. ThRrefore, the Mi ssion is not required to
be licensed by the Department of Human Services.
The Salt Lake City Mission was set up to help the homeless and
poor become independent, productive members of society thr o ugh
a life centered i in Jesus Chr ist .
The Mission offers long-term
discipleship training programs.
If you have questions or conce rns , please feel free to contact
this Office at 538-4242.
Thanks for your cooperatio n.
Sincerely,

fJ~~
Kent Callister
Licensing Specialist

•
0387MIS
-:, l 3'i

EXHIBIT 8

Call'gory
Converts to Christ

2000

1999

2001

2002

245
10

300
15

300
12

500
20

200

250

300

700

1500 people,
20,000 pieces
250 vo lunteers;
Thanksgiving
dinners combined
3,000
Chri stmas dinners
combined 3,000
Wrapped presents
for various fami lies
900
500

1500 peop le,
20,000 pieces

1700 people,
25,000 pieces

5,000 people,
40 ,000 pieces

300 vo lunt eers;
Thanksgivi ng
dinners combined

300 vol unteers;

Thanksgiving

500 vo lunteers;
Thanksgiving
dinners comhined

3,000;
Christmas di nners
combined 3,000;
Wrapped presents
for various families
900;
600

650

Daily meals

600 meals a day.

600 meals a day.

600 meals a day.

1500 mea ls a day

served
Shelter Provi ded

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes/No

2003
200
12

2004
250
IS

2005
300
20

2006 (Projected)
500
.20

100

50

50

500

500 people;
8,000 pieces

200 people;
4,000 pieces
500 volunteers;
Thanksgiving
dinners combined
4,000; Christmas
dilmers combined
3,000;

200 people;
4,000 pieces

500 people;
5,000 pieces

500 vo lunteers ;

dinners combined
3,000;

Wrapped presents

Wrapped present s

for vario us
families 1,200;

500 volunteers;
Than ksgiving
dinners comb ined
4,700; Christmas
dinners combined
4,800;
Wra pped presents
for various
families 1,700;

LOllg~Tc nn

Recovery
Pantry food

dist ributed to
needy families

Goods provided
fo r needy families
J-lohday und other
meals pro vided.

Bi ble studi es and

dinners co mbined

3,100;
Christmas dinners
combined 3,000;

6,000; Christmas
5,000; Wrapped

Wrapped presents

presents for va ri ous

for various rami! ies
1000;
600

famili es 1,500;

dinners combi ned

ot her group

sessI ons

C atc~o r y

Converts to Christ
Long-T enn
Rec overy

Pantry food
dis tr ibuted to
needy famili es
Goods provided
for needy pe o~le
Holiday and othe r
meals provi ded.

400 vo lun teers;

Thanksgiving
meals combined
2,500;
Christmas dinners
combined 2,000;
Wrapped presents
for var ious
fa milies 1,000;

Thanksgiving
dinners combined
4,700; Christmas

Bible studies and

400

400

for various
families
1,500;
400

other group
sess Ions
Daily meals served
Shelter Provided

100
No

100
No

100
No

1,000

100
No

EXHIBIT 9

SAL . . AKE CITY MI SS ION v. SAL"! LAKE CITY

JOHN RA VA RINO
again 50 thai ]'m slire thai

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

J

understand them.

A nd I want \0 hand you. if J may , a copy
of Exhibit 19 to Mr. Wilson's deposition wh ich is the
document we were working otT of. Do you remember tha

Iha1 we we nt over in the last deposition.

THE WITNESS ' I recogni zc SOllle of it. yes.
(By Mr. Rampton) Do you remember whe n we

10 were talking :lhotll il hack in October?
II
A.
I cia.
Q.
Reforc
I dive into the nitty-gritty of it.
12
reviewed
your
deposi ti on tran sc ript from the last
13
14 time and realized that I unde rstood you r t:xplan,:nion
15 of allocated indirect cos ts much less completely than
16 I believed I did as I was sining at the table
17 listening 10 you give it to me . and so si nce someday
J

18

you're going

19
20
21

probably a good exerc ise anyway.
Let me see if I understand what yo u were
sayillg. For each of the pages in Exhibit 19. staning
wi th about page RDA 00791 . you stated the costs
renec tcd on the various Exhibit A sheets in this
document were a combination o f direct and indirec t
costs, ind ire ct costs calculated in accordance with

~2

25

Page 105

10

have

10

3
4

5

document?
MR. IIILTON: I'd represent it's the one

Q.

2

explain thi s to a court. it's

who th ey are. It's not on the first five pa ges of
their book.
They talk about an FD -- FASB
Statement 117. Is that what yo u' ve just asked?
Q.
Yes. Where I was going with the quest ion
is that you referenced that as 0 standard by which \ ou
prepa red the exhibits in -- the Exhibit A pages of

6
7
8

Exhibit 19. and my question was go ing to be \\'11) \\a s I !

9

that you rei ied upon that stanclard in yo ur wo rk "

10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.
It's like the En gli sh language. 11 '5
universal in Ameri ca and Canada, I just noticed.

Q.
You're referring now to the FASI3
standards?
A.
I'm referring to thi s gui de which
inculcates FASB 117.
Q.
117, have I got it wrong?
A.
Well -Q.
117, okay.
A.
Well , 117 may not be the key one, but it
appears to be one of the major ones. AICPA -- this is
all reciting gene rally accepted accounting practices
for Christian organi zations, so the committee appears C
to be back there in the ivory tower in New York in the
American Inst itute of CPAs, the people that \'lark II ith
FASB that write thi s stuff for a guide industrywide.

Page 107

F ASB I believe No. 17 that vou stated.
nationwide, Canndian- wide.
2
Do yo u remember that"
Q.
Okay. And what I'm trying to understand
A.
I
don't
know
my
FSBs
(s
ic)
by
heal1,
but
I
3
is
does
it
rel ate simply to Chri st ian ministries or is
3
4 it an accounting practice generally?
4 kno w that this first page will say-Q. Okay . You're referri ng to a document to
5
A.
Ch ristian ministries. Christi an
5
6 min istries probably are maybe 20 pe rcent of all
6 refresh your rec ollection on the question?
A. There's a lot of FSABs (s ic).
7 nonprofit organi zations.
7
MR. HILTON: You need to explain what the
8
8
Q.
Does the document that you're lOO king at
9 there contain the tex t of FASB 117?
9 documcnt is.
THE WITNESS: The document is the
10
A.
It does and -10
II Accounting and Financial Reporting Guide For Christia II
Q.
I'm try ing to think how to handl e thi s.
12 Is that something I could look at"
12 Ministries . This is administered by the Evangelical
13 Joint Accounting Committee. and I can Il1nke this
13
A.
Yes. you could look at it.
14 available to YOLI. bu t -14
Q.
Thank yo u.
Q.
(By Mr. Rampton ) The Evangelical what
15
15
MR. HAGGERTY: I'd request. since it's
16 Accounting Committee?
16 been referred to in the deposition, to go ahead and
A. The Evangelical loint Accounting
17
17 make it an exhibit and get copies at a later lime.
18 Commi tt ee .
18
THE WITNESS: May I make a distinction"
Q.
Who are they?
19
19
MR. HAGGERTY: Pl ease.
A.
That's
what
I'm
trying
to
figure
out.
20
20
THE WITNESS: United Way would account
21 Thank you for asking.
21 simi larly. United Way is not a Christian
You would think, if you copied the li rst
22
22 organi zation. The American Red Cross would account
7_0'
four or five pages of their document, it would tell
23 sim ilarly . They are not a Christian organization.
24 yo u. but I believe it's the American Institute of
24 Salvation Am1Y is a Christian organization .
25 CPAs. And that 's all I can tell )' OU until I find out
25
Q. (By Mr. Rampton) Okay. I'm not going to
Page 108
Page 106
I
2

2 ( Pages 10510 108
Tt'!l1pcst Repon ing. Inc .

(80 1)51 1-5111
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EXHIBIT 10

Multi-Page 'M
Page 480

I';lgt.:

)y the drug home.
Q You have no desire or intention to use the

Jremises for emergency shelter. Was thal no! true?
A He £old us nOi to put it -Q Was not true?
A Yes.
Q Is what?
A We weren't going \0 do it? 1 w~sn'{ going
\0 use it as an emergency shelter.
Q You testified a few minutes ago you were
pUll ing them up on an emerge ncy basis.
A Not at this facility.
Q You weren 't going to clo it at this place?
A Right. They wouldn't let us . He sa id, You
can't.
Q All right.
A So we were trying to adapt ourselves to fit
their -- what they say is the ir cookie cutter which
we did over and ove r and no maller how we try [Q
adapt, they won't let us in a facili ty. Oh, if you
just become more like Interfaith, if we were a cookie
cutter of Interfa ith, we don't need you.
Q Who said cookie CUller to you?
A A cookie cu tter is what -Q WllO said that to you --

2 get an orde r. Is that what you want?
MR. HtLTON: I wa11l to know the basis h()w
3
4 it 's rdevanl to what -5
MR . RAMPTON: We've been in this ca,e fur
6 six years. There are claims against the RDA for
7 which if it is the prevailing parry it may have
8 e11litleme nt 10 attorney fees if there's lack of good
9 faith bas is here. I'm trying to understand why you
10 beli~ve this min istry has the breadth of power ;II ld
1 t immunity to any kind of regulation?
t2
THE WITNESS: I don't believe that.
13
Q (By Mr. Rampton) Well -14
A Now, you're putting words in my mou th illid
15 eve n says they have a right to regulate us according
16 to the courts.
17
Q Wllat-18
A To an insubstantial degree I'm reading wll" t
19 it says right in law. I read the case of the Supreme
20 Court says they can zone regu late to an insubstal lli;J]
21 degree churches for publ ic safety. I don 't have a
22 problem with us -- regulating us to publ ic safety 111 11
23 telling me how I can or cannot worship Gnu isn't
24 right.
25
Q Okay. Let' s get to that then . Let's get to

Page 481
A Nobody.
(Reporter interrupts)
Q Sorry. You've been empathic with you r
church?
A Yes .
Q And you testified empath ic that you r
function and your purpose are to defme the Bible,
co rrec t?
A Correct.
Q Which part of th e Bible~ There 's 1590 pages
long. I checked over lunch.
A Okay.
Q Wh ich part?
A I would say mainly in the new testamcnt but
the old , too. It' s written and we read throughout
the Bible. So the fabric of the Bible.
Q Would it be your position that your mis sion
is devoted to doing whatever is abdicated in any
porrion of the Bible?
MR. HILTON: I object to that question . I
don't th ink it has any bearing on RDA'S duty to
perform.
MR. RAMPTON: You can go ahead.
MR. HILTON: I'll instru ct him not to answe r
unless ordered by the judge.
ge 480 - Page 483

..j S~'

MR . RAMPTON: We. can vaCale rig ht now aile!

PJge 4 K3

I that. What do you cons ider to be the worship llf Gou "
A You said right here.
3
Q Just a moment please. You said in your
4 prior testimony feed Jesus, clothe Jesus. I assulIle
5 that refers to the passages in the Bible that say,
6 Inasmuch as he have done it unto the least of these
7 my brethren, ye have done it -8
A Correct.
9
Q -- untO me, correct?
10
A Correct.
II
Q You're talking about doing anything for
12 anybody that ' s the least of Christ' s brethren,
13 correct?
14
A Correct.
15
Q And whatever you can do [or them, you are
16 doing for Christ and that' s part of your worship~
17
A Yes.
18
Q And Iherefore, the city, any governJ1le(lI
19 agency can exercise only mini mal, whatever st anua rd
20 you articulated, limit the regulatory requirements.
2

21

correct?

A Insubstantial degree fo r public safety and
23 nothing else. I don't have a problem with public
24 safety.
Q But nothing else~
25

22

DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES , INC (80 1) J2R- Il S:,

'SI t.{
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EXHIBIT 12

(Exam2nrtion by Mr .

Mills

1

find

[

3

f o rm or a

4

decision?

fee

f or

5

A.

Yes .

6

Q.

So

have

process

l

3~minis~rative

requesting an

there ' s

co pay ;

is

a

yo~

form

that

!'. nd

Okay .

Q.

10

Pas cor Wilson ever

11

or

go

through

.n. .

12

~ill

[

fee

out and a

true?

[

to your

fill

ouc

).:~.~·.,ledge,

[

did

: :)rm o r pay

tha:

th~

that process?

To my

knowledge

i:n 't

T

remembe:

the:

ever happe n ing .

14

We ' ve

Okay .

Q.

15

mean

16

would

17

the decision by che

18

wouldn ' t .

talked _

co prolong the discussion
be --

would be ,

as Mr .

Board of

and

~ o t,

2t~~c

Hi ~ :~:o

when
puc

Ad·~5:ment,

Fo r

the

w a~:ed

assume

21

defined

22

location,

23

their proposal and wanced to go b3Ck to

24

would
lL

it,

r

do ~ ' c

Miss~~~

che

bOi.ind

and wh e n

2~scussi on ,

sake of this

20

that
in

I

[

[

jv
c~e!

[
[

19

25

for a

Yes .

9

13

fo~~al

there a

[

8

~

Is

Okay .

Q.

yo u

r

chat .

2

7

31

Pace)

what
the

if

the Missi on

Board of

Adjus~me~ :

the Mission made a

let ' s

to do was,
case ,

at

5~~nifi cant

that

as

[

that

[

change In
l oc ati on ,

the city consider chat?
I'm sorry ,

ask that
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Craig L. Ti\1Igr,' and Associates
Craig Taylor (#4421]1~ i'U TY CLERK
Matthew Hilton (#3655)
472 North Main Street
Kaysville, UT 84037
Telephone: (801) 544-9955

JU
'

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE TH IRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
7;1"

Salt Lake City Mission, et ai.,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW HILTON
)
v.

)

Salt Lake City, et aI.,

)

Civil No. 990908945

)

Judge: Joseph C. Fratto

Defendants

Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency,

)

Third-Party Plaintiff
)
v.

)

McDonald Brothers Investments, a
Utah General Partnership,
Third-Party Defendants.

)
)

COMES NOW Matthew Hilton, under oath and penalty of perjury, and states that the
following is true:
I.

I am over th e age of 18 and competent in all respects to make this affidavi t.

further declare under penalty of perjury that J have personal knowledge of the matters stated
herein and affirm th at the matters stated herein are true and accurate.
2.

I am attorney practi cing with the law finn of Craig L. Taylor & Associates which

represents the Pl ainti ffs in this acti on.
3.

I can veri fy that the document attached hereto as Exhibit " 1" is a true and correct

copy of correspondence dated August 30, 1999 from myself to Steve Swindle, counsel for MBI.
4.

I can verify that the document attached hereto as Exhibit "2" is a true and correct

copy of correspondence dated September 28, 1999 from Steve Swindle, counsel for MBI , to
myself.
5.

I can verify that the document attached hereto as Exhibit "3" is a true and correct

copy of correspondence dated September 19, 2005 fro m Douglas M. Skie, EPA regi on 8, to
myself.

IREMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK SIGNATURE ON FOLLOWING PAGE 1

•

DA TED this

Icraay of March, 2006.

Matthew Hilton

COUNTY OF DAVIS)
: ss
STATE OF UTAH )
On March I ~2006, Matthew Hilton, known to me, personally appeared before me and
swore under oath and penalty of perjury that he had executed the foregoing affi davit and that the
statements contained therein were true.

NOTA,llY PUBLIC

ROBYN J. NEWBOLD .
2290 East 3225 North
layto n. Utah 840~O
My Commission Expires
June 15 . 2008

STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
1 hereby certify that on the 28 th day of March, 2006, 1 had a copy of the foregoing
document sent via facsimi le and first class U.S. mail , postage prepaid, to the following:
Vincent C. Rampton
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Fax: (801) 328-0537
Lynn Pace
Sal t Lake City's Attorney's Office
451 South State Street Suite # 505A
Salt Lake City, UT 84 111
Fax: (801) 535-7640
John A. Snow
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84 144
Fax: (801) 534-0058
Wayne Wilson and Philip Arena
Salt Lake City Mission
342 West 200 South
P.O. Box 142
Salt Lake City, UT 841 10-0142
Fax: (801) 355-9364
DATED and EXECUTED thi s 28 th day of March, 2006.
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES
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Matthew Hilton __
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.
1220 North Main Street # 5A
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
(801 )-489-1111
(801 )-489-6000 (Facsimile)

. .. .

'

..-

.. ...

(VIA :ACSIMILE 801-534-0058)
I\ugu: ,t 30, 1999
St~!ve

Swindle
Van C Cltt, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 So Ith Main Street # 1600
Salt L. \ke City , UT 84144
, ~E:

McDonald Brothers Investment, a Utah general partnership
Salt Lake City Mission (Spectacular Ministries of the Lord's Servants)
468 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Dear M'. Swindle:

,

I am he ping you were able to reach your clients regarding my request to at least
allow tt e Mission to stay through the due diligence period Is for the ROA. I
underst; md that the Mission has to be out at the closing.
Thank \ ou for your time and attention to this critical matter that affects the
continuo tlon of the valuable religious and social services provided by the Mission
to many who are reached by 110 other private or government program or person_
With be5 t regards, I remain,

cc: P8!;tOI Wayne Wilson
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September 28, 1999

VJ..<\ FACSIMILE
(801) 489-GOOO

Matthew Hilt on, E sq.
1220 North Main Street, #5A
Sp ringville, Utah 84663
Re:

McDonald Brothers Investmen ts / Salt Lake City Mission

Dear Matt:
I did not hear back from you following our telephone conversation on September 20,
1999.
I al so tri ed without success to reach you last Friday and when I tried to reach you
yesterday I was advised that you were out ofthe office for the day.
The Agreement which was entered into between your client, Spectacular Ministries of the
Lords' Servants, an d my client, McDonald Brothers Investments, dated July 31, 1999, provided
that the premises would be vacated no later than September 6,1999. We can appreciate the
diffi culty of your circumstances but, as you indicated to me on September 20, 1999, your client
iniel1lb tu l,unor its CU lTIinitnient to 1v1cDonald Brothers Invcstlli~ntsJ tind ;t is, therefore,
imp erative th at th e premises be vacated as agreed . Obviously, if our client's transaction with the
R edevelopm ent Agency of Salt Lake City does not close by reason of your client's failure to
vacate the pre mi ses, th ere could be very significant damages to our client.
In acco rd ance with the Agreement dated July 31, 1999, any continued possession of the
premises by your client after September 6, 1999, constitutes an unlawful detainer pursuant to §7836-3(1)(a) of the Utah Code. As you hav e indicated to me, our client has been most cooperative
in att empting to meet the needs of your client. We obvi ously would prefer not to file an action to
enfo rce this Agreement, but now we feel we are compelled to do so unl ess the premises are
vacated no later than Tu esday, October 5, 1999.

010\ 1987 46.V \
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September 28, 1999
Page Two

lfwe mu st file an action, please let me know whether you will accept service for your
cli ent.
Your continued cooperation will be appreciated and if you should have any questions,
pl ease let me know .
Very truly yours,

Stephen D. Swindle
SDS/sb
cc:

James T. McD onald

O! 0\ 198746 . V!
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UNITED

STA
I

ES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTI ON AGENCY
999 18

TII

REGION 8
STREET - SUITE 300

DENVER, CO 60202·2466
Phone 800-227-8917
htlp:/Iwww.epa.gov/roglon08

SEP 1 9 2005

Ref: 8EPR-B
Mr. Mallhew F. Hillon

Craig L. Taylor, P.C., Atlom]Y & Coun selors at Law
472 North Mai n S treet

Kaysville, UT 84037
Re: FOlA Request #313-05 - E A Grants to Salt Lake City
Dear Mr. Hilton:

y?

Th is lelt er is in response to
Freedom of Informati on Act inquiry dated August 18,2005,
regardi ng infomlatioll pertait1il g to the Suit Lake Cit y Brownficlds project, morc speci fi ca lly the
SOO West Park Blocks Targc~e Brow nfi elds Assessmen t (TBA),

A\1L

Pcr your conversation 011
t 31,2005, with Luke C havez of m y SI"[[, I illll enc losing II copy
of Contract No. 68-W5-0031ia d the total cost of the expenses incuITed by EPA for the 500 West
Park Blocks TBA. The tot,,1 f st of the TBA "t $62, 159.87 included the product ionl1nd

implementation of the Smnpltn :lJlU Analysis Plan (SAP) and the Iinal An alyti t:a l Rcsu lls
Rcporl. No information was 1[1 und in EPA Region VIII's records identifying any cOllllllunicillioll
from Sail Lake City Redevelop nell I Agency (RDA) to EPA Region VIn, indic<lting thatllw
req uest for assistance d'lled Jlll e 2, 1999, from Salt Lake City RDA was withdrawn, the
information provided by the ~. lpling and Analysis Pl an (SAP) was declined or rejected, or the
expenses incurred by EPA Re' all V III was repa id or reimbursed by the Salt Lake City JWA .
If you have further questions r gl.l rdin g this response please con tact Luke Chavez at (303) 312·
6512.

EXHIBIT

?b

tfaiJjj

The lola l cost oflhis respons
und er separat~ cover.

$80.65. A separate invoice covering these charges wi ll be sen t

Douglas M. Skie, Program II" clor
Prep<Jreuness, Assessment an
mergency Response
Enclosures
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21A.12.0 10 Purpose Statement:
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21 A.12.01 0 Purpose Statement:
The interpretation authority established by this Chapter is intended to recognize that the
provisions of this Title, though detailed and extensive, cannot, as a practical matter,
address every specific situation to which these provisions may have to be applied . Many
of these situations can be resolved or clarified by interpreting the specific provisions of
this Title in light of the general and specific purposes for which those provisions were
enacted. This interpretation authority is administrative rather than legislative. It is intended
only to allow authoritative application of the provisions of this Title to specific cases. It is
not intended to add to or change the essential content of this Title. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-1),
1995)

http ://66.113.J95 .234IUT/Salt%20Lake%20CityI18006000000001000.htm
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21A. 12.020 Scope Of Zonin g Administrator A uthority:
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21A.12.020 Scope Of Zoning Administrator Authority:
Th e Zoning Administrator, subject to the proced ures, standards and limitations of this
Chapter, may render interpretations , including use interpretations , of the provisions of this
Title and of any rule or regulation issued pursuant to it. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-2), 1995)

http://66.1 13. 195.234/UT/Salt%20L ake%20CityI18006000000002000. htm
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21A.12.030 Persons Entitled To Seek Interpretations :
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21A.12.030 Persons Entitled To Seek Interpretations:
Applications for interpretations may be filed only by a property owner having need for an
interpretation or by the property owner's authorized agent. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-3), 1995)

http://66.113. 195.23 4/UT/Salt%20Lake%20CityI18006000000003000.htm

8/29/2007

21A. 12.040 Proced ures:
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21A.12.040 Procedures:
A. Application: An application for an interpretation of this Title shall be filed on a form
provided by the Zoning Administrator and shall contain at least the following information:
1. Provisions : The specific provision or provisions of this title for which an interpretation is
sought;
2. Facts: The facts of the specific situation giving rise to the request for an interpretation;
3. Interpretation: The precise interpretation claimed by the applicant to be correct;
4. Statement: When a use interpretation is sought, a statement of what use permitted
under the current zon ing classification of the property that the applicant claims either
includes the proposed use, or is most similar to the proposed use; and
5. Evidence: When a use interpretation is sought, documents, statements, and other
evidence demonstrating that the proposed use will comply with all use limitations
established for the district in which it is proposed to be located .
6. Fees: Nonrefundable fees established pursuant to the fee schedule shall accompany the
application .
7. Notification To Recognized And Registered Organizations: The city shall give
notification , by first class mail to any organization which is entitled to receive notice
pursuant to chapter 2.62 of this code, that a use interpretation has been determined.
B. Action On Application: The zoning administrator shall send the zoning administrator's
written interpretation to th e applicant stating any specific precedent or other reasons, or
analysis upon which the determination is based.
C. Records: A record of decisions on all applications for interpretations of this titl e shall be
kept on file in the office of the zoning administrator.
D. Appeal: Any person ad ve rsely affected by an interpretation rendered by the zoning
ad ministrator may appeal to the board of adjustment in accordance with th e provisions of
chaQler:2jA16 of this part. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-4),1995)

http ://66. 113.195.234/ UT/Salt%20Lake%20CityI18006000000004000. ht111
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21A.12. 0S0 Standards For Use Interpretations:

21A.12.050 Standards For Use Interpretations:
The following standards shall govern the zoning administrator, and the board of adjustment on
appeals from the zoning administrator, in issuing use interpretations :
A. Any use defined in

partY1.,j:haQ1er21A.Q~of

this title, shall be interpreted as defined;

B. Any use specifically listed without a "P" or .. c . designated in the table of permitted and
conditiona l uses for a district shall not be allowed in that zoning district;
C. No use interpretation shall allow a proposed use in a district unless evidence is presented
demonstrating that the proposed use will comply with the development standards
established for that particular district;
D. No use interpretation shall allow any use in a particular district unless such use is
substantially simi lar to the uses allowed in that district and is more similar to such uses than
to uses allowed in a less restrictive district;
E. If the proposed use is most similar to a conditional use authorized in the district in which it is
proposed to be located , any use interpretation allowing such use shall require that it may
be approved only as a conditional use pursuant to part v, chapter 21A.54 of this title; and
F. No use interpretation shall permit the establishment of any use that would be inconsistent
with the statement of purpose of that zoning district. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-5), 1995)

http://66. 11 3. 19S.23 4IUT/Sa lt%20Lake%20CityI1800600000000 SOOO. hlm
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21A.12.060 Effect Of Use Interpretati ons:
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21A.12.060 Effect Of Use Interpretations:
A use interpretation finding a particular use to be a permitted use or a conditional use
shall not authorize the establishment of such use nor the development, construction ,
reconstruction, alteration or moving of any building or structure. It shall merely authorize
the preparation, filing, and processing of applications for any approvals and permits that
may be required by the codes and ordinances of the City including , but not limited to, a
zoning certificate, a building permit, a certificate of occupancy, subdivision approval, and
site plan approval. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-6), 1995)

http ://66.113. 195.234/UT/Sa1t%20Lakeo/o20CityIl8006000000006000. htm
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21A.12.070 Limitations On Use Interpretations:
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21A.12.070 Limitations On Use Interpretations:
A use interpretation finding a particular use to be a permitted use or a conditional use in a
particular district shall be deemed to authorize only that particular use in the district and
such use interpretation shall not be deemed to authorize any other allegedly similar use
for which a separate use interpretation has not been issued. (Ord. 26·95 § 2(6·7), 1995)

http://66. 11 3.195.234IUT/Salt%20Lake%20City/ 18006000000007000. ht111
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21 A.S4.01 0 Purpose Statement:
A conditional use is a use which has potential adverse impacts upon the immediate
neighborhood and the city as a whole. It requires a careful review of its location, design,
configuration and special impact to determine the desirability of allowing it on a particular site.
Whether it is appropriate in a particular location requires a weighing, in each case, of the public
need and benefit against the local impact, taking into account the applicant's proposals for
ameliorating any adverse impacts through special site planning, development techniques and
contributions to the provision of public improvements, rights of way and services. (Ord. 26-95 §
2(27 -1), 1995)

http ://66 .113.J95.234/UT/Salt%20Lake%20CityI18028000000001000.htm
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21 A.S4.020 Authority:
The planning commission, or in the case of administrative conditional uses, the planning
director or designee, ma y, in accordance with the procedures and standards set out in this
chapter, and oth er regulati ons applicable to the district in which the property is located,
approve uses listed as conditional uses in the tables of permitted and conditional uses found at
the end of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of zoning district or districts.
(Ord . 69-06 § 1, 2006: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-2), 1995)

hltp ://66. 11 3.195.234fUT/Salt%20Lake%20CityIl80280000000020OO. htm
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21A.54.030 Categories Of Conditional Uses:
Conditional uses shall consist of the following categories of uses:
A. Uses Impacting Other Property: Uses that may give rise to particular problems with
respect to their impact upon neighboring property and the city as a whole, including their
impact on public facilities; and
B. Planned Developments: The uses which fall within these categories are listed in the tables
of permitted and conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of this title for
each category of zoning district or districts.
C. Administrative Consideration Of Conditional Uses: Certain conditional uses may be
considered to be low impact due to their particular location and are hereby authorized to be
reviewed administratively according to the provisions contained in section 21A.54.155 of
this chapter. Conditional uses that are authorized to be reviewed administratively are:
1. Applications for low power wireless telecommunication facilities that are listed as
conditional uses in subsection 21A.40.090E of this title.
2. Alterations or modifications to a conditional use that increase the floor area by one
thousand (1,000) gross square feet or more and/or increase the parking requirement.
3. Any conditional use as identified in the tables of permitted and conditional uses for each
zoning district, except those that:
a. Are listed as a "residential" land use in the tables of permitted and conditional uses for
each zoning district;
b. Are located within a residential zoning district;
c. Abut a residential zoning district or residential use; or
d. Require planned development approval.
4. Public/private utility buildings and structures in residential and nonresidential zoning
districts. (Ord. 69-06 § 2, 2006: Ord. 13-04 § 34, 2004: Ord. 81-01 § 2, 2001: Ord . 26-95 §
2(27 -3), 1995)

http://66.1 13 .195.234/UT/Salt%20Lake%20CityI18028000000003000. h1111
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21A.54.040 Site Plan Review Required:
Site plan review of development proposals is required for all conditional uses in all districts.
(Ord . 26-95 § 2(27-4),1995)

http ://66. 11 3. l 95.234/ UT/Sa lt%20Lake%20CityI18028000000004000. htl11
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21A.S4.0S0 Initiation:
An application for a conditiona l use may be filed with the zoning administrator by the owner of
the subject property or by an authorized agent. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-5),1995)

http ://66. 11 3.19S .234/ UT/Salt%20Lake%2 0CityI1802800000000S000. htm
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21A.S4.060 Procedures:
A. Application: A complete application shall contain at least the following information
submitted by the applicant, unless certain information is determined by the zoning
administrator to be inapplicable or unnecessary to appropriately evaluate the application :
1. The applicant's name , address, telephone number and interest in the property;
2. The owner's name, address and telephone number, if different than the applicant, and
the owner's signed consent to the filing of the application;
3. Th e street address and legal description of the subject property;
4. Th e zoning classification , zoning district boundaries and present use of th e subject
property;
5. A complete description of the proposed conditiona l use;
6. Site plans, as required pursuant to section 21 A.58.060 of this part;
7. Traffic impact analysis;
8. A signed statement that the applicant has met with and explained the proposed
conditional use to the appropriate neighborhood organization entitled to receive notice
pursuant to title 2, chaRter 2.62 of this code;
9. A statement indicating whether the applicant will require a variance in connection with
the proposed conditional use;
10. Mail ing labels and first class postage for ali persons required to be notified of the public
hearing on the proposed conditional use pursuant to part II, chapte r 21 A.1 0 of this title;
11 . Such other and further information or documentation as the zoning administrator may
deem to be necessary for a fu ll and proper consideration and disposition of the particular
application.
B. Determination Of Completeness: Upon receipt of an application for a conditional use, the
zoning administrator shall make a determination of completeness of the appl ication
pursuant to section 21A.1 0.01 0 of this title.
C. Fees: The application for a co nditional use shall be accompanied by the fee established on
the fee schedule.
D. Staff ReportSite Plan Review Report: Once the zoning administrator has determined that
the application is complete a staff report evaluating th e conditiona l use application shall be
prepared by the plann ing division and forwarded to the planning co mmission, or, in the
case of administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee along with a site
plan review report prepared by the development review team .

hl1p :1166.1 13. 195.234/UT/Salt%20Lake%20City/ 18028000000006000.htm
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2 1A.54.060 Procedures:

Page 2 012

E. Public Hearing: The planning commission , or, in the case of administrative conditional
uses , the planning director or designee shall schedule and hold a public hearing on th e
proposed conditional use in accordance with the standards and procedures for conduct of
the public hearing set forth in part II, chapter 21A.10 of this title. (See sections 21A.54 .150
and 2~,A.li.1. 1 .Q~of this chapter for additional procedures for public hearings in connection
with planned developments and administrative conditional uses.)
F. Notice Of Applications For Additional Approvals: Whenever, in connection with the
application for a conditional use approval, the applicant is requesting other types of
approvals, such as a variance or special exception, all required notices shall include
reference to th e request for all required approvals.
G. Planning Commission And Planning Director Or Designee Action: At the conclusion of
the public hearing, th e planning commission, or, in the case of ad ministrative conditional
uses , the planning director or designee, shall either: 1) approve the conditional use; 2)
approve the conditional use subject to specific modifications; or 3) deny the conditional use .
(Ord . 69-06 § 3, 2006: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-6), 1995)

http://66. 113.195.234/ UT/Salt%20Lake%20CityI18028000000006OOO. hlm
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21A.S4.070 Sequence Of Approval Of Applications For Both A Conditional
Use And A Variance:
Whenever the applicant indicates pursuant to subsection 21A.54.060A9 of this chapter that a
variance will be necessary in connection with the proposed conditional use (other than a
planned development), the appl ica nt shall at the time of filing the application for a co nditional
use, file an application for a variance with the board of adjustment.
A. Combined Review: Upon the filing of a combined application for a conditional use and a
variance, at the initiation of the planning commission or the board of adjustment, the
commission and the board may hold a joint session to consider the conditional use and the
va rian ce applications simultaneously.
B. Actions By Planning Commission And Board Of Adjustment: Regardless of whether
the planning commission and board of adjustment conduct their respecti ve reviews in a
combined session or separately, the board of adjustment shall not take any action on the
application for a va riance until the planning commission shall first act to recommend
approval or disapproval of the application for the conditional use. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-7) ,
1995)

hlt p ://66. I 13. I 95 .234/UT/Sa lt%20Lake%20C ityIl8028000000007000. htm
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21A.S4.080 Standards For Conditional Uses:
The planning commission shall only approve, approve with conditions, or deny a conditional
use based upon written findings of fact with regard to each of the standards set forth below
and, where applicable, any special standards for conditional uses set forth in a specific zoning
district:
A. The proposed development is one of the conditional uses specifically listed in this title;
B. The proposed development is in harmony with the general purposes and intent of this title
and is compatible with and implements the planning goals and objectives of the city,
including applicable city master plans;

c.

Streets or other means of access to the proposed development are suitable and adequate
to carry anticipated traffic and will not materially degrade the service level on the adjacent
streets ;

D. The internal circulation system of the proposed development is properly designed;
E. Existing or proposed utility services are adequate for the proposed development and are
designed in a manner that will not have an adverse impact on adjacent land uses or
resources;
F. Appropriate buffering is provided to protect adjacent land uses from light, noise and visual
impacts;
G. Architecture and building materials are consistent with the development and compatible
with the adjacent neighborhood ;
H. Landscaping is appropriate for the scale of the development;
I. The proposed development preserves historical , architectural and environmental features of
the property;
J. Operating and delivery hours are compatible with adjacent land uses;

K. The proposed conditional use or, in the case of a planned development, the permitted and
conditional uses contained th erein, are compatible with the neig hborhood surrounding th e
proposed development and will not have a material net cumulative adverse impact on the
neighborhood or the city as a whole;
L. The proposed development comp lies with all other applicable codes and ordinances. (Ord .
35-99 § 95, 1999: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-8),1995)
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21A.54.090 Conditions On Conditional Uses:
The planning commission, or, in the case of administrative conditional uses, the planning
director or designee, may impose on a conditional use such conditions and limitations as may
be necessary or appropriate to prevent or minimize adverse effects upon other property and
improvements in the vicinity of the conditional use, upon the city as a whole, or upon public
facilities and services. However, such conditions shall not be used as a means to authorize as
a conditional use any use which is intended to be temporary only. These conditions may
include, but are not limited to, conditions concerning use, construction , character, location ,
landscaping, screening, parking and other matters relating to the purposes and objectives of
this title. Such conditions shall be expressly set forth in the motion authorizing the conditional
use.

A. Violations Of Conditions: Violation of any such condition or limitation shall be a violation
of this title and shall constitute grounds for revocation of the conditional use approval. (Ord .
69-06 § 4, 2006: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-9), 1995)
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21A.S4.100 No Presumption Of Approval:
The listing of a conditional use in any table of permitted and conditional uses found at the end
of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of zoning district or districts does not
constitute an assurance or presumption that such conditional use will be approved. Rather,
each proposed conditional use shall be evaluated on an individual basis, in relation to its
compliance with the standards and conditions set forth in this chapter and with the standards
for the district in which it is located , in order to determine whether the conditional use is
appropriate at the particular location . (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-10),1995)
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21A.54.110 Effect Of Approval Of Conditional Use:
The approval of a proposed co nditional use by the planning commission, or, in the case of
administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee, shall not authorize the
establishment or extension of any use nor the development, construction , reco nstruction,
alteration or moving of any building or structure, but shall merely authorize the preparation,
filing and process ing of applications for any permits or approvals that may be required by the
regulations of the city, including, but not limited to, a building permit, certificate of occupancy
and subd ivision approval. (Ord. 69-06 § 5, 2006: Ord . 26-95 § 2(27-11), 1995)
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21A.54.120 Limitations On Conditional Use Approval:
Subject to an extension of time granted by the planning commission, or, in the case of
administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee, no conditional use shall be
valid for a period longer than twelve (12) months unless a building permit is issued and
construction is actually begun within that period and is thereafter diligently pursued to
completion , or unless a certificate of occupancy is issued and a use commenced within that
period, or unless a longer time is requested and granted by the planning commission , or, in the
case of administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee. The approval of a
proposed conditional use by the planning commission, or, in the case of administrative
cond itional uses, the planning director or designee, shall authorize only the particular use for
which it was issued. (Ord. 69-06 § 6, 2006: Ord . 26-95 § 2(27-12), 1995)
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21A.S4.130 Conditional Use Related To The Land:
An approved conditional use relates only to, and is only for the benefit of the use and lot rather
than the owner or operator of such use or lot. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(27-13),1995)
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21A.54.135 Alterations Or Modifications To A Conditional Use:
Any land use currently listed as a conditional use under existing zoning regulations shall be
required to obtain conditio nal use approval subject to the provisions of this chapter if th e floor
area increases by one th ousand (1,000) gross square feet or more and/or the parking
requirement is increased.
A. Administrative Consideration Of Conditional Use: Applications for alterations and/or
modifications to a condition al use may be reviewed according to the procedures set forth in
section 21A.54 .155 of this chapte r. (Ord. 13-04 § 35, 2004)
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21A.54.140 Conditional Use Approvals And Planned Developments:
When a development is proposed as a planned development pursuant to the procedures in
section 21A.54.1 50 of this chapter and also includes an application for conditional use
approval, the planning commission shall decide the planned deve lopment application and the
conditional use application together. In the event that a new conditiona l use is proposed after a
planned development has been approved pursuant to section 21A.54.150 of this chapter, the
proposed conditional use shall be reviewed and approved , approved with conditions, approved
with modifications, or denied under the standards set forth in section 21A.54 .080 of this
chapter. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-14),1995)
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21A.S4.1S0 Planned Developments:
A. Purpose Statement: A planned development is a distinct category of conditional use. As
such, it is intended to encourage the efficient use of land and resources, promoting greater
efficiency in public and utility services and encouraging innovation in the planning and
building of all types of development. Through the flexibility of the planned development
technique, the city seeks to achieve the following specific objectives:
1. Creation of a more desirable environment than would be possible through strict
application of other city land use regulations ;
2. Promotion of a creative approach to the use of land and related physical facilities
resulting in better design and development, including aesthetic amenities;
3. Combination and coordination of architectural styles, building forms and building
relationships;
4. Preservation and enhancement of desirable site characteristics such as natural
topography, vegetation and geologic features, and the prevention of soil erosion;
5. Preservation of buildings which are architecturally or historically significant or contribute
to the character of the city;
6. Use of design, landscape or architectural features to create a pleasing environment;
7. Inclusion of special development amenities; and
8. Elimination of blighted structures or incompatible uses through redevelopment or
rehabilitation .
B. Authority: The planning commission may approve planned developments for uses listed in
the tables of permitted and conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of
this title for each category of zoning district or districts . The approval shall be in accordance
with the standards and procedures set forth in this section, and other regulations applicable
to the district in which the property is located.
C. Authority To Modify Regulations: In approving any planned development, the planning
commission may change, alter, modify or waive any provisions of this title or of the city's
subd ivision reg ulations as th ey apply to the proposed planned development. No such
change, alterati on, modification or waiver shall be approved unless the planning
commission shall find that the proposed planned development:
1. Will achieve the purposes for which a planned development may be approved pursuant
to subsecti on A of this section; and
2. Will not violate the general purposes, goals and objectives of this title and of any plans
adopted by th e planning co mmi ssion or the city council.
D. Limitation: No change, alteration, mod ification or wa iver authorized by subsection C of thi s
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section shall authorize a change in the uses permitted in any district or a modification with
respect to any standard established by this section, or a modification with respect to any
standard in a zoning district made specifically applicable to planned developments, unless
such regulations expressly authorize such a change, alteration, modification or waiver.
E. Other Standards:
1. Minimum Area: A planned development proposed for any parcel or tract of land under
single ownership or control shall have a minimum net lot area for each zoning district as set
forth in table 21A.54.150E2 of this section.
2. Density Limitations: Residential planned developments shall not exceed the density
limitation of the zoning district where the planned development is proposed . The calculation
of planned development density may include open space that is provided as an amenity to
the planned development. Public or private roadways located within or adjacent to a
planned development shall not be included in the planned development area for the
purpose of calculating density.
Table 21A.54.150E2
PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS
Table 21A.54.150E2
PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS
DISTRICT

MINIMUM PLANNED
DEVELOPMENT SIZE

Residential Districts
FR-1 /43,560 foothills estate residential district

5 acres

FR-2/2 1,780 foothills residential district

5 acres

FR-3/12,000 foothills residential district

5 acres

R-1 /12,000 single-family residential district

5 acres

R-1 /7,000 single-family residential district

20,000 square feet

R-1/5,000 single-family residential district

20,000 square feet

SR-1 special development pattem resid ential
district

9,000 square feet

SR-2 special development pattern residential
district

Reserved

SR-3 interior block single-family residential district 9,000 square feet
R-2 single- and two-family residential district

9,000 square feet

RMF-30 low density multi-family residential district 9,000 square feet
RMF-35 moderate density multi-family residential
district

9,000 square feet
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RMF-45 moderate/high density multi-family
residential district

20,000 square feet

RMF-75 high density multi-family district

9,000 square feet

RB resid ential/bus iness district

No minimum requi red

R-MU-35 residential/mixed use district

9,000 square feet

R-MU-45 residential/mixed use district

9,000 square feet

R-MU residential/mixed use district

No minimum required

RO resid ential/office distri ct

20,000 square feet

Commercial Districts
CN neighborhood com merci al district

No minimum required

CB community business district

No minimum required

CS community shopping district

60,000 square feet

CC corridor commercial district

20,000 square feet

CSHBO Sugar Hou se business district

No minimum required

CG general commercial district

1 acre

TC-75 transit corridor district

No minimum requ ired

0

Manufacturing Districts
M-1 light manufacturing district

2 acres

M-2 heavy manufacturing district

2 acres

Downtown Districts
0-1 central business district

2 acres

0-2 downtown support commercial district

2 acres

0-3 downtown wa rehouse/residential district

1 acre

Special Purpose Districts
RP research park district

10 acres

BP business park district

10 acres

FP foothills protection district

32 acres

AG ag ri cu ltural distri ct

10 acres

AG-2 agricultural district

4 acres

AG-5 agricultural district

10 acres

AG-20 agricu ltural district

40 acres

A ai rport district

2 acres

PL public land s district

5 acres

PL-2 publ ic lands district

1 acre

I institutiona l district

5 acres

UI urban institutional district

1 acre

http://66.1 13.19S.234/UT/SaJt%20Lake%20CityI1802800000001 6000.htm

0

8129/2007

Page 4 of 13

21A.S4. 150 Planned Developments:

OS open space district

2 acres

MH mobile home park district

10 acres

EI extractive industries district

10 acres

MU mixed use district

No minimum required

3. Consideration Of Reduced Width Public Street Dedication: A residential planned
development application may include a request to dedicate the street to Salt Lake City for
perpetual use by the public. The request will be reviewed and evaluated individually by
appropriate departments, including transportation, engineering, public utilities, public
services and fire. Each department reviewer will consider the adequacy of the design and
physical improve ments proposed by the developer and will make recommendation for
approval or describe required changes. A synopsis will be incorporated into the staff report
for review and decision by the planning commission. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no
such street will be accepted as a publicly owned street unless there is a minimum width of
twenty feet (20') of pavement with an additional right of way as determined by the planning
commission.
4. Planned Developments: Planned developments within the TC-75, RB , R-MU, MU, CN,
CB, and CSHBD zoning districts and the South State Street overlay. Also planned
developments within the CS zoning district, when the district is adjacent to more than sixty
percent (60%) residential zoning (within 300 feet, either on the same block or across the
street).
Planned developments within these zoning districts may be approved subject to
consideration of the following general conceptual guidelines (a positive finding for each is
not requ ired):
a. The development shall be primarily oriented to the street, not an interior courtyard or
parking lot,
b. The primary access shall be oriented to the pedestrian and mass transit,
c. Th e fa cade shall maintain detailing and glass in sufficient quantities to facilitate
pedestrian interest and interaction ,
d. Architectural detailing shall emphasize the pedestrian level of the building,
e. Parking lots shall be appropriately screened and landscaped to minimize their impact
on the neig hborhood,
f. Parking lot lighting shall be shielded to eliminate excessive glare or light into adjacent
neighborhoods,
g. Dumpsters and load ing docks shall be appropriately screened or located within th e
structure, and
h. Signage shall emphasize the pedestrian/mass transit orientation.
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5. Perimeter Setback: Th e perimeter side and rear yard building setback shall be the
greater of th e required setbacks of the lot or adjoining lot unless modified by the planning
commission.
6. Topographic Change: The planning commission may increase or decrease the side or
rear yard setback where there is a topographic change between lots .
F. Preapplication Conference: Prior to submitting a planned development application, an
applicant shall participate in a preapplication conference with the planning director and the
development review team (ORT). A member of the planning commission and the city
council member of the district in which the proposed planned development is located may
be invited to attend the preapplication conference. Representatives of other city
departments and decision making bodies may also be present, where appropriate.
1. Purpose Statement: The purpose of the preapplication conference is to enable the
applicant to present the concept of the proposed planned development and to discuss the
procedures and standards for planned development approval. The conference is intended
to facilitate the filing and consideration of a complete application. No representation made
by the planning director, the ORT, the city council and planning commission members, or
the representatives of city departments or of other decision-making bodies during such
conference shall be binding upon the city with respect to the application subsequently
submitted.
2. Scheduling Of Conference: The planning director shall schedule the preapplication
conference within fifteen (15) calendar days after receiving the request from the applicant.
3. Information Needed For Preapplication Conference: At the time of request for the
preapplication conference, the applicant shall include a narrative summary of the proposal
and a description of adjacent land uses and neighborhood characteristics.
4. Action Following Preapplication Conference: Following the preapplication
conference, the staff of the planning director shall be available to assist the applicant in the
application procedure for the planned development.
G. Development Plan Approval Steps: The development plan approval process requires a
minimum of two (2) approval steps: 1) a preliminary development plan approval; and 2) a
final development plan approval. An applicant may elect to submit a concept development
plan pursuant to subsection H of this section before submitting an application for
preliminary development plan approval in order to obtain guidance regarding how city
requ irements wou ld apply to th e nature and scope of the proposed planned development.
H. Concept Development Plan (Optional):
1. Purpose Statement: The concept development plan is an optional step th at is intended
to provi de the applicant an opportunity to submit and obtain review of a plan showing the
basic character and scope of the proposed planned development without incurring undue
cost. At the election of the applicant, th e co ncept development plan may be submitted to
the planning commission for its review and decision following a public hearing .
2. Application: An application for submittal of a concept development plan shall include
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the following items and information:
a. Schematic drawings, at a scale of not smaller than fifty feet to the inch (50' = 1") , of the
proposed development concept, showing buildings located within eighty five feet (85')
(exclusive of intervening streets and alleys) of the site; the general location of vehicular
and pedestrian circu lation and parking; public and private open space; and residential,
commercia l, industrial and other land uses, as applicable, and a tabulation of the
following information:
i. Total number of dwelling units and rooming units proposed, by type of structure and
number of bedrooms if the planned development includes residential land uses;
ii. Total square feet of building floor area proposed for commercial uses, recreation and
accessory uses and industrial uses, by general type of use;
iii. Proposed number of off street parking and loading spaces for each proposed type
of land use ; and
iv. Total land area, expressed in square feet and as a percent of the total development
area, proposed to be devoted to residential uses, by type of structure; commercia l
uses; industrial uses; other land uses; public and private open space; streets and
sidewalks; and off street parking and loading area;
v. Total project density or intensity of use.
b. Proposed elevations.
c. When the planned development is to be constructed in phases, a schedule for the
development of such phases shall be submitted stating the approximate beginning and
completion time for each phase. When a development provides for common open space,
the total area of common open space provided at any stage of development shall , at a
minimum, bear the same relationship to the total open space to be provided in the entire
development as the phases completed or under development bear to the entire
development.
3. Review By Development Review Team (DRT): Upon receipt of a complete concept
development plan application, the zoning administrator shall forward the application to the
DRT for its review. The DRT shall prepare a memorandum with its general evaluation and
recommendations regarding any revisions that must be incorporated in any subsequent
application for preliminary development plan approval in order to assure comp liance with
the requirements of this title. A copy of this memorandum shall be sent to the applicant.
4. Planning Commission Review Of The Concept Plan: Upon receipt of the DRT
memorandum pursuant to subsection H3 of this Section, the applicant may request in
writing within fourteen (14) calendar days of the date of receipt thereof that the Planning
Director forward the con ce pt development plan application to the Planning Commission for
its review and decision. The Zoning Administrator shall forward the concept development
plan application accompanied by the DRT memorandum to the Planning Division for
Planning Commission consideration at a public hearing. In the event that the applicant does
not request Pl anning Commission review of the concept development plan within the
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fourteen (14) day time frame provided, no further action shall be taken on the proposed
planned development until the applicant submits an application for preliminary plan
development approval.
5. Public Hearing: If an applicant requests Planning Commission review of the concept
development plan pursuant to subsection H4 of this Section a public hearing shall be
scheduled and conducted by the Planning Commission in accordance with the standards
and procedures set forth in Part II, Chapter 21A.1 0 of this Title.
6. Planning Commission Action: Following the conclusion of the public hearing, the
Planning Commission shall either approve the concept development plan, approve the
concept development plan subject to modifications or conditions, or disapprove the concept
development plan.
7. Procedure Upon Denial Of Concept Development Plan: If the Planning Commission
denies the application for approval of the concept development plan, it shall require the
applicant to resolve specific issues before approval may be granted, if resubmitted , for the
preliminary development plan.
8. Approval Of Concept Development Plan: If the Planning Commission approves the
concept development plan, with or without modifications or conditions, it shall adopt a
motion establishing the land uses and density for the proposed planned development and
authorizing the proposed applicant to submit an application for a preliminary development
plan consistent with the approved concept development plan. Every such motion shall be
expressly conditioned upon approval of the preliminary development plan in accordance
with subsection I of this Section.
9. Time Limitation On Concept Development Plan Approval: Subject to an extension of
time granted by the Planning Director, unless a preliminary development plan covering the
area designated in the concept development plan has been filed within one year from the
date the Planning Commission grants concept development plan approval, the Planning
Commission's approval of the concept development plan shall automatically expire and be
rendered void.

I. Preliminary Development Plan: Whether or not an applicant for a planned development
elects first to submit a concept development plan, the applicant must file an application for
preliminary development plan approval with the Zoning Administrator.
1. Application Requirements: Th e preliminary development plan application shall be
submitted on a form provided by the Zoning Administrator accompanied by such number of
copies of documents as the Zoning Administrator may require for processing of th e
application , and shall include at least the following information set forth below:
a. General Information:

i. Th e applicant's name, address, telephone number and interest in the property;
ii . The owner's name, address and telephone number, if different th an th e applicant,
and the owner's signed co nsent to the filing of the application;
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iii. The street address and legal description of the subject property;
iv. The zoning classification, zoning district boundaries and present use of the subject
property;
v. A vicinity map with north , arrow scale and date, indicating the zoning classifications
and current uses of properties within eighty five feet (85') (exclusive of intervening
streets and alleys) of th e subject property; and
vi. The proposed title of the project and the names, addresses and telephone numbers
of the architect, landscape architect, planner or engineer on the project.
b. Preliminary Development Plan: A preliminary development plan at a scale of twenty
feet to the inch (20' = 1") or larger, unless otherwise approved by the Zoning
Administrator, setting forth at least the following , unless waived by the Zoning
Administrator:
i. Th e location, dimensions and total area of the site;
ii . The location, dimensions, floor area, type of construction and use of each proposed
building or structure;
iii. The number, the size and type of dwelling units in each building, and the overall
dwelling unit density;
iv. The proposed treatment of open spaces and the exterior surfaces of all structures,
with sketches of proposed landscaping and structures, including typical elevations;
v. Architectural graphics, if requested by the Zoning Administrator, including typical
floor plans and elevations, profiles and cross sections;
vi. Th e number, location and dimensions of parking spaces and loading docks, with
means of ingress and eg ress ;
vii. The proposed traffic circu lation pattern within the area of the development,
including the location and description of public improvements to be installed, including
any streets and access easements;
viii. A traffic impact analysis;
ix. Th e locati on and purpose of any existing or proposed dedication or easement;
x. The general drainage plan for the development tract;
xi. Th e location and dimensions of adjacent properties, abutting public rights of way
and easements, and utilities serving the site;
xi i. Significant topographical or physical fe atures of th e site, including existing trees;
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xiii. Soils and subsurface conditions, if requested;
xiv. The location and proposed treatment of any historical structure or other historical
design element or feature;
xv. One copy of the preliminary development plan colored or shaded (unmounted) for
legibility and presentation at public meetings; and
xvi. A reduction of the preliminary development plan to eight and one-half by eleven
inches (8 1/2 x 11"). The reduction need not include any area outside the property lines
of the subject site.
c. Plat Of Survey: A plat of survey of the parcel of land, lot, lots, block, blocks, or parts
or portions thereof, drawn to scale, showing the actual dimensions of the parcel, lot, lots,
block, blocks, or portions thereof, according to the registered or recorded plat of such
land.
d. A Preliminary Subdivision Plat, If Required: A preliminary subdivision plat showing
that the planned development consists of and is conterminous with a single lot described
in a recorded subdivision plat, or a proposed resubdivision or consolidation to create a
single lot or separate lots of record in suitable form ready for review.
e. Additional Information: The application shall also contain the following information
as well as such additional information, drawings, plans or documentation as may be
requested by the Zoning Administrator or the Planning Commission if determined
necessary or appropriate for a full and proper consideration and disposition of the
application:
i. When the proposed planned development includes provisions for common open
space or recreational facilities, a statement describing the provision to be made for the
care and maintenance of such open space or recreational facilities;
ii. A written statement showing the relationship of the proposed planned development
to any adopted General Plan of the City;
iii. A written statement addressing each of the standards set forth in subsection H of
this Section, and such additional standards, if any, as may be applicable under the
specific provi sions of this Title. The statement shall explain specifically how the
proposed planned development relates to and meets each such standard.
iv. A written statement showing why the proposed planned development is compatible
with other property in the neighborhood.
2. Review Procedure: Upon the review of a preliminary development plan application, by
the development review team, the zoning administrator shall notify the applicant of any
deficiencies and or modifications necessary to complete the application.
a. Public Hearing : Upon receiving site plan review and recommendation from the
development review team, and completing a staff report , the planning commission shall
hold a public hearing to review th e preliminary development plan application in
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accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in part II, chaRter 21A.1 0 of this
title.
b. Planning Commission Action: Following the public hearing, the planning
commission shall decide, on the basis of the standards contained in subsection 13 of this
section whether to approve, approve with modifications or conditions, or deny the
application.
c. Planning Commission Action On Preliminary Development Plan Subject To
Certification By Planning Director: The motion of the planning commission approving
the preliminary development plan shall include a provision approving the final
development plan, subject to certification by the planning director that the final
development plan is in conformance with the preliminary development plan approved by
the planning commission.
d. Notification Of Decision: The planning director shall notify the applicant of the
decision of the planning commission in writing, accompanied by one copy of the
submitted plans marked to show such decision and a copy of the motion approving,
approving with modifications, or denying the preliminary development plan application.
3. Standards: A planned development, as a conditional use, shall be subject to the
standards for approval set forth in section 21A.54.080 of this chapter. The planning
commission shall make written findings of fact with respect to each of the standards in
section 21 A.54,..080 of this chapter before approval.
J. Certification Of Final Development Plan Compliance: Upon receipt of an application for

final development plan certification, the planning director shall review the application to
determine if it is complete, including any modifications required in conjunction with the
approval by the planning commission. Within ten (10) working days of receipt of the
completed application, the planning director shall either: 1) certify that the final
development plan complies with the approved preliminary plan; or 2) refuse to certify the
final development plan for lack of compliance with the preliminary development plan as
finally approved by the planning commission.
K. Effect Of Certification Of Compliance: A final development plan as approved and certified
shall not be modified, except pursuant to subsection S of this section.
L. Effect Of Refusal Of Certification: If the planning director refuses to certify the final
development plan, the applicant shall be notified in writing of the items th at do not comply
with the approved preliminary development plan. The applicant shall have fourteen (14)
days following receipt of the planning director's notice of lack of certification to correct the
deficiencies identified. If th e applicant fails to correct the deficiencies within the fourteen
(14) day period, unless extended by the planning director, the fin al development plan shall
automatica ll y expire and be rendered void.
M. Appeal Of Planning Director's Refusal To Certify Compliance: Any party aggrieved by
th e decision of the planning director not to certify a final development plan, may appeal to
the planning co mmission within thirty (30) days of the date of decision.
N. Appeal Of The Planning Commission Decision: Any party aggrieved by the decision of
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the plann ing comm ission on appeal of the planning director's refusal to certify a final
development plan , may file an appeal to the land use appeals board.

o. Time Limit On Approved Planned Development:

No planned development approval shall
be valid for a period longer than one year unless a building permit is issued and
construction is diligently pursued. However, upon written request of the applicant, the one
year period may be extended by the planning comm ission for such time as it shall
determine for good cause shown, without further public hearing.

P. Additional Requirements: The decision approving a planned development shall contain a
legal description of the property subject to the planned development. The decision shall be
recorded by the city in the office of the county recorder before any permits may be issued.
Q. Effect Of Approval Of Planned Development: The approval of a proposed planned

development by the planning commission shall not authorize the establishment or
extension of any use nor the development, construction , reconstruction, alteration or
moving of any building or structure, but shall authorize the preparation, filing and
processing of applications for any permits or approvals that may be required by the
regulations of the city, including , but not limited to , a building permit, a certificate of
occupancy and subdivision approval.

R. Regulation During And Following Completion Of Development: Following final
development plan approval , the final development plan, rather than any other provision of
this title, shall constitute the use, parking, loading, sign, bulk, space and yard regulations
applicable to the subject property, and no use or development, other than home occupation
and temporary uses , not allowed by the final development plan shall be permitted within the
area of the planned development.

S. Modifications To Development Plan:
1. New Application Required For Modifications And Amendments: No substantial
modification or amendment shall be made in the construction, development or use without
a new application under the provisions of this title. Minor modifications or amendments may
be made subject to written approval of the planning director and the date for completion
may be extended by the planning commiss ion upon recommendation of the planning
director.
2. Minor Modifications: During build out of the planned development, the planning director
may authorize minor modifications to the approved final development plan pursuant to the
provisions for modifications to an approved site plan as set forth in chaRter 21A.58 of this
part, when such modifications appear necessary in light of technical or engineering
cons iderations. Such minor modifications shall be limited to the following elements :
a. Adjusting th e distance as shown on th e approved final development plan between any
one structu re or group of structures, and any other structure or group of structures, or
any ve hicular ci rcu lation element or any boundary of the site;
b. Adju sting the location of any open space;
c. Adju sting any final grad e;
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d. Altering the types of landscaping elements and their arrangement within the required
landscaping buffer area; and
e. Signs .
Such minor modifications shall be consistent with the intent and purpose of this title and the
final development plan as approved pursuant to this section, and shall be the minimum
necessary to overcome the particular difficulty and shall not be approved if such
modifications would result in a violation of any standard or requirement of this title.
3. Major Modifications: Any modifications to the approved final development plan not
authorized by subsection S2 of this section shall be considered to be a major modification.
The planning commission shall give notice to all property owners whose properties are
located within one hundred feet (100') (exclusive of intervening streets and alleys) of the
planned development, requesting the major modification. The planning commission may
approve an application for a major modification to the final development plan, not requiring
a modification of written conditions of approval or recorded easements, upon finding that
any changes in the plan as approved will be in substantial conformity with the final
development plan. If the commission determines that a major modification is not in
substantial conformity with the final development plan as approved, then the commission
shall review the request in accordance with the procedures set forth in this subsection.
4. Fees: Fees for modifications to a final development plan shall be as set forth in the fee
schedule, chapJer 21A.64 of this title.
T. Disclosure Of Infrastructure Costs For Planned Developments: Planned developments,
approved under this title after January 1, 1997, shall include provisions for disclosure of
future private infrastructure maintenance and replacement costs to unit owners.
1. Infrastructure Maintenance Estimates: Using generally accepted accounting
principles, the developer of any planned development shall calculate an initial estimate of
the costs for maintenance and capital improvements of all infrastructure for the planned
development including roads, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, water and sewer pipes and related
facilities , drainage systems, landscaped or paved common areas and other similar facilities
("infrastructure"), for a period of sixty (60) years following the recording of the subdivision
plat for the estimated date of first unit occupancy of the planned development, whichever is
later.
2. Initial Estimate Disclosure: The following measures shall be incorporated in planned
developments to assure that owners and future owners have received adequate disclosure
of potential infrastructure maintenance and replacement costs:
a. The cost estimate shall be recorded with and referenced on the recorded plat for any
planned development. The initial disclosure estimate shall cover all private infrastructure
items an d shall be prepared for six (6) increments of ten (10) years each.
b. The recorded plat shall also contain a statement entitled "Notice To Purchasers"
disclosing that the infrastru cture is privately owned and that the maintenance, repair,
replacement and operation of the infrastructure is the responsibility of the property
owners and wi ll not be assumed by the city.
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c. The cost estimate shall be specifically and separately disclosed to the purchaser of
any property in the planned development, upon initial purchase and also upon all future
purchases for the duration of the sixty (60) year period.
3. Yearly Maintenance Statements: The entity responsible for the operation and
maintenance of the infrastructure shall, at least once each calendar year, notify all property
owners in the planned development of the estimated yearly expenditures for maintenance,
repair, operation or replacement of infrastructure, and at least once each calendar year
shall notify all property owners of the actual expenditures incurred, and shall specify the
reason(s) for any variance between the estimated expenditures and the actual
expenditures.
4. Maintenance Responsibilities: The property owners in a planned development shall be
collectively and individually responsible, on a pro rata basis, for operating, maintaining,
repairing and replacing infrastructure to the extent necessary to ensure that access to the
planned development is available to the city for emergency and other services and to
ensure that the cond ition of the private infrastructure allows for the city's continued and
uninterrupted operation of public facilities to which the private infrastructure may be
connected or to which it may be adjacent. (Ord. 76-05 §§ 4, 5 (Exh. A), 2005 : Ord. 12-05 §
1, 2005: Ord . 3-05 §§ 9 (Exh. A), 10,2005: Ord . 71-04 § 27 (Exh. G), 2004 : Ord. 13-04 §§
36,37 (Exh. K), 2004: Ord. 77-03 § 8, 2003: Ord. 73-02 § 19 (Exh. G), 2002: Ord. 70-02 §
4,2002: Ord. 14-00 § 15,2000: Ord . 35-99 §§ 96-99,1999: Ord. 17-99 § 1, 1999 : Ord . 5297 § 1, 1997: Ord. 88-95 § 1 (Exh. A), 1995: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-15),1995)
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21A.54.155 Administrative Consideration Of Conditional Uses:
The purpose of this section is to establish an administrative hearing process for certain
categories of low impact conditional uses as authorized by subsection 21A.54 .030C of this
chapter. Applications for administrative conditional use approval shall be reviewed as follows:
A. Preapplication And Application Requirements:
1. Preapplication Conference: The applicant shall first meet with a member of the Salt
Lake City planning division to discuss the application and alternatives.
2. Community Council Review: The applicant shall meet with the respective community
council(s) pursuant to subsection 21A.1 0.01 08 of this title.
3. Application: The applicant shall file an application and associated application fees with
the planning office on a form prescribed by the city and consistent with this chapter. After
considering information received, the planning director or designee may choose to
schedule an administrative hearing or to forward the application to the planning
commission .
B. Administrative Hearing:
1. Noticing And Posting Requirements: Notice of the proposed conditional use shall be
mailed to all applicable property owners and the property shall be posted pursuant to
subsection 21A.1 0.0208 of this title.
2. Administrative Hearing: After consideration of the information received from the
applicant and concerned residents, the planning director or designee may approve,
approve with conditions, or deny the conditional use request.
At the admin istrative hearing , the planning director or designee may decline to hea r or
decide the request and forward the application for planning commission consideration, if it
is determined that there is neighborhood opposition, if the applicant has failed to
adequately address the co nditional use standards, or for any other reason at the discretion
of th e planning director or designee.
The planning director may grant th e conditional use requ est on ly if the proposed
development is co nsistent with the standards for conditional uses listed in section
21A.54.080 of this chapter and any specific standards listed in this titl e that regu late the
particular use.
C. Appeals:
1. Objection To Administrative Consideration: Th e petitioner or any person who objects
to the planning director or designee administratively co nsidering the conditional use request
may req uest a hearing before the planning commission by filing a written notice at any time
prior to th e planning director's sched uled administrative hearing on the conditional use
req uest. If no such objections are received by the city prior to th e planning director's
administrative hearing , any objections to such administrative cons ideration wi ll be deemed
wa ive d. The notice shall specify all reasons fo r the objection to the administrative hearing .
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Upon receipt of such an objection, the matter will be forwarded to the Salt Lake City
planning commission for consideration and decision.
2. Appeal Of Administrative Consideration: Any person aggrieved by the decision made
by the planning director or designee at an administrative hearing may appeal that decision
to the Salt Lake City planning commission by filing notice of an appeal within fourteen (14)
days after the planning director's administrative hearing. The notice of appeal shall specify,
in detail, the reason(s) for the appeal. Reasons for the appeal shall be based upon
procedural error or compliance with the standards for conditional uses listed in section
21 A.54.080 of this chapter or any specific standards listed in this title that regulate the
particular use. (Ord. 69-06 § 7, 2006: Ord. 81-01 § 3, 2001)
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21A.54.160 Appeal Of Planning Commission Decision:
Any party aggrieved by a decision of the planning commission on an appl ication for a
co nditional use, including a planned development, may file an appeal to the land use appeals
board within thirty (30) days of the date of the decision . The filing of the appeal shall not stay
the decision of the planning commission pending the outcome of the appeal, unless the
planning commission takes specific action to stay a decision . (Ord. 77-03 § 9, 2003: Ord. 8396 § 6,1996: Ord. 26·95 § 2(27-16),1995)
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21A.S4.170 Appeal Of Land Use Appeals Board Decision:
Any party adversely affected by the decision of the land use appeals board on appeal from a
decision of the planning commission may appeal to the district court within thirty (30) days of
the date of th e land use appeals board decision. (Ord . 83-96 § 7.1996)
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21A.62.040 Definitions:
For the purposes of this title, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
"Abutting" means adjacent or contiguous including property separated by an alley, a private
right of way or a utility strip.
"Access taper" means the transitional portion of a drive access that connects a driveway to
a parking pad located with in a side yard.
"Accessory building or structure" means a subordinate building or structure, located on the
same lot with the main building, occupied by or devoted to an accessory use. When an
accessory building or structure is attached to the main building in a substantial manner, as
by a wall or roof, such accessory building shall be considered part of the main building.
"Accessory guest and servants' quarters" means accessory living quarters with or without
kitchen facilities located on the same lot as the principal use and meeting all yard and bulk
requirements of the applicab le district.
"Accessory lot" means a lot adjoining a principal lot under a sing le ownership.
Accessory Structure: See definition of Accessory Building Or Structure.
"Accessory use" means a use that:
A. Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to, and serves a principal use;
B. Is customari ly found as an incident to such principal use;
C. Contributes to the comfort, convenience or necessity of those occupying , working at or
being serviced by such principal use;
D. Is, except as otherwise expressly authorized by the provisions of this title, located on
the same zoning lot as such principal use; and
E. Is under the same ownership or control as the principal use.
"Administrative decision" means any order, requirement, decision, determination or
interpretation made by the zoning administrator in the administration or the enforcement of
this title .
"Agricultural use" means the use of a tract of land for growing crops in the open , dairying,
pasturage, horticulture, floriculture, general farming uses and necessary accessory uses ,
including the structures necessary for carrying out farming operations; provided, however,
such agricultural use shall not include the follow ing uses:
A. Commercial operations or accessory uses whi ch involve retail sales to the general
public unless the use is specifica ll y permitted by this title; and
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B. The feeding of garbage to animals, the raising of poultry or furbearing animals as a
principal use, or the operation or maintenance of commercial stockyards, or feed yards,
slaughterhouses or rendering facilities.
"Alley" means a public or private right of way that affords a service access to abutting
property.
"Alteration", as applied to a building or structure, means a change or rearrangement in the
structural parts or in the exit facilities, or an enlargement, whether by extending on a side,
by increasing in height, or the moving from one location or position to another.
"Alternative parking property" means the property for which an alternative parking
requirement pursuant to section 21A.44.030 of this title is proposed.
"Amusement park" means a commercial facility or operation that primarily offers
entertainment in the form of rides and games.
"Ancillary mechanical equipment" means supplemental equipment, attached or detached,
including, but not limited to, equipment for the provision of services for heat, ventilation, air
conditioning, electricity, plumbing, telephone and television.
"Animal pound" means a public or licensed private facility to temporarily detain and/or
dispose of stray dogs, cats and other animals.
"Antenna" means any system of wires, poles, rods, reflecting discs , or similar devices used
for the transmission or reception of electromagnetic waves external to or attached to the
exterior of any building.
Antenna, Low Power Radio Service: "Low power radio service antenna" means a
transmitting or receiving device used in telecommunications that radiates or captures radio
signals.
Antenna, Low Power Radio Service Monopole With Antennas And Antenna Support
Structures Greater Than Two Feet In Width: "Low power radio service antennamonopole
with antennas and antenna support structures greater than two feet in width" means a selfsupporting monopole tower on which antennas and antenna support structures exceeding
two feet (2') in width are placed. The antenna and antenna support structures may not
exceed thirteen feet (13') in width or eight feet (8') in height.
Antenna, Low Power Radio ServiceMonopole With Antennas And Antenna Support
Structures Less Than Two Feet In Width: "Low power radio service antennamonopole with
antennas and antenna support stru ctures less than two feet in width" means a monopole
with antennas and antenna support structures not exceeding two feet (2') in width.
Antenn as and antenna support structures may not exceed ten feet (10') in height.
Antenna , Roof Mounted : "Roof mounted antenna" means an antenna or series of individual
antennas mounted on a flat roof, mechanical room or penthouse of a building.
Antenna , Satellite Dish : "Satellite dish antenna" means a type of antenna capable of
receiving , among other si gnals , television tran smission sign als , and whi ch has a disk
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shaped receiving device, excluding wall mountable antennas with a surface size less than
four hundred (400) square inches, projecting no more than two feet (2').
Antenna, TV: "TV antenna" means a type of antenna used to receive television
transmission signals, but which is not a satellite dish antenna.
Antenna , Wall Mounted: "Wall mounted antenna" means an antenna or series of individual
antennas mounted against the vertical wall of a building.
Antenna, Whip: "Whip antenna" means an antenna that is cylindrical in shape. Whip
antennas can be directional or omnidirectional and vary in size depending upon the
frequency and gain for which they are designed.
Apartment: See definition of Dwelling , Multi-Family.
"Arcade" means range of arches supporting a roofed area along with a column structure,
plain or decorated over a walkway adjacent to or abutting a row of retail stores on one side
or both.
"Architecturally incompatible" means buildings or structures which are incongruous with
adjacent and nearby development due to dissimilarities in style, materials, proportions,
size, shape and/or other architectural or site design features .
"Art gallery" means an establishment engaged in the sale, loan or display of paintings,
sculpture or other works of art. The term "art gallery" does not include libraries or
museums.
"Art studio" means a building or portion of a building where an artist or photographer
creates works of art.
"Assisted living facility (large)" means a facility licensed by the state of Utah that provides a
combination of housing and personalized healthcare designed to respond to the individual
needs of more than six (6) individuals who require help with the activities of daily living,
such as meal preparation, personal grooming, housekeeping , medication , etc. Care is
provided in a professionally managed group living environment in a way th at promotes
maxi mum independence and dignity for each resident.
"Assisted living facility (small)" means a facility licensed by the state of Utah that provides a
combination of housing and personalized healthcare designed to respond to th e individual
needs of up to six (6) individuals who require help with the activities of daily living, such as
meal preparation, personal grooming, housekeeping, medication , etc. Care is provided in a
professionally managed group living environment in a way that promotes maximum
independ ence and dignity for each resident.
"Auditorium" means a mu ltipurpose assembly facility that is designed to accommodate
conventions, live performances, tra de shows, sports events and other such events .
"Automatic amusement device" means any machine, apparatus or device which, upon the
insertion of a coin, token or simi lar object, operates or may be operated as a game or
co ntest of skill or amusement and for the play of which a fee is charged, or a device simila r
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to any such machine, apparatus or device which has been manufactured , altered or
modified so that operation is controlled without the insertion of a coin, token or similar
object. Th e term does not include coin operated televisions, ride machines designed
primarily for the amusement of children, or vending machines not incorporating features of
gambling or skill.
"Automobile" means any veh icle propelled by its own motor and operating on ordinary
roads. As used herein, the term includes passenger ca rs, light tru cks (1 ton or less),
motorcycles, recreation ve hicles and the like.
Automobile Repair, Major: "Major automobile repair" means any use principally engaged in
repairing of automobiles, including any activities excluded in the definition of Automobile
Repair, Minor.
Automobile Repair, Minor: "Minor automobile repair" means a use engaged in the repair of
automobiles involving the use of three (3) or fewer mechanics' service bays, where all
repairs are performed within an enclosed building, and where not more than ten (10)
automobiles, plus one automobile per employee, are parked on site at anyone time
including, but not limited to, those permitted as gas stations. Auto body repairs and drive
train repair are excluded from this definition.
"Automobile salvage and recycling" means the dismantling of automobiles, including the
collection and storage of parts for resale, and/or the storage of inoperative automobiles for
future salvage or sale. Such activities may be conducted outdoors or within fully enclosed
buildings.
Bakery, Commercial: "Commercial bakery" means a use involvi ng the baking of food
products for sale principally to the wholesale trade, not directly to the consumer.
"Base zoning district" means a zoning district that reflects the four (4) basic geographically
based land use categori es in the cityresidential areas, commercial areas, manufacturing
areas and th e downtownwith appropriate regulations and development standards to govern
the uses in these districts.
"Basement" means a story wherein each exterior wall is fifty percent (50%) or more below
grade. For purposes of establishing building height, a basement shall not count toward the
maxi mum number of stories allowed. The exposed portion of the basem ent wa ll shall not
exceed five feet (5').
"Bed and breakfast" means a building co nstructed originally as a single-family dwelling that
is occupied by th e property owner who offers lodging in up to seven (7) rooms on a nightly
or weekly basis to paying guests . A bed and breakfast may provide breakfast to overnight
guests onl y and shall not provide other meals.
"Bed and breakfast inn" mea ns a building that is designed to accommodate up to eighteen
(18) rooms fo r lodging on a nightly or weekly basis to paying guests. A bed and breakfast
inn may provide breakfast from intern al kitchen facilities to overnight guests and their
guests only oth er than meals th at are occasionally catered from off site establishments .
Th e owner of the bed and breakfast inn may prepare meals on site or receive cate red
meals for private use.
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"Bed and breakfast manor" means a building designed to accommodate up to thirty (30)
rooms for lodging on a nightly or weekly basis to paying guests. A bed and breakfast manor
may provide breakfast from internal kitchen facilities to overnight guests and their guests
only other than meals that are occasionally catered from off site establishments. The owner
of the bed and breakfast manor may prepare meals on site or receive catered meals for
private use. Restaurants operating in conjunction with a bed and breakfast manor must be
approved under a separate restaurant license.
"Block corner" means the ninety degree (90°) intersection of private property adjacent to
the intersection of two (2) public street rights of way both of which are at least one hundred
thirty two feet (132') wide. When applied to corner buildings, the provisions of this definition
shall extend to one hundred sixty five feet (165') from the block corner on the street face
and one hundred sixty five feet (165') in depth.
"Block face" means all of the lots facing one side of a street between two (2) intersecting
streets. Corner properties shall be considered part of two (2) block faces, one for each of
the two (2) intersecting streets. In no case shall a block face exceed one thousand feet
(1,000').
"Board of adjustment" means the board of adjustment of Salt Lake City, Utah.
"Boarding house" means a building other than a hotel or motel, with three (3) or more
bedrooms where direct or indirect compensation for lodging and/or kitchen facilities, not
occupied in guest-rooms, or meals are provided for boarders and/or roomers not related to
the head of the household by marriage, adoption, or blood. Rentals must be on at least a
monthly basis.
"Brewpub" means a restaurant type establishment that also has a beer brewery, producing
beer in batch sizes not less than seven (7) U.S. barrels (31 gallons), on the same property
which produces, except as provided in subsection 6.08.081 B2 of this code, only enough
beer for sale and consumption on site or for retail carryout sale in containers holding less
than two liters (2 I) or for wholesale as outlined in subsections 0 and E of this definition .
Automated bottle or canning production is prohibited. At least fifty percent (50%) of the beer
sold shall be brewed on the premises. Revenue from food sales shall constitute at least fifty
percent (50%) of the total business revenues, excluding retail carryout sales of beer and
the sales allowed pursuant to subsection 6.08.081 B2 of this code. Brewpubs are limited to
a total brewing capacity of two thousand five hundred (2,500) barrels per year or one
hundred twenty (120) barrels of fermentation at anyone time, whichever is less. Brewpubs
may sell beer in keg (larger than 2 liters) containers for the following purposes and in the
following amounts:
A. An unlimited number of kegs (not to exceed 2,500 barrel capacity) for "brew fests"
which, for the purpose of this definition, means events, the primary purpose of which is
the exposition of beers brewed by brewpubs and micro breweries, which include the
participation of at least three (3) such brewers;
B. No more than one hundred (100) kegs per year (not to exceed 2,500 barrel capacity)
to events sponsored by charitable organizations exempt from federal inco me tax
pursuant to 26 USC, section 501 (c)(3) or its successor; and
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C. No more than one hundred (100) kegs per year (not to exceed 2,500 barrel capacity)
to events operating under a single event license from the state and the city where the
purpose of the event is not for commercial profit and where the beer is not wholesaled to
the event sponsor but is, instead, dispensed by employees of the brewpub;
D. Unlimited distribution to other restaurants of same ownership or control (not to exceed
2,500 barrel capacity). "Ownership or control" means more than fifty percent (50%)
ownership in the actual business or controlling interest in any management partnership;
and
E. No more than five hundred (500) barrels for wholesale distribution (not to exceed
2,500 barrel capacity).
Buffer Yard: See definition of Landscape buffer.
"Buildable area" means the portion of the lot remaining after required yards have been
provided and after the limitations of any pertinent environmental regulations have been
applied. Buildings may be placed in any part of the buildable area, but ifthere are
limitations on percent of the lot which may be covered by buildings, some open space may
be required within the buildable area.
"Building" means a structure with a roof, intended for shelter or enclosure.
Building, Accessory: See definition of Accessory Building Or Structure.
"Building connection" means two (2) or more buildings which are connected in a substantial
manner or by common interior space including internal pedestrian circulation. Where two
(2) buildings are attached in this manner, they shall be considered a single building and
shall be subject to all yard requirements of a single building. Determination of building
connection shall be through the site plan review process.
"Building coverage" means that percentage of the lot covered by principal or accessory
buildings.
Building, Front Line Of: "Front line of building" means the line of that face of the building
nearest the front or corner side lot line of the lot. This face includes sun parlors, bay
windows, and covered and/or uncovered porches, whether enclosed or unenclosed, but
does not include uncovered steps less than four feet (4') above grade.
"Building heightin the FR-1, FR-2, FR-3, FP, R-1 /5,OOO, R-1 /7,OOO, R-1 /12,OOO, R-2, SR-1
and SR-3 districts" shall be th e vertical distance between the top of the roof and the grade
of the site, as describ ed in subsection 21A.24.01001a of this title, measured at any give n
point of building coverage . (See illustration in section 21A.62 .050 of this chapter.)
"Building heightoutside FR, FP , R-1, R-2 and SR districts" means the vertical distance,
measured from th e average el evation of the finished lot grade at each face of the building ,
to the highest point of the cop ing of a flat roof or to the deck line of a mansard roof or to the
average height of the highest gable of a pitch or hip roof. (See illustration in section
21A.62.050 of th is chapter.)
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"Building line" means a line dividing a required yard from other portions of a lot.
"Building material distributor" means a type of wholesale distributor supplying the building
materials industry, but excluding retail outlets conducted in a warehouse format.
"Building official" means the building official of the department of community development.
Building, Principal: "Principal building" means a building that is used primarily for the
conduct of the principal use.
Building, Public: "Public building" means a building owned and operated, or owned and
intended to be operated by a public agency of the United States of America or the state of
Utah, or any of its subdivisions.
"Bulk" means the size and setbacks of the buildings or structures and the location of same
with respect to one another, and including: a) height and area of buildings; b) location of
exterior walls in relation to lot lines, streets or other buildings; c) gross floor area of
buildings in relation to lot areas (floor area ratio); d) all open spaces allocated to buildings ;
e) amount of lot area required for each dwelling unit; and f) lot coverage.
"Business" means any occupation, employment or enterprise which occupies time,
attention, labor and/or materials for compensation whether or not merchandise is exhibited
or sold, or services are offered.
Business, Mobile: "Mobile business" means a business that conducts all or part of its
operations on premises other than its own. The term "mobile business" shall not include
any business involved in construction, home or building improvement, landscape
construction, surveying or medical related activities, including veterinary services. The
simple delivery of goods shall not constitute a mobile business.
"Business park" means a business district planned and developed as an optimal
environment for business occupants while maintaining compatibility with the surrounding
community.
"Carpool" means a mode of transportation where two (2) or more persons share a car ride
to or from work.
"Carport" means a garage not completely enclosed by walls or doors. For the purpose of
this title, a carport shall be subject to all of the regulations prescribed for a garage.
"Cemetery" means land used or intended to be used for the burial of the dead and
dedicated for cemetery purposes, including columbariums, crematories, mausoleums, and
mortuaries when operated in conjunction with and within the boundaries of such cemetery.
"Certificate of appropriateness" means a certification by the historic landmark commission
stating that proposed work on historic property is compatible with the historic character of
the property and of the historic preservation overlay district in which it is located.
"Certificate of occupancy" means an official authorization to occupy a structure as issued
by the building official.
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Certificate, Zoning: "Zoning certificate" means a written certification that a structure, use or
parcel of land is, or will be , in compliance with the requirements of this title.
"Change of use" means the replacement of an existing use by a new use, or a change in
the nature of an existing use which does not increase the size, occupancy, or site
requirements. A change of ownership, tenancy, name or management, or a change in
product or service within the same use classification where the previous nature of the use,
line of business, or other function is substantially unchanged is not a change of use. (See
also definition of Land Use Type (Similar Land Use Type).)
"Charity dining hall" means a sit down dining facility operated by a nonprofit organization to
feed, without charge, the needy and the homeless.
"Chemical manufacturing" means a use engaged in making chemical products from raw or
partially finished materials, but excluding chemical wholesale distributors.
"City council" means the city council of Salt Lake City, Utah.
"College or university" means an institution accredited by the state providing full time or
part time education beyond the high school level for aBA, BS or associate degree,
including any lodging rooms or housing for students or faculty. (See also definition of
Schools.)
"Commercial districts" means those districts listed in subsection 21A.22.01 OB of this title.
"Commercial indoor recreation" means public or private recreation facilities, tennis or other
racquet courts, swimming pools, bowling alleys, skating rinks, or similar uses which are
enclosed in buildings and are operated on a commercial or membership basis primarily for
the use of persons who do not reside on the same lot as that on which the recreational use
is located. The term "commercial indoor recreation" shall include any accessory uses, such
as snack bars, pro shops, and locker rooms , which are designed and intended primarily for
the use of patrons of the principal recreational use. The term "commercial indoor
recreation" shall not include theaters, cultural facilities, commercial recreation centers,
massage parlors, or any use which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of permitted
and conditional uses found at the end of each chapter in part III of this title for each
category of zoning district or districts.
"Commercial laundry" means an establishment primarily engaged in the provision of
laundering, dry cleaning, or dyeing services other than retail services establishments.
Typical uses include bulk laundry and cleaning plants, diaper services, and linen supply
services .
"Commercial outdoor recreation" mea ns public or private golf courses, golf driving ranges,
swimming pools, tennis co urts, ball fields , ball courts, fishing piers, skateboarding courses,
water slides, mechanical rides, go-cart or motorcycle courses, raceways, drag strips,
stad iums, marinas , overnight camp ing , or gun firing ranges, which are not enclosed in
buildings and are operated on a com mercial or membership basis primarily for the use of
persons who do not reside on th e same lot as th at on which the recreational use is located.
The term "commercia l outdoor recreation" shall include any accessory uses, such as sna ck
ba rs, pro shops, and clubh ouses which are desig ned and intended primaril y for the use of
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patrons of th e principal recreational use.
"Commercial service establish ment" means a building, property, or activity, of which th e
prin cipa l use or purpose is the provis ion of services for the installation and repair, on or off
site, of eq uipment and facilities that support principal and accessory uses to co mmercia l
and consumer users. Commercial services establishment shall not include any use or other
type of establi shment which is otherwise listed specificall y in the tabl e of permitted and
conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of
zoning district or districts.
"Commercial vehicle" means a vehicle which exceeds one ton capacity and taxis . This shall
include, but not be limited to, th e following : buses, dump trucks , limousines, roll back tow
tru cks, stake body trucks, step vans, taxis, tow trucks and tractor trai lers.
"Commercial video arcade" means a principal use that contains ten (10) or more automatic
amusement devices.
"Common areas, space and facilities" means the property and improvements of th e
condominium project, or portions thereof, conforming to the definition set forth in section
57-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or its successor. (See part V, chapter
21 A.56 of this title .)
"Communication tower" means a tower structure used for transmitting a broadcast signal or
for receivi ng a broadcast signal (or other signal) for retransmission . A communication tower
does not includ e "ham" radio transmission antenna.
"Community garden" means the exclusive use of a vaca nt lot for the growing of ga rd en
produce by a nonprofit organization in wh ich food produced is co nsumed by local needy
individuals and families .
"Community recreation cente r" means a pl ace , structure , area, or oth er facility used for and
providing social or recreational programs generally open to the public and designed to
accommodate and serve seg ments of th e co mmunity.
"Composting" means a method of solid waste management whereby the organic
component of the waste stream is biologically decomposed under controlled co nditions to a
state in which th e end product or compost ca n be safely handled, stored or applied to th e
land without adversely affecting human health or th e environment.
"Concept development pl an" mea ns a conceptual plan submitted for review and com ment
in order to obtain guidance from th e city regarding how city requirements would apply to a
proposed planned development.
"Concrete manufacturing" means a use engaged in making and delivering "rea dy mix" type
concrete from batch plant operations. Thi s use excludes cement manufacturing , such as
Portland ce ment, wh ich is an ingredient in concrete manufactu ring.
"Condominiumcondominium project and co ndominium un it" means property or portions
th ereof confo rmin g to the definitions set forth in section 57-8-3, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended , or its successo r. (See part V, chapter 21A.56 of this titl e.)
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"Condominium ownership act of 1975 or act" means the provisions of chapter 8 of title 57 of
Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1975. (See part V, chapter 21A.56 of this title.)
Condominium Unit: See definition of CondominiumCondominium Project And Condominium
Unit.
"Construction period" means the time period between when the building permit is obtained
and the certificate of occupancy is issued.
"Contractor's yard/office" means a use that provides construction businesses with a base of
operations that can include office space and indoor/ outdoor storage of construction
equipment or materials used by the construction business . This use excludes salvage or
recycling operations.
"Conversion" means a proposed change in the type of ownership of a parcel or parcels of
land, together with the existing attached structures, from single ownership of said parcel,
such as an apartment house or multi-family dwelling, into that defined as a condominium
project or other ownership arrangement involving separate ownersh ip of individual units
combined with joint collective ownership of common areas, facilities or elements. (See part
V, chapter 21A.56 of this title.)
"Corner building" means a building, the structure of which rises above the ground within
one hundred feet (100') of a block comer on the street face and one hundred feet (100') in
depth.
Corner Lot: See definition of Lot, Corner.
Corner Side Yard: See definition of Yard, Corner Side.
"Dance studio" means a use engaged in the instruction of dance.
Daycare: Persons , associations, corporations, institutions or agencies providing on a
regular basis care and supervision (regardless of educational emphasis) to children under
fourteen (14) years of age, in lieu of care and supervision ordinarily provided by parents in
their own homes, with or without charge, are engaged in providing chi ld "daycare" for
purposes of this title. Such providers and their facilities shall be classified as defined herein
and shall be subject to the applicable provisions of title 5, chapters 9.08 through 9.20, 9.28
through 9.40, and 14.36 of this code, this title, and applicable state law.
Dayca re Center, Adu lt: "Adult daycare center" means a nonmedical facility for the daytime
care of adults who, due to advanced age, handicap or impairment, require assistance
and/or supervision during the day by staff.
Daycare Center, Child : "Child daycare center" means an establishment providing care and
maintenance to seven (7) or more chi ld ren at anyone time of any age separated from th eir
parents or guardians.
Daycare, Nonregistered Home: "Nonregistered home daycare" means a person who uses
his/her principal place of residence to provide daycare for no more than two (2) children.
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Daycare, Registered Home Daycare Or Preschool: "Registered home daycare or presch ool
daycare" means the use of a principal place of residence to provide educational or daycare
opportunities for children under age seven (7) in small groups. The group size at any given
time shall not exceed eight (8), including the provider's own children under age seven (7).
"Decibel" means a logarithmic and dimensionless unit of measure of ten (10) used to
describe the amplitude of sound. Decibel is denoted as "dB".
"Development" means the carrying out of any building activity, the making of any material
change in the use or appearance of any structure or land, or the dividing of land into
parcels by any person. The following activities or uses shall be taken for the purposes of
these regulations to invol ve "deve lopment":
A. The construction of any principal building or structure;
B. Increase in the intensity of use of land, such as an increase in the number of dwelling
units or an increase in nonresidential use intensity that requires additional parking;
C. Alteration of a shore or bank of a pond, river, stream, lake or other waterway;
D. Commencement of drilling (except to obtain soil samples), the driving of piles, or
excavation on a parcel of land ;
E. Demolition of a structure;
F. Clearing of land as an adjunct of construction, including clearing or removal of
vegetation and including any significant disturbance of vegetation or soil manipulation;
and
G. Deposit of refuse, solid or liquid waste, or fill on a parcel of land.
Th e following operations or uses shall not be taken for the purpose of these regulations
to involve "development":
A. Work by a highway or road agency or railroad company for the maintenance of a road
or railroad track, if the wo rk is carried out on land within the boundaries of the right of
way;
B. Utility installations as stated in SUbsection 21A.02.050B of this title;
C. Landscaping for residential uses; and
D. Work invo lving the maintenance of existing landscaped areas and existing rights of
way such as setbacks and other planting areas.
"Development pattern" : Th e development pattern standard applies to principal building
height and wall height, attached garage placement and width, detached garage placement,
height, wa ll height, and footprint size, A development pattern shall be established when
three (3) or more existing structures are identified to establish th e pattern, or in th e case
that three (3) structures constitutes more than fifty percent (50%) of the stru ctures on the
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block face fifty percent (50%) of the structures shall establish a pattern.
Disabled: See definition of Persons with disabilities.
"Drive-through window" means a facility which accommodates patrons' automobiles and
from which the occupants of the automobiles may make purchases or transact business.
"Dwelling" means a building or portion thereof, which is designated for residential purposes
of a family for occupancy on a monthly basis and which is a self-contained unit with kitchen
and bathroom facilities. The term "dwelling" excludes living space within hotels, bed and
breakfast establishments, apartment hotels, boarding houses and lodging houses.
Dwelling, Manufactured Home: "Manufactured home dwelling" means a dwelling
transportable in one or more sections, which is built on a permanent chassis and is
designed for use with or without a permanent foundation. A manufactured home dwelling
shall be connected to all utilities required for permanent dwellings and shall be certified
under the national manufactured housing construction and safety standards act of 1974. A
manufactured home dwelling is a type of manufactured home that is considered a singlefamily dwelling for the purposes of this title. (See definition of Mobile Home.) A modular
home is a type of manufactured home that is a dwelling transported in one or more sections
that is fixed to a permanent site built foundation and connected to all utilities required for a
permanent dwelling. The dwelling shall have a minimum roof pitch of three to twelve (3: 12)
and the nongable roof ends shall have a minimum overhang of twelve inches (12"). The
dwelling shall also meet all uniform building code regulations and have a minimum width of
twenty feet (20'). A "modular home dwelling" is a type of manufactured home that is
considered a single-family dwelling for the purposes of this title.
Dwelling, Modular Home: See definition of Dwelling, Manufactured Home.
Dwelling, Multi-Family: "Multi-family dwelling" means a building containing three (3) or more
dwellings on a single lot. For purposes of determining whether a lot is in multiple-family
dwelling use, the following considerations shall apply:
A. Multiple-family dwelling uses may involve dwelling units intended to be rented and
maintained under central ownership or management, or cooperative apartments,
condominiums and the like.
B. Any multiple-family dwelling in which dwelling units are available for rental or lease for
periods of less than on e month shall be considered a hotel! motel.
Dwelling, Single-Family: "Single-family dwelling" means a detached building containing only .
one dwelling unit surrounded by yards that is built on site or is a modular home dwelling
that resembles site built dwellings. Mobile homes, travel trailers, housing mounted on selfpropelled or drawn vehicles, tents, or other forms of temporary housing or portable housing
are not included in this definition. All living areas of a single-family dwelling shall be
accessible and occupi ed by the entire family.
Dwelling, Single-Family Attached: "Single-family attached dwelling" means a dwelling unit
that is attached via a common party side wall to at least one other su ch dwelling and where
at least three (3) such dwellings are connected together.
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Dwelling, Single-Room Occupancy: "Single-room occupancy dwelling" means a residential
dwelling facility containing individual , self-contained, dwelling units none of which may
exceed five hundred (500) square feet in size.
Dwelling , Twin Home: "Twin home dwelling" means a building containing one dwelling
separated from one other dwelling by a vertical party wall. Such a dwelling shall be located
on its own individual lot.
Dwelling , Two-Family. "Two-family dwelling" means a detached building containing two (2)
dwelling units on a single lot.
Dwelling Unit: See definition of Dwelling.
Electric Generation Facility, Public/Private: "Public/private electric generation facility"
means an electric generating facility that uses natural gas, coal, solar energy, steam , wind
or other means to produce electricity for exclusive delivery to the local or regional high
voltage electric transmi ssion grid.
"Electronic repair shop" means a use engaged in the consumer repair services of
household electronic items and appliances.
"Elevation area" means the area or portion thereof (in square feet) of an architectural
elevation of one side of a building.
Elevation Area, First Floor: "First floor elevation area" means the elevation area or portion
thereof (in square feet) of th e first or ground floor (story) of one side of a building.
"Emergency medical service facility" means a facility or licensed healthca re provider
providing emerg ency medical or dental or similar examination , diagnosis, treatment and
care on an outpatient basis only. An emergency medical service facility shall not provide
twenty four (24) hour service unless it meets all zoning requirements applicable to
hospitals.
"Equipment rental" means a type of use involv ing the rental of equipment, excluding heavy
construction vehicles and equipment, in which all operations are co ntained within fully
enclosed buildings.
Equipment Rental, Heavy: "Heavy equ ipment rental" means a type of use invo lving th e
rental of equipment, including heavy construction ve hicl es and equipment, in which all
operations are not co ntained within fully enclosed buildings.
"Evergree n" means a plant having foliage that remains on the plant through out the year.
"Excess dwelling units" means a number of residential dwelling units in a structure in
excess of th e number of dwelling units that have been approved either under applicable
zoning codes or issued bu ilding permits.
"Existing/established subdivision" means any subdivision for which a plat has been
approved by th e city and recorded prior to the effective date hereof.
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"Explosive manufacturing" means a use engaged in making explosive devices , but
excluding explosive material s wholesale distributors.
"Extractive industry" means an establishment engaged in the on site extraction of surface
or sub-surface mineral products or natural resources. Typical extractive industries are
quarries, barrow pits, sand and gravel operations, oil and gas extraction , and mining
operations.
"Family" means:

A. One or more persons related by blood, marriag e, adoption , or legal guardianship,
including foster ch ildren, living together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit;
or
B. A group of not more than three (3) persons not related by blood, marriage, adoption ,
or legal guardianship li vi ng together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit; or
C. Two (2) unrelated persons and their children living together as a single housekeeping
unit in a dwelling unit.
The term "family" shall not be construed to mean a club, group home, transitional victim
home , substance abuse home, transitional home, a lodge or a fraternity/sorority house.
"Farmers' market" means an establishment for the sale of fresh produce and related food
items , which may have outdoor storage and sales . A farmers' market may provide space for
one or more ve ndors.
"Fee schedule" means a schedule of fees in connection with applications for a zoning
amendment, a special exception, a conditional use, a zoning certificate, a certificate of
occupancy, sign certificate , or any other type of approval required by the provisions of this
title which is established by the city council and revised from time to time upon
recommendation by th e zoning administrator. The fee schedule is available from the zoning
ad ministrator.
"Fence" means a stru cture erected to provide privacy or security which defines a private
space and may enhance the design of individual sites . A wall or similar barrier shall be
deemed a fence.
"Fence , opaque or solid" means an artificially constru cted solid or opaque barrier th at
blocks th e transmission of at least ninety five percent (95%) of light and vis ibility through
th e fence, and is erected to screen areas from public streets and abutting properties .
"Fence, open" means an artifici ally constru cted barri er th at blocks the transmission of a
maximum of fifty percent (50%) of light and visibility through the fence , and is erected to
sepa rate private property from public rights of way and abutting properties .
"Financial institution " means a building, property or activity, the principal use or purpose of
wh ich is the provision of financial servi ce s, including , but not limited to, banks, facilities fo r
automated teller machi nes (ATM s), cred it unions, savings and loan institutions, stock
brokerages and mortgage companies. "Financial institution" shall not include any use or
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other type of institution wh ich is otherwise listed in the table of permitted and con ditional
uses for each catego ry of zoning district or districts under thi s title.
"Fixed dimensional standards" means numerical maximum or minimum co nditions w hich
govern the deve lopment on a site.
"Flag lot" means a lot of irregular co nfiguration in wh ich an access strip (a strip of land of a
width less than the required lot w idth) connects the main body of the lot to the street
frontage. (See illu stration in section 21A.62.050 of this chapter.)
"Flammable liquid s or gases, heating fuel distribution" means a type of wholesale
distributor engaged in supplying fl ammable liquids, gases and/or heating fu el. This use
does not include the accessory storage of such substances on site.
Fl ea Market (Indoor): "Indoor flea market" means a building devoted to the indoor sales of
new and used merchandise by independent vendors with individual stalls, tabl es, or oth er
spaces.
Flea Market (Outdoor): "Outdoor flea market" means an outdoor area devoted to the
periodic outdoor sales of new and used merchandise by independent vendors with
individual stalls, tables, or other spaces.
Floor: See definition of Story (floor).
Floor Area, Gross: "Gross floor area" (for determining floor area ratio and size of
establishment) means the sum of the gross horizontal area of all floors of the building
measured from th e exterior face of the exterior walls or from the centerline of walls
separating two (2) buildings. The floor area of a building shall include basem ent floor area,
penthouses, attic spa ce having headroom of seven feet (7') or more, interior balconies and
mezzanines , enclosed porches, and floor area devoted to accessory uses. Th e floor area of
cove red accessory buildings, including parking structures, shall be included in the
calculation of floor area ratio . Space devoted to open air off street parking or load ing shall
not be includ ed in fl oor area.
The fl oor area of stru ctures devoted to bulk storage of materials including , but not limited
to, grain elevators and petroleu m storag e tanks, shall be determin ed on th e basis of height
in fe et (i.e., 10 feet in height shall equal one fl oor) .
"Floor area ratio" means the number obtained by dividing the gross floor area of a building
or other structure by the area of the lot on which th e building or structure is located. When
more th an one building or structure is located on a lot, the floor area ratio is determin ed by
dividing the total floor area of all th e buildings or stru ctu res by th e area of the site.
Floor Area, Usable: "U sable floo r area" (for determining off street parking and load ing
requirements) means the sum of the gross horizontal areas of all floors of the building, as
measured from the outside of the exterior walls, devoted to the principal use, including
accessory storage areas located withi n selling or workin g space such as counters, racks, or
closets, and any floor area devoted to reta iling activities, to the production or processing of
goods or to business or professional offices.
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Floor area for the purposes of measurement for off street parking spaces shall not include:
A. Floor area devoted primarily to mechanical equipment or unfinished storage areas;

B. Floor area devoted to off street parking or loading facilities, including aisles, ramps ,
and maneuve ring space.
"Fraternity/sorority house" means a building which is occupied only by a group of university
or college students who are associated together in a fraternity/sorority that is officia ll y
recognized by the university or college and who receive from the fraternity/sorority lodging
and/or meals on th e premises for compensation.
Front Yard : See definition of Yard, Front.
"Funeral home" means an establishment where the dead are prepared for burial or
cremation and where wakes and funerals may be held.
"Garage" means a building, or portion thereof, used to store or keep a motor vehicle.
Garage, Attached: "Attached garage" means an accessory building which has a roof or wall
of wh ich fifty percent (50%) or more is attached and in common with a dwelling. Where the
accessory building is attached to a dwelling in this manner, it shall be considered part of the
dwelling and shall be subject to all yard requirements of the main build ing .
"Gas station" means a building and premises where gasoline must be sold, and where oil,
grease, batteries, tires and automobile accessories may be suppl ied and dispensed at
retail, and where , in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales made:
A. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributors and distributor parts;

B. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;

c. Replacement or adjustment of mufflers and tailpipes , water hose, fan belts, brake
fluid, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades,
grease retainers, wheel bearings, mirrors, and the like;
D. Rad iator cleaning and flu shing; provision of water, antifreeze and the like;
E. Greasing and lubrication;
F. Providing and repairing fuel pumps, oil pumps and lines;
G. Servicing and repair of ca rburetors;
H. Electrical repa irs;
I. Adjusting and repairing brakes;
J. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or cra nkcase; and
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K. Sale of beverages, packaged foods, tobacco, and similar convenience goods.
Uses permissible at a gas station do not include major mechanical and body work,
straightening of frames or body parts, steam cleaning, painting, welding, storage of
automobiles not in operating condition, or any activity involving noise, glare, fumes,
smoke or other characteristics to an extent greater than normally found in gas stations.
"General plan" means the comprehensive plan for Salt Lake City adopted by the city
council.
"Government uses" means state or federal government operations providing services from
specialized facilities, such as the highway department maintenance/construction, state
police and federal bureau of investigation, etc. State or federal operations providing
services from nonspecialized facilities shall be considered office uses.
Grade, Established: "Established grade" means the natural topographic grade of
undisturbed areas on a site or the grade that exists after approved subdivision site
development activity has been completed prior to approval for building permit construction
activity.
Grade, Finished: "Finished grade" means the finished grade of a site after reconfiguring
grades according to an approved regrading plan related to the initial building permit activity
on a site.
Gross Floor Area: See definition of Floor Area, Gross.
"Groundcover" means any perennial evergreen plant material species that generally does
not exceed twelve inches (12") in height and covers one hundred percent (100%) of the
ground all year.
Group Home, Large: "Large group home" means a residential facility set up as a single
housekeeping unit and shared by seven (7) or more unrelated persons, exclusive of staff,
who require assistance and supervision. A large group home is licensed by the state of
Utah and provides counseling, therapy and specialized treatment, along with habilitation or
rehabilitation services for physically or mentally disabled persons. A large group home shall
not include persons who are diagnosed with a substance abuse problem or who are staying
in the home as a result of criminal offenses.
Group Home, Small: "Small group home" means a residential facility set up as a single
housekeeping unit and shared by up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, who
require assistance and supervision . A small group home is licensed by the state of Utah
and provides counseli ng , therapy and specialized treatment, along with habilitation or
rehabilitation services for physically or mentally disabled persons. A small group home shall
not include persons who are diagnosed with a substance abuse problem or who are staying
in the home as a result of crim inal offenses.
"Guest" means any person hiring or occupying a room for living or sleeping purposes.
"Halfway home" means a fa cility, lice nsed or contra cted by the state of Utah to provide for
the supervision, counseling, training or treatment of residents to facilitate their transition
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from a correctional institutional environment to independent living.
"Hard surfaced" means a concrete, asphalt surface, brick, stone or turf block.
"Health and fitness facility" means a business or membership organization providing
exercise facilities and/or nonmedical personal services to patrons, including , but not limited
to, gymnasiums (except facil ities owned by a governmental entity), private clubs (athletic,
health, or recreational) , reducing salons, tanning salons, and weight control establishments.
"Health hazard" means a classification of a chemical for which there is statistically
significant evidence based on a generally accepted study conducted in accordance with
established scientific principles that acute or chronic health effects may occur in exposed
persons. The term "health hazard" includes chemicals which are carcinogens, toxic or
highly toxic agents, reproductive toxins, irritants, corrosives, sensitizers, hepatotoxi ns,
nephrotoxins, neurotoxi ns, agents which act on the hematopoietic system, and agents
which damage the lungs, skin, eyes or mucous membranes.
"Heliport" means a facility or structure that is intended or used for the landing and takeoff of
rotary-wing aircraft, but not including the regular repair or maintenance of such aircraft or
the sale of goods or materials to users of such aircraft.
"Historic buildings or sites" means those buildings or sites listed on the national register of
historic places.
"Historic Landmark Commission" means the historic landmark commission of Salt Lake
City, Utah. (See section 21A.06.050 of this title.)
Historic Site: See definition of Landmark site.
"Home occupation" means a business, profession, occupation, or trade conducted for gain
or support and located and conducted within a dwelling unit, which use is accessory,
incidental and secondary to the use of the building for dwelling purposes and does not
change the essential resid en tial character of appearance of such building and subject to
the regulations set forth in section 21A.36.030 of this title.
"Homeless shelter" means a building or portion thereof in which sleeping accommodations
are provided on an emergency basis for the temporarily homeless.
"Hospital" means an institution licensed by the state of Utah specializing in giving clinical,
temporary, or emergency services of a medical or surgical nature to human patients.
"Hotel/motel room" means a room or combination of rooms (suite) offered as a single unit
for lodging on a daily or weekly basis.
"House museum" means a dwelling unit which is converted from its original principal use as
a dwelling unit to a staffed institution dedicated to educational, aesthetic or historic
purposes . Such museum shou ld include a staff who commands an appropriate body of
special knowledge necessary to convey the historical , aesthetic or architectural attributes of
the building and its collections to the general public. Such staff should also have the ability
to reach museological decisions consona nt with the experience of his or her peers and
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have access to and acquaintance with the literature of the field. Such museum should
maintain either regular hours or be available for appointed visits such that access is
reasonably convenient to the public.
"Impact statement" means a statement containing an analysis of a project's potential impact
on the environment, traffic, aesth etics, schools, and/or municipal costs and revenues, as
well as comments on how the development fits into the general plan of Salt Lake City.
Incinerator, Medical Waste/Hazardous Waste: "Med ical waste/hazardous waste incinerator"
means a device using heat, for th e reduction of medical/ hazardous waste materials, as
defined by the state of Utah division of solid and hazardous waste .
"Industrial assembly use" mea ns an industrial use engaged in the fabrication of finished or
partially fin ished products from component parts prod uced off-site. Assembly use shall not
entail metal stamping, food processing, chemical processing or painting other than painting
that is accessory to the assembly use.
"Infill" means new development that occurs with in an already developed area where
building patterns and lot platting are already established .
"Institution" means an organization or establishment providing religious, educational,
charitable, medical, cu ltural or governmental services.
Interior Side Yard: See definition of Yard, Interior Side.
"Intermodal transit passenger hub" means a publicly owned and operated central transit
passenger transfer facility servicing rail, bus, shuttle, limousine, taxis, bicyclists and
pedestrians and may include, but is not limited to, the following complementary land uses
such as offices, restaurants, reta il sales and services, bus line terminals, bus line yards and
repair faci lities, limousine service and taxicab facilities .
"Interpretation" means an administrative decision regard ing the general provisions of this
title to specific cases. Interpretations shall not include administrative decisions that will
effect a permitted use, conditional use or nonconforming use.
Interpretation, Use: "Use interpretation" mea ns an administrative decision of thi s title
related to specific cases which affect permitted use or conditional use provisions within a
specific district and affect nonconforming uses.
"Jail" means a place for lawful confinement of persons. For the purpose of this title, a jail
shall not include halfway homes and mental hospitals.
"Jewelry fabrication" means the production of jewelry from component materials, diamond
cutting and related activities.
"Kennel, public or private" means the keeping of more than two (2) dogs and/or two (2) cats
that are more than six (6) months old. A third dog or cat may be allowed if a pet rescue
permit has been approved under section 8.04 .1 30 of this code.
Laboratory, Medical, Dental, Optical: "M edica l, dental and optical laboratory" means a
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laboratory processing on- or off-site orders limited to med ica l testing and precision
fabrication of dental/optical articles wo rn by patients.
"Land use" means the conduct of an activity, or the performance of a fun ction or operation ,
on a site or in a building or facility for the purpose for which the land or building is occupied,
or maintained, arranged, designed or intended .
Land Use Type (S imilar Land Use Type): "Land use types" shall be considered to be similar
land use types if both uses are allowed in the same zoning district or in the same or more
restrictive zoning district within the commercia l zoning category or in the same or more
restrictive district within the manufacturing zoning category and the change from one land
use type to another similar land use type does not increa se the parking req uirement. If the
proposed land use type is a conditional use it wi ll be subject to the conditional use process.
"Landfill" means a municipal , commercia l or construction debris disposal facil ity where solid
waste is placed in or on the land and which is not a land treatment facility. The term
"landfill" does not incl ude facilities where solid waste is applied onto or incorporated into the
soil surface for the purpose of biodegradation .
Landfill, Commercial: "Commercial landfill" means a commercial landfill which receives any
nonhazardous solid waste for disposal. A commercial landfill does not include a landfill that
is solely under contract with a loca l government within the state to dispose of
nonhazardous solid waste generated within the boundari es of th e local governm ent.
Landfill , Construction Debris: "Construction debris landfill" means a landfill that is to receive
only construction/demolition waste, ya rd waste, inert waste or dead animals, but excluding
inert demolition waste used as fill material.
Landfill, End Use Plan: "End use plan landfill" means a plan showing how the site will be
reused/ recl ai med upon co mpletion of landfill activities to allow for the productive and
compatible reuse of the site.
Landfill, Municipal: "Municipa l landfill" means a municipal landfill or a commercial landfill
solely under contract with a local government taking municipa l waste generated within the
boundaries of th e local government.
"Landmark site" means a building or site of histori c importance designated by the city
counci l.
"Landscape area" means that portion of a lot devoted exclusively to landscaping, except
that streets, drives and sidewalks may be located within such area to provide reasonable
access.
"Landscape buffer" means an area of natural or planted vegetation adjoining or surroun ding
a land use and unoccup ied in its entirety by any building, stru ctu re , paving or portion of
such land use, fo r the purposes of screening and softening the effects of th e land use .
"Landscape plan" mea ns th e plan for landscaping required pursuant to part IV, chapter
2 1A.48 of th is titl e.
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"Landscape yard" means that portion of a lot required to be maintained in landscape area.
"Landscaping" means the improvement of a lot, parcel or tract of land with grass, shrubs
and trees. Landscaping may include pedestrian walks, flower beds, ornamental objects
such as fountains, statuary, and other similar natural and artificial objects designed and
arranged to produce an aesthetically pleasing effect.
"Lattice tower" means a self-supporting multiple sided, open steel frame structure used to
support telecommunications equipment.
"Legal conforming" means a status conferred by a provision of this title which shall be
limited to the regulation(s) contained within that provision. Legal conforming status allows
the reconstruction of a destroyed use/structure to its level of use intensity and building bulk
before destruction.
"Limou si ne service" means a use that provides personal vehicular transportation for a fee ,
and operating by appointment only.
"Lodging house" means a residential structure that provides lodging with or without meals,
is available for monthly occupancy only, and which makes no provision for cooking in any
of the rooms occupied by paying guests.
"Lot" means a piece of land identified on a plat of record or in a deed of record of Salt Lake
County and of sufficient area and dimensions to meet district requirements for width, area,
use and coverage, and to provide such yards and open space as are required and has
been approved as a lot through the subdivision process. A lot may consist of combinations
of adjace nt individu al lots and/or portions of lots so recorded; except that no division or
co mbination of any residual lot, portion of lot, or parcel shall be created which does not
meet the requirements of this title and the subdivision regulations of the city.
"Lot area" means the total area within the property lines of the lot plus one-half (1/2) the
right of way area of an adjacent public alley.
Lot Area, Net: "Net lot area" means the area within the property lines of a lot, excluding any
right of way area of an adjacent public alley.
"Lot assemblage" means acquisition of two (2) or more contiguous lots by the same owner
(s) that mayor may not be conso lidated into a si ngle parcel.
Lot, Corner: "Corner lot" means a lot wh ich has two (2) adjacent sides abutting on public
streets, serving more than two (2) lots, provided the interior angle at the intersection of
such two (2) sides is less th an one hundred thirty five degrees (1350).
"Lot depth" means th e mean horizontal distance between the front lot line and the rear lot
line of a lot, measured within the lot boundaries.
Lot, Flag: See definition of Flag Lot.
Lot, Interior: "Interior lot" means a lot other th an a corner lot.
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Lot Line, Corner Side: "Corner side lot line" means any lot line between the front and rear
lot lines which abuts a public street.
Lot Line, Front: "Front lot line" means that boundary of a lot which is along an existing or
dedicated public street, or where no public street exists, is along a public way. On corne r
lots , the property owner shall declare the front lot line and corner side yard line on a
building permit application . In the case of landlocked land , the front lot line shall be the lot
line that faces the access to the lot.
Lot Line, Interior Side: "Interior side lot line" means any lot line between the front and rear
lot lines which does not abut a public street.
Lot Line , Rear: "Rear lot line" means that boundary of a lot which is most distant from , and
is, or is most nearly, parallel to, the front lot line.
Lot, Nonconforming: "Nonconforming lot" means a lot which lawfully existed prior to the
effective date hereof, or any amendment thereto, but which fails to conform to the lot
regulations of the zoning district in which it is located.
"Lot width" means the horizontal distance between the side lot lines measured at the
required front yard setback.
"Lower power radio services facility or wireless telecommunications facility" means an
unmanned structure which consists of equipment used primarily for the transmission ,
reception or transfer of voice or data through radio wave or (wireless) transmissions. Such
sites typically require the construction of transmission support structures to which antenna
equipment is attached. Low power radio services facilities include "cellular" or
"pes" (personal co mmunications system) communications and paging systems.
"Major streets" means th ose streets identified as major streets on city map 19372.
Manufactured Home : See definition of Dwelling , Manufactured Home.
Manufacturing, Heavy: "Heavy manufacturing" means the assembly, fabrication, or
processing of goods and materials using processes that ordinarily have greater than
average impacts on th e environment, or that ordinarily have significant impacts on the use
and enjoyment of adjacent property in terms of noise, smoke, fumes, odors, glare, or health
and safety hazards , or that otherwise do not constitute "light manufacturing". Heavy
manufacturing generally incl udes processing and fabrication of large or bulky products,
products made from extracted or raw materials, or products involving flammable or
explosive materials and processes which require extensive floor areas or land areas for the
fabrication and/o r incidental storage of the products. The term "heavy manufacturing" shall
include uses such as refineries and chemical manufacturing . Th e term "heavy
manufacturing" shall not include any use which is otherwise listed specifically in th e table of
permitted and conditional uses for the category of zon ing district or districts under this title.
Manufacturing, Light: "Light manufacturing" means the assembly, fabrication or processing
of goods and materials using processes that ordinarily do not create noise, smoke, fumes,
odors , glare, or health or safety hazards outside of the building or lot where such assembly,
fabrication or processing takes place or where such processes are housed entirely within a
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building. Light manufacturing generally includes processing and fabrication of finished
products, predominantly from previously prepared materials, and includes processes which
do not require extensive floor areas or land areas. The term "light manufacturing" shall
include uses such as electronic equipment production and printing plants. The term "light
manufacturing" shall not include any use which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of
permitted and conditional uses for the category of zoning district or districts under this title.
"Master plan" means a portion of the long range general plan for Salt Lake City as adopted
by the city council.
"Medical/dental office or clinic" means a facility dedicated exclusively to providing medical ,
dental or similar examination, diagnosis, treatment, care and related healthcare services by
licensed healthcare providers and other healthcare professionals practicing medicine as a
group on persons on an outpatient basis. No portion of the facility may be used to provide
on site inpatient care, overnight care, or twenty four (24) hour operations, unless it is in
compliance with all ordinances applicable to hospitals. Laboratory facilities shall be
accessory only and shall be utilized for on site care.
"Medical nursing school" means a professional school with facilities for teaching and
training individuals for the nursing profession and that awards a degree for individu als who
complete the nursing curriculum.
"Microbrewery" means a brewpub which , in addition to retail sale and consumption on site,
markets beer wholesale in an amount not to exceed sixty thousand (60,000) barrels (31
gallons) per year. Revenue from food sales must constitute at least fifty percent (50%) of
the total business revenues , excluding wholesale and retail carryout sales of beer. (See
sections 6.08.081 through 6.08.089 of this code.)
"Mid block area" means an area of development not deemed to be a block corner.
"Miniwarehouse" means a retail service establishment providing off site storage space to
residents and businesses, offering convenience storage and limited warehousing services
primarily for personal effects and household goods within enclosed structures having
individual access, but exclud ing use as workshops, hobby shops, manufacturing or
comme rci al activity.
"Mobile home" means a transportable, factory built home, designed as a year round
residential dwelling and built prior to June 15, 1976, the effective date of the national
manufactured hou sing construction and safety standards act of 1974. The following are not
included in the mobile home definition:
A. Travel trail ers, motor homes, camp ing trailers, or other recreational vehicles.
B. Manufactured and modular housing designed to be set on a permanent foundation.
"Motel /hotel" means a building or buildings in which lodging units are offered for persons,
for compensation by the day or the week.
"Municipal servi ces " means city or cou nty gove rnment operations and governmental
authorities providing services from specialized facilities, such as police service,
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street/highway department maintenance/co nstruction, fire protection, sewer and water
services, etc. City or county operations and governmental authorities providing services
from nonspecialized facilities shall be considered office uses.
"Museum" means an institution for the acquisition, preservation, study and exhibition of
works of artistic, historical or scientific value and for which any sales relating to such
exhibits are incidental and accessory to the exhibits presented.
"New construction" means on site erection, fabrication or installation of any building,
structure, facility or addition thereto.
"Noncomplying structure" means buildings and structures that serve complying land uses
which were legally established on the effective date of any amendment to this title that
makes the structure not comply with the applicable yard area, height and/or bulk
regulations of this title.
"Nonco nforming lot" means a parcel of land which was legally established on the effective
date of any amendment to this title that made the lot noncomplying that has less lot area,
frontage or dimensions than required in the district in which it is located.
"Nonconforming use" means any building or land legally occupied by a use at the time of
passage of the ordinance codified in this title or amendment thereto which does not
conform after passage of said ordinance or amendment thereto with the use regulations of
the district in which located.
"Nonconformity" means the presence of any nonconforming use or noncomplying structure.
"Nursing care facility" means a healthcare facility , other than a hospital , constructed,
licensed and operated to provide patient living accommodations, twenty four (24) hour staff
availability, and at least two (2) of the following patient services: a) a selection of patient
care services, under the direction and supervision of a registered nurse, ranging from
continuous medical, skilled nursing, psychological or other professional therapies to
intermittent health related or paraprofessional personal care services; b) a structured,
supportive social living environment based on a professionally designed and supervised
treatment plan, oriented to the individual's habilitation or rehabilitation needs; or c) a
supervised living environment that provides support, training or assistance with individual
activities of daily livi ng.
"Obstruction" means a structure or appurtenance to a building that is located or projects
into a req uired yard. Allowed obstructions are listed in section 21A.36.020 of this title.
"Off site" means a lot that is separate from the principal use.
"Off street parking" means parking provided on private or public property, excluding public
rights of way.
"Office use" means a type of business use, which mayor ma y not offer services to the
public, that is engaged in the processing, manipulation or application of business
inform ation or professional expertise. An office use is not materially in vo lved in fabricating ,
assembling or ware housing of physical products for the retail or wholesale market, nor is an
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office engaged in the repair of products or retail services. Examples of professional offices
include accounting, investment services, architecture, engineering, legal services and real
estate services. Unless otherwise specified, office use shall include doctors' and dentists'
offices. Office use shall not include any use or other type of establishment which is
otherwise specifically listed in the table of permitted and conditional uses for the applicable
zoning districts.
"Open space" means any area of a lot which is completely free and unobstructed from any
structure or parking areas. Landscaping, walkways, uncovered patio areas, light poles and
other ornamental features shall not be considered as obstructions for purposes of this
definition. Driveways that provide access to parking lots shall not be considered as an
obstruction subject to the driveways not exceeding twenty percent (20%) of any required
yard area that they provide access through .
"Outdoor sales and display" means the use of open areas of the lot for sales or display of
finished products for sale to the consuming public. Outdoor sales and display shall include
accessory sales/ display areas, such as auto accessory items at a gas station, as well as
principal sales/display areas, such as the sales yard of garden center. Outdoor sales and
display shall not include items sold in bulk quantities (e.g., sand, gravel, lumber),
merchandise inventory not intended for immediate sale, or items not typically sold to the
consuming public (e.g., pallets, construction equipment and supplies, industrial products).
"Outdoor storage" means the use of open areas of the lot for the storage of items used for
nonretail or industrial trade , the storage of merchandise inventory, and the storage of bulk
materials such as sand, gravel, and other building materials. Outdoor storage shall also
include contractors' yards and salvage or recycling areas.
"Outdoor storage, public" means the use of open areas of the lot for the storage of private
personal property including recreational vehicles, automobiles and other personal
equipment. This use category does not include or allow the storage of junk as defined in
section 21AAO.140 of this title.
"Outdoor television monitor" means an outdoor large screen television monitor that displays
material generated and/or produced by an on site television station. The material displayed
shall be the television station's primary broadcast feed or rebroadcast news, sports and/or
public affairs broadcasts, and shall not be in conflict with the federal communication
commission's (FCC) community standards that apply to broadcasts from the television
station between the hours of six o'clock (6:00) A.M. and twelve o'clock (12:00) midnight
(regardless of the time of day that such material is displayed on the outdoor television
monitor). The material displayed must be the television station's primary broadcast feed or
rebroadca st news, sports and/or public affairs broadcasts to the general public (except
between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 6:00 A.M. where daytime programming,
consistent with community standards , may be substituted). Outdoor television monitors
may not be illuminated to a brightness that causes undue glare or interference with
adjacent properties. Sound emanating from the outdoor television monitor may not exceed
Salt Lake City or County health standards.
"Overlay district" means a zoning district pertaining to particular geographic features or land
uses imposing supplemental requirements and standard s in addition to th ose provided in
the base or underlying zoning district. Boundaries of overlay districts are shown on th e
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zoning map or on special maps referenced in the text.
"Parcel" means a continuous area of real property, or lot, which is legally described and
accurately drawn on the plat of such property and recorded with Salt Lake County. See
definition of Lot.
"Park and ride lot" means the use of a lot for parking as an adjunct to mass transit.
Park, Public: "Public park" means a park, playground, swimming pool, golf course or
athletic field within the city which is under operation or management of the city's park
department.
"Park strip" means the landscape area within a public way located between the back of
street curb and the sidewalk, or in the absence of a sidewalk, the right of way line.
"Park strip landscaping" means the improvement of property within the street right of way
situated between the back of curb and the sidewalk or, if there is no sidewalk, the back of
curb and the right of way line, through the addition of plants and other organic and
inorganic materials harmoniously combined to produce an effect appropriate for adjacent
uses and compatible with the neighborhood . Park strip landscaping includes trees and may
also include a combination of lawn, other perennial groundcover, flowering annuals and
perennials, specimen shrubs, and inorganic material.
Parking Facility, Shared: "Shared parking facility" means a parking lot or garage used for
shared parking by two (2) or more businesses or uses.
Parking Garage, Commercial: "Commercial parking garage" means a structure used for
parking or storage of automobiles, generally available to the public, and involving payment
of a charge for such parking or storage. A garage used solely in conjunction with multiplefamily housing or a hotel shall not be construed to be a commercial garage, but rather a
permitted accessory structure and use, even though not on the same premises as the
multiple-family housing or motel/hotel .
Parking, Intensified Reuse: "Intensified reuse parking" means the change of the use of a
building or structure, the past or present use of which mayor may not be legally
nonconforming as to parking , to a use which would require a greater number of parking
stalls available on site which would otherwise be required pursuant to table 21 A.44.060F of
this title. Intensified parking reuse shall not include residential uses in residential zoning
districts other than single room occupancy residential uses and unique residential
populations .
Parking , LeasedAltern ative Parking: "Leased parkingalternative parking" means the lease,
for a period of not less than five (5) years, of parking spaces not required for any other use
and located within five hundred feet (500') measured between a public entrance to the
alternative parking property place of pedestrian egress from the leased parking along the
shortest public pedestrian or ve hicle way, except that in the downtown 0-1 district the
distance to the leased parking may be up to one thousand two hundred feet (1 ,200')
measured between a public entrance to the alternative parking property and a pl ace of
pedestrian egress from the leased parking along the shortest public pedestrian or ve hicle
way.
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"Parking lot" means a paved, open area on a lot used for the parking of more than four (4)
automobiles whether free, for compensation, or as an accommodation for clients and
customers.
Parking, Off Site: "Off site parking" means the use of a lot for required parking that is
separate from the lot of the principal use.
Parking, Off SiteAlternative Parking: "Off site parkingalternative parking" means parking
under the same ownership as the alternative parking property located within five hundred
feet (500') of the alternative parking property, or within the one thousand two hundred feet
(1,200') in a downtown 0-1 district, measured between a public entrance to the alternative
parking property and a place of pedestrian egress from the off site parking along the
shortest public pedestrian or vehicle way, and which parking is not required or dedicated for
another use.
Parking, Shared: "Shared parking" means off street parking facilities on one lot shared by
multiple uses because the total demand for parking spaces is reduced due to the
differences in parking demand for each use during specific periods of the day.
"Parking space" means space within a parking area of certain dimensions as defined in part
IV, chapter 21A.44 of this title, exclusive of access drives, aisles, ramps, columns, for the
storage of one passenger automobile or commercial vehicle under two (2) ton capacity.
Parking StudyAlternative Parking: "Parking studyalternative parking" means a study
prepared by a licensed professional traffic engineer specifically addressing the parking
demand generated by a use for which an alternative parking requirement is sought and
which provides the city information necessary to determine whether the requested
alternative parking requirement will have a material negative impact to adjacent or
neighboring properties and be in the best interests of the city.
"Patio" means a paved surface on an earthen/ stone base that is not more than two feet (2')
above established grade, designed for pedestrian use.
"Pawnshop" means a commercial establishment which lends money at interest in exchange
for valuable personal property left with it as security.
"Pedestrian connection" means a right of way intended for pedestrian movement/activity,
including, but not limited to, sidewalks, internal walkways, external and internal arcades,
and plazas.
"Perennial" means a plant having a life span more than two (2) years.
"Performance standards" means standards which establish certain criteria wh ich must be
met on a site, but allow flexibility as to how those criteria can be met.
"Performing arts production fa cility" means a mixed use facility housing the elements
needed to support a performing arts organization. Such facility should include space for the
design and construction of stage co mponents; costume and prop design and construction,
administrative support, rehearsal space, storage space, and other fun ction s associated
either with an on site or off site live performance theater.
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"Person" means a firm , association, authority, organization, partnership, company or
corporation as we ll as an individual.
"Persons with disabilities" means the city adopts the definition of "disabled" from the
Americans with disabilities act, the rehabilitation act, title 8 of the civil rights act and all
other applicable federa l and state laws.
"Pet cemetery" means a place designated for the burial of a dead animal where burial
rights are sold.
"Philanthropic use" means an office or meeting hall used exclusively by a nonprofit public
service organization.
"Place of worship" means a church, synagogue, temple, mosque or other place of religious
worship, including any accessory use or structure used for religious worship.
"Planned development" means a lot or contiguous lots of a size sufficient to create its own
character where there are multiple principal buildings on a single lot, where not otherwise
authorized by this title, or where not all of the principal buildings have frontage on a public
street. A planned development is controlled by a single landowner or by a group of
landowners in co mmon agreement as to control, to be developed as a single entity, the
character of which is compatible with adjacent parcels and the intent of the zoning district
or districts in which it is located .
"Planning commission" means the planning commission of Salt Lake City, Utah.
"Planning official" means the director of the planning division of the department of
community development, or his/her designee.
"Planting season" means that period during which a particular species of vegetation may be
planted for maximum survivability and healthy growth.
"Plaza" means an open area which is available to the public for walking, seating and eating.
"Precision instrument repair shop" means a shop that provides repair services for industrial ,
comme rcial, research, and similar establishments. Precision instrument repai r does not
include cons umer repair services for individuals and households for items such as watches
or jewelry, household appliances, musical instruments, cameras, and household electronic
equipment.
Prepared Food, Take Out: "Take out prepared food" means a retail sales establishment
which prepare s food for consumptio n off site only.
"Printing plant" means a commercial establis hment which co ntracts with persons for the
printing and binding of written works. The term "printing plant" shall not include a publishing
company or a retai l copy or reproduction shop.
"Pri vate recreational facility" means a golf cou rse, swimming pool, tennis club or other
recreational facility under private control, operation or management which functions as the
pri ncipa l use of the property.
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"Public/private utility buildings and structures" means buildings or structures used in
conjunction with the provision of public or private utilities.
Public Transportation, Employer Sponsored: "Employer sponsored public transportation"
means a program offering free or substantially discounted passes on the Utah transit
authority to employees.
"Publishing company" means a company whose business is the editing and publishing of
works of authors. The term "publishing company" shall not include a printing plant, unless it
is only accessory to the publishing business.
"Railroad freight terminal facility" means a major railroad track yard area for primary use by
railroad employees for regional scale interstate mainline oriented intermodal freight
transfers of: a) multimodal (sea, rail , truck transport) self-contained cargo containers from
train to train, train to semitruck trailer, and semitruck trailer to train loading; and b) for new
motor vehicle train transports to semitruck trailer transports for regional distribution
purposes. No breakdown of self-contained cargo containers occurs at intermodal railroad
freight terminal facilities.
Rear Yard: See definition of Yard, Rear.
"Reception center" means a facility which leases the premises for hosting weddings and
other private events. The term "reception center" shall not include uses whose primary
function is a restaurant or banquet hall.
"Record of survey map" means the map as defined in section 57-8-3(18), Utah Code
Annotated , 1953, as amended, or its successor. (See part V, chapter 21A.56 of this title.)
"Recreation vehicle park" means a business that provides space for livi ng in a recreational
vehicle, (camper, travel trailer or motor home), on a daily or weekly basis. A recreational
vehicle park may include accessory uses such as a convenience store, gasoline pumps
and recreation amenities, such as swimming pools, tennis courts, etc., for the convenience
of persons living in the park.
"Recycling collection station" means a use, often accessory in nature, providing designated
containers for the collection, sorting and temporary storage of recove rable resources (such
as paper, glass, metal and plastic products) until they are transported to separate
processing facilities.
"Recycling co ntainer" means an enclosed or semien closed container used for the
temporary storage of recyclable material s until such materials can be efficiently collected
and processed.
"Recycling processing center" means a facility to temporarily store, sort, recycle, process,
compost or treat materials (such as paper, glass, metal and plastic products) to return them
to a co ndition in which they can be reused for production or transported to another
approved site for permanent storage , landfilling or further processing. Recycling processing
center does not include automobile salvage and recycling.
"Relocatable office building" means a portable structure built temporarily on a chassis or
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skids , and desi gned to be used with or without a permanent foundation for use or
occupancy for any commercial or industrial purpos e when connected to water, power or
utility hooku ps . (See subsection 21AA2 .0701 of this title.)
"Resident healthcare facility" means a facility licensed by the state of Utah which provid es
protected living arrangements for two (2) or more persons who because of minor disabilities
cannot, or choose not to , remain alone in their own home. The faci lity may serve the
elderly, persons with minor mental or physical disabilities, or any other persons who are
ambulatory or mobile and do not require continuous nursing care or services provided by
another category of licensed health facility. The resident healthcare facility shall be
considered the resident's principal place of residence.
"Residential districts" means those districts listed in subsection 21A.22 .01 OA of this title.
Residential Structure: The term "residential structure" for the purposes of the RB zoning
district means a structure that has maintained the original residential exterior without
significant structural modifications. (False facades are not considered a significant
structural modification. )
Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Home, Large: "Large residential substance abuse
treatment home" means a residential facility for seven (7) or more unrelated persons ,
exclusive of staff, and licensed by the state of Utah , that provides twenty four (24) hour staff
supervision and may include a peer support structure to help applicants acquire and
strengthen the social and behavioral skills necessary to live independently in the
community. A large residential substance abuse treatment home provides supervision,
counseling and therapy through a temporary living arrangement and provides specialized
treatment, habilitation or rehabilitation services for persons with alcohol, narcotic drug or
chemical dependencies.
Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Home, Small: "Small residential substance abuse
treatment home" means a residential facility for up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of
staff, and licensed by the state of Utah , that provides twenty four (24) hour staff supervision
and may include a peer support structure to help applicants acquire and strengthen the
social and behavioral skills necessary to live independently in the community. A small
residential substance abuse treatment home provides supervision, counseling and therapy
through a temporary living arrangement and provides specialized treatment, habilitation or
rehabilitation services for persons with alcohol, narcotic drug or chemica l dependencies.
"Restaurant" means a building within which there is served a va riety of hot food for
co nsumption on the premises and where more than sixty percent (60%) of the gross
volume is derived from th e sale of foods served for consumption on the premises.
"Retail goods establishment" means a building , property or activity, th e principal use or
purpose of which is th e sale of physical goods , prod ucts or merchandise directly to the
co nsumer. Retail goods establishment shall not include any use or other type of
establishment whi ch is oth erwise listed specifically in the table of permitted and conditional
uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of th is title for th e category of zoning
district or districts.
"Retail services establi shment" means a building , property or activity, th e principal use or
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purpose of which is the provision of personal services directly to the consumer. The term
"retail services establishment" shall include , but shall not be limited to, barbershops , beauty
parlors, laundry and dry clea ning establishments (plant off premises), tailoring shops, shoe
repair shops and th e like. Retail services establishment shall not include any use or other
type of establishment which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of permitted and
conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of
zoning district or districts.
"Retaining wall" means a wa ll designed to resist the lateral displace ment of soil or other
materials.
"Reve rse vending machine" means a machine designed to pay cash to customers in
exchange for th e deposit of used beverage cans and/or bottles for recycling.
"Rooming house" means a building or group of attached or detached buildings containing in
combination at least three (3) lodg ing units for occupancy on at least a monthly basis , with
or without board, as distinguished from hotels and motels in which rentals are generally for
daily or weekly periods and occupancy is by transients.
"Sanitarium" means a health facility or institution for the inpatient treatment and
recuperation of persons suffering from physical or mental disorders, providing qualified
medical, profe ssional and nursing staff. A sanitarium shall not include facilities for the
criminally insane .
Schools, Professional And Vocational : "Professional and vocational school" means schools
offering occupational and vocational training, the courses of which are not generally
transferable towa rd a bachelor's degree.
Schools, Public Or Private: "Public or private school" means an institution of learning or
instruction primarily catering to minors, whether public or private, which is licensed at such
facility by either the city or the state of Utah. Th e definition includes nursery schools,
kindergarten, elementary schools, junior high schools, middle high schools, senior high
schools or any special institution of learning under the jurisdiction of the state department of
ed ucation, but not including professional and vocational schools, charm schools, dancing
schools, music schools or similar limited schools nor public or private unive rsitie s or
coll eges.
"Seasonal item sales" means items th at are id entified with individual holidays or
celebrations re lating to the four (4) seasons: spring, summer, autumn or winter (such as a
winter festival or harvest festiva l). Such items includ e, but are not limited to, Valentine's
Day or Easter items, Halloween pumpkin, or Christmas tree sales . Ind ependence Day and
Pioneer Day fireworks are govern ed independently in this code. Prepared food is not a
seasonal item, however fresh farm produce, sold within th e intermou ntain region harvest
season, is allowed. Food pertaining to farm ers' markets and farm sales are regulated
separately.
Setback: See defi nition of Yard.
"Sewage treatment plant" means a licensed facility th at purifies san itary sewer effl uent to a
minimum level as established by state and/or federal environmental protection agen cies.
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"Sexually oriented business" means any business for which a sexually oriented business
license is required as an ad ult business, nude entertainment business, or as a seminude
dancing bar, pursuant to the sexuall y oriented business licensing requirements in chaRter
5.61_of this code. (See section 21A.36.140 of this title.)
"Shopping center" means a co ncentration of related commercial establishments with one or
more major anchor tenants, shared parking, and unified architectural and site design. A
shopping center normally has single or coordi nated ownership/ operations/management
control and may include pad site as well as architecturally connected units.
"Shopping center pad site" means a separate parcel of land designated in the shopping
center plan as a building site. The pad site may not be owned by the shopping center
owner.
Side Yard : See definition of Yard, Side.
"Sight distance triangle" means a triangular area formed by a diagonal line connecting two
(2) points located on intersecting right of way lines (or a right of way line and the edge of a
driveway). For both residential driveways and nonresidential driveways, the points shall be
determined through the site plan review process by the development review team. The
purpose of the sight distance triangle is to define an area in which vis ion obstructio ns are
prohibited. (See illustration in section 21A.62 . 0~50 of this chapter.)
Single~ Family

Dwelling: See definition of Dwelling, Single-Family.

"Site development permit" means a permit for earth work or site preparation required
pursuant to chapter 18.28 of this code.
"Site plan" means an accurately scaled plan that ill ustrates the existing cond itions on a land
parcel and the details of a proposed development.
"Sketch plan review" means a preliminary review process administered by the development
review administrator or designee for the purpose of determining the required standard for
front or corner side yard; building height and wa ll height, width and placement of attach ed
garages; and the location , building height and footprint of accessory structures prior to the
formal submittal of plans to obtain a building permit.
"Sludge" means any solid , semisolid or liqu id waste, including grit and screenings
generated from a municipal , commercial or industrial wastewater treatment plant or water
supply treatment plant or air pollution contro l facility or any other such use having similar
characteristics.
"Snow cone and shaved ice hut" means a temporary building designed to accommodate
the sales of flavored ice onl y.
"Socia l service mission" means an establishment that provides social services other than
on site housing faciliti es.
"Solid waste transfer station" means a facility used to combine and compact loads of solid
waste into larger units of waste, which are then loaded onto trucks for delivery to landfill
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sites.
"Special purpose districts" means zoning districts which require regulations that address
special types of land uses, such as the airport or institutional uses .
"Spot zoning" means the process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use
classification materially different and inconsistent with the surrounding area and the
adopted city master plan, for the sole benefit of the owner of that property and to the
detriment of the rights of other property owners.
"Stable, private" means a detached building for the keeping of horses owned by the
occupants of the premises and not kept for remuneration, hire or sale.
"Stable, public" means a building or land where animals are kept for remuneration, hire ,
sale, boarding, riding or show.
"Store, conventional department" means a retail business which offers a broad range of
merchandise lines at moderate level price points, consisting of primarily apparel and home
goods. No merchandise line predominates and goods are displayed in a departmentalized
format. Customer assistance is provided in each department, but checkout facilities can be
either departmentalized or centralized. These stores are typically over one hundred
thousand (100,000) square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to , Kohls, J.C.
Penney and Mervyn's, as such stores are typically configured as of January 13, 2004.
"Store, fashion oriented department" means a retail business which offers more specialized
lines of merchandise than conventional department stores, with an emphasis on apparel
merchandise. The merchandise is displayed in separate departments, with over forty
percent (40%) of sales area devoted to the sale of apparel, shoes, cosmetics and
accessories related to personal care and appearance. Fashion oriented department stores
sell goods which are primarily nationally advertised brands, they may sell appliances which
are usually serviced by other companies, and often offer limited lines of merchandise
through seasonal or special catalogs. These stores provide checkout service and customer
assistance (salespersons) within each department. These stores are typically over one
hundred thousand (100,000) square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to,
Meier & Frank, Bloomingdales, Macy's, Dillards, Marshall Fields, Bon Marche, Broadway,
Broadway Southwest, Robinsons/May, as such stores are typically configured as of
January 13, 2004.
"Store, mass merchandising" means a retail business selling a variety of merchandise,
including apparel and home goods, at generally lower price points. Mass merchandising
stores have fast turnove r and high volume retailing with centralized checkout stations.
Generally, shopping carts are available to customers and there is reduced customer
assistance within each department but customer assistance may occur in departments for
special promotions or where appropriate for product demonstration, legal compliance or
security purposes. These stores typically exceed eighty thousand (80,000) square feet in
size. Examples include, but are not limited to, Wal-Mart, K-Mart, Target, Fred Meyer and
ShopKo, as such stores are typica ll y config ured as of January 13, 2004.
"Store, specialty" means a retail business specializing in a broad range of a single category
of goods at competitive prices. The categories usually included are home improvement,
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consumer music and electronics, office supply, auto aftermarket, computers, toys, books,
home/bed/bath, pet supply, craft! hobby, or sporting goods. They often have departments,
centralized and/or exit checkout stations and operate in various physical formats. These
stores typically range from twenty thousand (20,000) to one hundred thousand (100 ,000)
square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to, The Home Depot, OfficeMax,
Toys 'R' Us, PetsMart, Michaels, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Borders Books, Barnes & Noble,
Circuit City, Galyan's, Sports Authority, Pep Boys , and CompUSA, as such stores are
typica lly configured as of January 13, 2004.
"Store, specialty fashion department" means a retail business which specializes in high end
merchandise in the categories of apparel, fashion accessories, jewelry, and limited items
for the home and housewares. These stores feature exclusive offerings of merchandise ,
high leve ls of customer service and amenities, and higher price points. Specialty fashion
department stores provide checkout service and customer assistance (salespersons) within
each department and often offer specialized customer services such as valet parking,
exclusive dressing rooms and personal shoppers. These stores typically range from eighty
thousand (80,000) to one hundred thirty thousand (130,000) square feet in size. Exa mples
include, but are not limited to, Lord & Taylor, Neiman Marcus, Nordstrom, Saks Fifth
Avenue, as such stores are typically configured as of January 13, 2004.
"Store, superstore and hypermarket" means a retail business primarily engaged in retailing
a general line of groceries in combination with general lines of new merchandise, such as
apparel, furniture, and appliances, sold at discount prices. They have centralized exit
checkout stations, and utilize shopping carts for customers. These stores typically range
from one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) to one hundred eighty thousand (180,000)
square feet in size. Exa mples include, but are not limited to , Wal-Mart Supercenter,
Meijer's, Fred Meyer (with grocery) and Super Target, as such stores are typically
configured as of January 13, 2004.
"Store, warehouse club" means a retail business requiring patron membership, and selling
packaged and bulk foods and general merchandise. They are characterized by high volume
and a restricted line of popular merchandise in a no frills environment. They have
centralized exit checkout stations, and utilize shopping carts for customers. These stores
typically range from one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) to one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) square feet in size. Exa mples include, but are not limited to, BJ's Wholesale
Club, Costeo, and Sam's Club, as such stores are typically configured as of January 13,
2004.
"Story (floor)" means the vertical distance between the finished floor of one level and th e
finished floor of the level above or below.
Story, Half: "H al f story" means the portion of a building which co ntains habitable living
space with in the roof structure of a shed, hip or gable roof. The portion of a building which
co ntains habitable living space within the roof structure of a mansard, gambrel or fl at roof
co nstitutes one full story, not one-half (1 /2 ) story.
"Street" means a ve hicul arway which may also serve for all or part of its width as a way for
pedestrian traffic, whethe r ca lled street, highway, thoroughfare , parkway, throughway, road,
avenue, boulevard, lane, place, alley, mall or otherwise designated.
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"Street frontage" means all of the property fronting on one side of the street between
intersecting streets, or between a street and a waterway, a dead end street, or a political
subdivision boundary, and having unrestricted vehicular and pedestrian access to the
street. For the purpose of regulating signs or flags, "street frontage" means an entire lot
fronting on a portion of the street.
"Street trees" means trees located in the landscape area within a public way located
between the back of the street curb and the sidewalk, or in absence of the sidewalk, the
right of way line.
"Structural alteration" means any change in the supporting members of a structure , such as
foundations, bearing walls or bearing partitions, columns, beams or girder, or any
substantial change in the roof.
"Structure" means anything constructed or erected with a fixed location on the ground or
inlover the water bodies in the city. Structure includes, but is not limited to, buildings,
fences, walls, signs, and piers and docks, along with any objects permanently attached to
the structure.
Structure, Accessory: See definition of Accessory building or structure.
"Subdivision" means any land that is divided, resubdivided or proposed to be divided into
two (2) or more lots, parcels, sites, units, plots, or other division of land for the purpose,
whether immediate or future, for offer, sale, lease, or development either on the installment
plan or upon any and all other plans, terms, and conditions.
TV Antenna: See definition of Antenna, TV.
"Tavern" means any business establishment engaged primarily in the retail sale or
distribution of beer to public patrons for consumption on the establishment's premises, and
that includes beer bars, parlors, lounges , cabarets and nightclubs.
"Temporary use" means a use intended for limited duration as defined for each type of
temporary use in part IV, chapter 21A.42 of this title.
"Testing laboratory" means a use engaged in determining the physical qualities of
construction, medical or manufactured materials. This use does not include research
laboratories engaged in scientific experimentation.
Transitional Treatment Home, Large: "Large tran sitional treatm ent home" means a
residential facility for seven (7) or more unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed
by the state of Utah , that provides twenty four (24) hour staff supervision and a peer
support structure to help applicants acquire and strengthen the social and behavioral skills
necessary to live independently in th e community. Such programs provide supervision,
counse ling and therapy through a temporary living arrangement and provide specialized
treatment, habilitation or rehabilitation services for persons with emotional , psychological,
developmental, behavioral dysfunctions or impairments. A large transitional treatment
home shall not include any persons referred by th e Utah state department of corrections.
Transitional Treatment Home, Small: "Small transitional treatment home" means a
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residential facility for up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed by the
state of Utah , that provides twenty four (24) hour staff supervision and a peer support
structure to help applicants acquire and strengthen the social and behavioral skills
necessary to live independently in the community. Such programs provide supervision,
counseling and therapy through a temporary living arrangement and provide specialized
treatment, habilitation or rehabilitation services for persons with emotional, psychological ,
developmental, behavioral dysfunctions or impairments. A small transitional treatment
home shall not include any persons referred by the Utah state department of corrections.
Transitional Victim Home, Large: "Large transitional victim home" means a residential
facility for seven (7) or more unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed by the state
of Utah as a residential support facility. A large transitional victim home provides twenty
four (24) hour care and peer support to help victims of abuse or crime. A large transitional
victim home arranges for or provides the necessities of life and protective services to
individuals or families who are experiencing a temporary dislocation or emergency which
prevents them from providing these services for themselves or for their families. Treatment
is not a necessary component of residential support services, however, care shall be made
available on request.
Transitional Victim Home, Small: "Small transitional victim home" means a residential
facility for up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed by the state of
Utah as a residential support facility. A small transitional victim home provides twenty four
(24) hour care and peer support to help victims of abuse or crime. A small transitional
victim home arranges for or provides the necessities of life and protective services to
individuals or families who are experiencing a temporary dislocation or emergency which
prevents them from providing these services for themselves or for their families. Treatment
is not a necessary component of residential support services, however, care shall be made
available on request.
"Trellis" means a frame of latticework designed to support plants.
Truck Repair, Large: "Large truck repair" means a use engaged in the repair of trucks that
are in excess of one ton in size.
Two-Family Dwe lling: See definition of Dwelling , Two-Family.
"Undevelopable area" means the portion of a lot that is unusable for or not adaptable to the
normal uses made of the property, which may include areas covered by water, areas that
are excessively steep, included in certain types of easements , or otherwise not suitable for
development, including areas designated on a plat as undevelopable.
"Unique resid ential population" means occupants of a residential facility who are unlikely to
drive automobiles requiring parking spaces for reasons such as age, or physical or mental
disabilities.
"Unit" means the physical elements or space or time period of a condominium project whic h
are to be owned or used sepa rately , and excludes common areas and fa cilities as defined
in section 57-8-3, Utah Code Annotated , 1953, as amended, or its successor. (See part V,
chapter 21A.56 of this titl e.)
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"Unit legalizationdimensional zoning violations" means the violations of the city's zoning
code related to side yards, rear yards, front yard setbacks, lot area and width, usable open
space, building height and other violations.
"Unit legalization implied permit" means a permit for construction which either specifically is
for the construction of a particular number of units in excess of what should have been
allowed or which references that the structure has a number of units in excess of what
should have been allowed or the city's continuous issuance of an apartment business
revenue license for a number of units in excess of what should have been allowed.
"Unit legalizationnondimensional zoning violations" means violations not related to
dimensional zoning violations, including the existence of illegal signs, front and side yard
parking, hard surface driveways, fences, accessory buildings and similar such violations.
"Unit legalization permit" means a permit issued for construction by the city.
"Unit legalizationsubstantial compliance with life and safety codes" means all units, and the
building in which they are located, are constructed and maintained in such a manner that
they are not an imminent threat to the life, safety or health of the occupants or the public.
"Upholstery shop" means a business specializing in the upholstery of furniture for individual
customers for residential, office or business use, but excluding upholstery for automobile
use .
Use, Principal: "Principal use" means the main use of land and/or buildings on a lot as
distinguished from an accessory use.
Use, Unique Nonresidential: "Unique nonresidential use" means the nonresidential use of a
building resulting in a documented need for fewer parking stalls than would otherwise be
required by chapter 21AA4 of this title, due to the building's particular design, size, use, or
other factors and unique characteristics.
"Used or occupied" include the words intended, designed or arranged to be used or
occupied .
"Vacant lot" means a lot in an established area or neighborhood which at the present time
contains no structures or other aboveground improvements. In new residential
subdivisions, lots which contain no structures or other aboveground improvements shall be
considered vacant, as opposed to undeveloped land , when ninety percent (90%) or more of
the total number of lots in the subdivision have been built upon and the remaining lots are
scattered throughout the subdivision.
"Van pool" means a mode of transportation where two (2) or more persons share a ride in a
va n to or from work.
Vanpool, Employe r Sponsored : "Employer sponsored vanpool" means a program offered
by a business or in conjunction with the Utah transit authority to provide a multipassenger
va n for employee tran sportation.
"Va riance" mea ns a reasonable deviation from those provis ions regulating the size or area

http ://66.11 3. 195.234/UT/Sa1t%20Lake%20CityI18033000000004000 .htm

8/29/2007

21 A.62.040 D efi niti ons:

Page 38 of39

of a lot or parcel of land , or the size, area, bulk or location of a building or structure under
this title and authorized according to the procedures set forth in part II, chapter 21 A.18 of
this title.
"Vegetation" means living plant material including, but not limited to, trees, shrubs, flowers,
grasses, herbs and groundcover.
"Vending cart" includes any non motorized mobile device or pushcart from which limited
typ es of products, as listed in title 5, chapter 5.65 of this code, are sold or offered for sale
directly to any consumer, where the point of sale is conducted at the cart, where the
duration of the sale is longer than fourteen (14) days and where the vending cart meets the
requirem ents of title 5, chapter 5.65 of this code for the conducting of business in a
specified permit operating area approved by the city.
"Vertical clearance" means clear space between floor grade level and ceiling height.
Veterinary Office, Large: "Large veterinary office" means a veterinary facility that serves
large animals, either wild or domesticated, such as sheep, goats, cows, pigs, horses ,
llamas, wildcats, bears or other similarly sized animals.
Veterinary Office, Small: "Small veterinary office" means a veterinary facility that serves
only small animals such as dogs, cats, birds, rabbits, reptiles, rodents and other similarly
sized animals.
"Warehouse" means a structure, or part thereof, or area used principally for the storage of
goods and merchandise.
"Waterbody/waterway" means a natural or manmade body of water such as a lake, river,

creek, stream, canal, or other channel over which water flows at least periodically.
"Wholesale distributors" means a business that maintains an inventory of materials,
supplies and goods related to one or more industries and sells bulk quantities of materials,
supplies and goods from its inventory to companies within the industry. A wholesale
distributor is not a retail goods establishment.
"Yard" means on the same zoni ng lot with a use, building or structure, an open space
which is unoccupied and unobstructed from its ground level to the sky, except as otherwise
permitted herein . A yard extends along a lot line, and to a depth or width specified in the
yard requirements for the zoning district in which such zoning lot is located.
Yard , Corner Side: "Corner side ya rd" means a yard on a corner lot extending between
front yard setback line and the rear lot line and between the corner side lot line and the
required corner side ya rd setback line.
Yard, Front: "F ront ya rd" means a ya rd extending between side lot lin es and between the
front lot line and the required front yard setback lin e.
Yard, Interior Side : "Interior side ya rd" means a ya rd extending between the front and rear
ya rd setback lines and between the interior side lot line and the required interior side yard
setback line.
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Yard, Rear: "Rear yard" means a yard extending between the two (2) interior side lot lines
from the rear lot line to the required rear yard setback line. In the case of corner lots, the
rear yard shall extend from the interior side lot line to the front yard or corner side yard
setback line.
Yard, Side: See definition of Yard, Interior Side.
"Zoning administrator" means the director of the division of building services and licensing
of the department of community development or such person as the zoning administrator
shall designate.
"Zoning districts" means areas of the city designated in the text of this title in which
requirements and standards for the use of land and buildings are prescribed.
Zoning Lot: See definition of Lot.
"Zoning map" means a map or series of maps delineating the boundaries of all zoning
districts and overlay districts in the city. (Ord. 68-06 § 1,2006: Ord. 52-06 § 2, 2006: Ord.
20-06 § 1,2006: Ord. 13-06 § 1,2006: Ord. 90-05 § 2 (Exh. B), 2005: Ord. 89-05 § 9,
2005: Ord. 77-05 § 1, 2005: Ord. 76-05 § 10,2005: Ord. 15-05 §§ 3, 4, 2005: Ord. 72-04 §
2,2004: Ord. 6-04 § 20, 2004: Ord. 4-04 §§ 6,7,2004: Ord. 62-03 § 3, 2003: Ord. 61-03 §
3,2003: Ord. 6-03 § 4,2003: Ord. 50-02 § 2, 2002: Ord. 23-02 § 8, 2002: Ord. 5-02 § 4,
2002: Ord. 2-02 § 2, 2002: Ord. 84-01 § 2, 2001: Ord. 64-01 § 4, 2001: Ord. 20-01 § 4,
2001: Ord. 54-00 § 3, 2000: Ord. 20-00 §§ 4,5,2000: Ord. 14-00 §§ 16-18, 2000: Ord. 3599 § 102,1999: Ord. 30-98 § 7,1998: Ord. 12-98 § 8,1998: Ord. 8-97 § 3,1997: amended
during 5/96 supplement: Ord. 88-95 § 1 (Exh. A), 1995: Ord. 84-95 § 1 (Exh. A), 1995: Ord.
26-95 § 2(3 1-4),1995)
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21 A.16.01 0 Authority:
As described in section 21 A.06.040 of this part, the board of adjustment should hear and
decide appeals alleging an error in any administrative decision made by the zoning
administrator or the administrative hearing officer in the administration or enforcement of this
title. (Ord. 90-05 § 2 (Exh. B), 2005: Ord. 26-95 § 2(8-1), 1995)
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21A.16.020 Parties Entitled To Appeal:
An applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision administering or
interpreting this title may appeal to the board of adjustment. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(8-2), 1995)
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21A.16.030 Procedure:
Appeals of administrative decisions to the board of adjustment shall be taken in accordance
with the following procedures:
A. Notice Of Appeal: Notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the administrative
decision . The appeal shall be filed with the zoning administrator and shall specify the
decision appealed and the reasons the appellant claims the decision to be in error.
B. Fees: Nonrefundable application and hearing fees established pursuant to the fee schedule
shall accompany the notice of appeal.
C. Stay Of Proceeding: 'An appeal to the board of adjustment shall stay all further
proceedings conce rning the matter about which the appealed order, requirement, decision ,
determination or interpretation was made unless the zoning administrator certifies in writing
to the board of adjustment, after the notice of appeal has been filed, that a stay would, in
th e zoni ng administrator's opinion , be agai nst the best interest of the city.
D. Public HearingNotice: Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board of adjustment shall
give notice and hold a public hearing in accordance with the requirements of chaQter
21 A.1 0 of this part.
E. Action By The Board Of Adjustment: Following the hearing, the board of adjustment shall
render its decision on the appeal. Such decision may reverse or affirm, wholly or in part, or
may modify the administrative decision. The board of adjustment may reve rse or materially
modify the zoning administrator's or the administrative hea ring officer's decision only if at
least three (3) members of the board of adjustment vote in favor of such an action. A
decision by the board of adjustment shall become effective the date th e vote is taken.
F. Notification Of Decision: Notification of the decision of the board of adjustment shall be
sent by mail to all parties of the proceed ing within ten (10) days of th e board of
adjustment's decision. (Ord. 90-05, 2005: Ord. 26-95 § 2(8-3), 1995)
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21A.16.040 Appeal Of Decision:
Any person adversely affected by any decision of the board of adjustment may. with in thirty
(30) days after the decision is made, present to the district court a petition specifying the
grounds on which the person was adversely affected. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(8-4),1995)
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21 A.1 6.050 Stay Of Decision:
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21A.16.050 Stay Of Decision:
By a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote at the time of any decision, the board of adjustment may
stay th e issuance of any permits or approvals based on its decision for thirty (30) days or until
the decision of the district court in any appeal of the decision. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(8-5), 1995)
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